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ABSTRACT. 
Visual and Verbal Processin3_in Reasonin_q_, 
_! 
2y_E,.. G. Brooks. 
This programme of research, involving seven 
experiments, investigates Evans' (1980a; 1980b) revised version 
of the Dual Process theory of reasoning (Wason and Evans, 
1975). A Type 2 process is characterised as verbal-rational and 
a Type I process as non-verbal and non-logical. Evans links the 
processes to two statistical components of observed reasoning 
performance. The Type I process reflects non-logical response 
biases and the Type 2 process reflects attention to the logical 
nature of the task. 
Six experiments employ a concurrent articulation 
(with or without a short-term memory load) methodology devised 
by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) for investigating their Working 
Memory model. Four experiments apply this technique to 
conditional reasoning tasks in an attempt to disrupt the verbal 
Type 2 process. 
Some weak evidence for the revised Dual Process 
theory is found. There is a tendency, marked in only one 
experiment, for concurrent articulation to inhibit logical 
performance, whilst having little effect on response biases. 
Unexpectedly, articulation conditions (without memory load) are 
characterised by faster responding than silent conditions. 
The results are inconsistent with Hitch and 
Baddeley's (1976) data and several features of their Working 
Memory model. Two further experiments repeat and extend their 
work. A number of important theoretical implications are 
discussed in the light of recent revisions to their theory (eg. 
Baddeley, 1983). 
A possible connection is drawn between Type I and 
Type 2 processes and dual memory codes (Paivio, 1971; 1983) and 
thought systems (Paivio, 1975) of a verbal and visual nature. 
The hypothesis that Type I processes may be associated with 
visual mechanisms is tested by introducing a factor into three 
experiments to induce use of a visual code. This does not 
affect the Type 1 process but facilitates lo3ical performance. 
These results are discussed in relation to the revised Dual 
Process theory. An explanation in terms of a recent tricoding 
model for processing of pictures and words (Snodgrass, 1980; 
1984) is suggested. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
There are many di++erent routes to the study o+ human 
psychology. The cognitive approach can be distinguished +rom 
others quite readily. Cognitive Psychology can be de+ined as 
"the scientific analysis of human mental processes and memory 
structures in order to understand human behaviour" (Mayer, 
1981, pl). Whilst Behaviourists banished the notion of mental 
experience or of any unobservable events in their explanations 
of behaviour, the cognitive approach places emphasis on the 
analysis of mechanisms underlying behaviour in order to explain 
that behaviour. However, cognitive processes should only be 
postulated if they can lead to testable predictions about 
observable behaviour. 
Cognitive psychology adopts an in+ormation processing 
model in its approach to understanding behaviour. In this model 
the human be i ng isvi ewed as a processor of information 
somewhat analogous to a computer. Input information enters 
through the senses and a number of mental operations are 
performed on it, thus changing it, until an output is 
generated. The information processing model is concerned with 
the cognitive operations, such as coding, storing, retrieving 
and transf orming input information, which are employed in any 
given situation. Testable predictions about the latency or 
nature of responding to particular kinds of input are made 
according to the specific operations which are postulated 
during the processing stages. 
This thesis adopts a cognitive approach to the study 
of thinking. Whilst Behaviourists may conceive of thinking as 
subvocal speech (eq. Watson, 1930), it is viewed by cognitive 
ý3 
psychologists as a form o+ in+ormation processing which 
mediates between stimulus and response. In the present case, 
the main -focus o+ attention will be on that aspect o+ thinking 
known as reasoning, mainly conditional reasoning. Until 
recently this field has been somewhat isolated from many of the 
mainstream issues of concern in cognitive psychology. In the 
study of conditional reasoning considerable attention has been 
paid to the role o+ logic and the implications 0+ reasoning 
research for rationalistic explanations of behaviour. Although 
these are interesting matters, the present research focus will 
lie elsewhere. 
In the psychology of thinking dichotomies seem to 
abound. As Neisser (1963) observes, thought processes have been 
divided into two or more sorts by several distinguished 
theorists. Examples include the distinctions between: 
productive and blind, creative and constrained, autistic and 
realistic, primary process and secondary process, intuitive and 
rational, and multiple and sequential thought. Since Neisser's 
article, further dichotomies have arisen, for example between 
visual and verbal thought processes (eq. Paivio, 1975). The 
present research investigates the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying reasoning performance. It is mainly concerned with 
the experimental investigation of the Dual Process theory of 
reasoning (Wason and Evans, 1975; Evans and Wason, 1976). In a 
revised +orm, (Evans, 1980a; 1980b), it postulates reasoning 
processes of a verbal and non-verbal nature. These processes 
are linked to two orthoc3onal statistical components which 
account for performance on conditional reasoning tasks. 
In order to assess the revised Dual Process theory o+ 
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reasoning, the research reported here employs competing task 
methodology. As we shall see, such techniques are regularly 
used in cognitive psychology although they are not without 
critics. In essence the idea is that if two tasks require the 
use of a common mechanism then they will compete for its use., 
with consequent interference. In the present context, if a 
concurrent verbal task is performed by a subject engaged in 
conditional reasoning then we might expect the interference to 
be restricted to the verbal process leaving the non-verbal 
process relatively undisturbed. This kind of selective 
interference should be ref lected in the performanr_e data if the 
revised Dual Process theory is correct. 
However, this project is also concerned with matters 
of relevance to the study of memory, imagery and more general 
cognitive theory. Reasoning is a complex, high-level cognitive 
process. It necessitates interaction between many lower-level 
processes involved in the comprehension, representation and 
manipulation of symbolic information in a working memory 
system. The exact nature of those processes and the 
representations on which they operate is of considerable 
interest in cognitive psychology. Also of interest is the 
current, unresolved debate between theorists who postulate a 
functional role for mental imagery in cognition and those who 
view imagery as an epiphenomenon resulting from a more abstract 
propositional representation. In this thesis an attempt is made 
to narrow the gap between research on reasoning and research on 
issues of more general interest. 
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The Laj2! -t. L-2f-this 
Thesis. 
This thesis is divided into three major sections. 
Section One contains three Chapters which review various 
theoretical areas of particular relevance to the project. 
Chapter I concentrates on the general issues and paradigms 
involved in conditional reasoning research and introduces the 
Dual Process theory of reasoning. Chapter 2 relates this theory 
to other research concerning the nature of coding processes in 
high-level cognition. In Chapter 3 theoretical and 
methodological issues are considered and a current theory of 
Working Memory is introduced. Section Two contains three 
chapters describing seven original experiments. Section Three 
contains two chapters which discuss the interpretation of the 
experiments in the light of the Dual Process theory and other 
literature considered in the review. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONDITIONAL REASONING. 
This chapter will survey the psychological literature 
concerning conditional reasoning. In order to assist our 
understanding of this literature, a brief description of 
relevant aspects of the propositional calculus of logic will be 
given initially. Following this a number of- experimental 
paradigms which have been used to study conditional reasoning 
will be outlined and several psychological studies which have 
utilised each of these will be reviewed. Theoretical approaches 
to the study of reasoning will be considered and one particular 
approach, arising from this research, which postulates dual 
thought processes in reasoning will be evaluated. Finally, 
recent modifications to this theory characterising discrete 
verbal and non-verbal thought processes will be described. 
PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC AND CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 
Logic is defined by Copi (1982, p3) as "the study of 
the methods and principles used to distinguish good (correct) 
from bad (incorrect) reasoning". He distinguishes this from 
'the science of reasoning' which is part of the psychologists' 
doma, in. Reasoning is a particular sort of thinking in which 
inference takes place. Copi (1982, p5) defines inference' as 
"a process by which one proposition is arrived at and af+irmed 
on the basis of one or more other propositions accepted as the 
starting point o+ the process". The validity (or correctness) 
of an inference is determined by examinin(3 the logical 
relationships between the propositions at the start and end 
points of the inference process. A proposition is either true 
or false. Unlike questions, commands and exclamations, only 
propositions can be affirmed or denied, or judged to be either 
true or false. 
A conditional sentence of the form 'If it is red 
then it is a triangle' asserts a relationship between two 
propositions. One proposition ('it is red') is contained in 
the antecedent clause of the sentence, whilst the other ('it is 
a triangle') is contained in the consequent clause. 
When considering propositional arguments, it is often 
convenient to strip sentences of their particular content in 
order to lay bare their logical form. When this is done it is 
conventional to substitute single letters (eq. p, q, r) for 
particular propositions. Consider the particular sentence: 'If 
it is red then it is a triangle'. The antecedent proposition 
can be replaced by the letter 7p' and the consequent 
proposition by the letter 'q'. We are then left with the 
conditional assertion: 'I+ p then q'. Any logical inference 
derived from this argument will be valid (ie. consistent with 
the laws of logic) no matter what particular content is 
substituted for the propositions 'p' and 'q'. 
In standard logic the principle of bivalence is 
assumed and thus propositions are either true or false. In this 
system the +undamental operation o+ negation always reverses 
truth value. Thus i+ the proposition 'P1 is true, then its 
negation 'not p' is +alse. The converse o+ this argument also 
holds such that i+ 'p' is +alse then 'not p' is true. In actual 
usac3e, however, the principle of bivalence may be considered 
inadequate and, as will be illustrated later, a third truth 
value of 'irrelevant' or 'indeterminate' is required. 
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In standard loc3ic, an analysis of the sentence 'If p 
then will reveal that four possible continc3encies can be 
defined depending upon the combinations of truth value of the 
two propositions. This is illustrated below in Table 1.1 . 
Proposition Truth Table Case 
p q Notation 
True True TT 
True False TF 
False True FT 
False False FF 
Table 1.1 . The four possible combinations of truth value of 
two propositions used in standard logic and their notation. 
In order to assess the validity of arguments arising 
from a conditional rule, it is essential to assign a truth 
value to each of the four truth table cases that can be derived 
from it. Unfortunately the interpretation of a conditional 
sentence is not entirely clear-cut and four possible truth 
tables have been assigned to it. Which of these is deemed 
appropriate for a linguistic circumstance will depend upon the 
particular content of the propositions and upon the context in 
which the conditional is used. 
Logicians have distinguished Material Implication and 
Material Equivalence relationships. In the former relation, p 
implies q which means that p could never be observed without q. 
The relationship is false when p is true and q is false, and is 
true otherwise. The Material Equivalence (or bi-conditional) 
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relatior)ship means that p implies q and also the converse, q 
implies p. Therefore the relationship will be true when both p 
and q are true or when both p and q are false, otherwise the 
relationship is false. The truth tables for Material 
Implication and Material Equivalence are shown in Table 1.2 . 
Truth Value Truth Value Truth Value of 'If p then q'. 
of p of q M. I. M. E. 
True True True True 
True False False False 
False True True False 
False False True True 
Table 1.2 . Truth Tables showing Material Implication (M. I. ) 
and Material Equivalence (M. E. ) for the rule 'If p then q'. 
Although logicians often use statements such as 'If p 
then q' to denote implication, various other linguistic 
possibilities exist for this relation. Amongst these are 'q if 
pl, 'whenever p then q', 'never p without q'. Although formally 
equivalent to each other, these may well entail very different 
psychological interpretations. Logicians suggest that the 
sentence 'If p and only if p then q' should be used to denote 
material equivalence. However, in common usage, the abbreviated 
form 'If p then q' is usual in both circumstances and semantic 
factors are used to aid precise interpretation. For instance it 
is obvious that the sentence 'If it is a dog then it is a 
mammal, does not entail its converse. A mammal may be a dog, a 
human or any other animal that suckles its young. However, in 
10 
some circumstances, 
seem appropriate. 
person has an XY 
seem to suggest that 
an XY chromosone'. 
'If you mow the lawn 
the converse form of a conditional does 
For instance, the definitional rule 'If a 
chromosone then that person is male' would 
'If a person is male then that person has 
With conditional promises and threats (eq. 
then I'll give you five pounds') an 
equivalence is often assumed. 
It has been argued by Kneale and Kneale (1962) that 
in conditional sentences where the antecedent is false, they 
have no application and, as a result, no truth value is 
appropriate. This interpretation is known as Defective 
Implication and goes beyond standard logic's principle of 
bivalence in that a third category of 'irrelevant' is required 
in the truth table. A truth table for Defective Equivalence can 
also be derived in which the FF case is considered 
'irrelevant'. These defective truth tables are shown in Table 
1.3 Some experiments which apparently support defective 
interpretations of conditionals will be reviewed later. 
Truth Value Truth Value Truth Value of 'If p then q'. 
of p 0+ q D. I. D. E. 
True True True True 
True False False False 
False True Irrelevant False 
False False Irrelevant Irrelevant 
Table 1.3 Truth Tables showing Defective Implication (D. I. ) 
and Defective Equivalence (D. E. ) for the rule 'If p then q'. 
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It should be pointed out that for all four truth 
tables of the rule 'If p then q' the rule is true when both the 
antecedent and consequent are true (TT case). Also the rule is 
considered false in all cases when the antecedent is true and 
the consequent is false (TF case). In other circumstances the 
truth value of the rule is seen to be equivocal. 
A number of inferences can -be drawn from a 
conditional rule such as 'If p then q'. These are shown in 
Table 1.4. 
In+erences drawn +rom Validity 
"I+ p then q" Given Conclude I. E. 
Modus Ponens (MP) p q VV 
Denial o+ the Antecedent (DA) Not p Not q FV 
A++irmation of the Consequent (AC) q p FV 
Modus Tollens (MT) No tq Not p VV 
Table 1.4 Inferences which can be drawn from the rule 'If p 
then q' together with their validity under Implication (I. ) and 
Equivalence (E. ). (V = Valid, F= Fallacious). 
Under either an Implication or an Equivalence truth 
table the inferences known as Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens 
are shown to be valid. Modus Ponens infers 'q' given 'p'. Modus 
Tollens infers 'not p' given 'not q'. Both of these inferences 
depend upon the +act that the TF truth table case is prohibited 
(see Table 1.2) and thus 'p' and 'not qI cannot occur together 
if the conditional is true. 
Under the truth table +or Equivalence, the FT case 
I- 
is also prohibited (see Table 1.2) and hence 'q' and 'not pi 
are also not permitted to occur together given the true 
conditional "I+ p then q". Hence the inferences known as Denial 
of the Antecedent (DA) and Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) 
are also valid under an Equivalence truth table. Thus c3iven 
'not p', 'not ql is inferred by DA. A1 so given 
7 
q', 
7pI is 
inferred by AC. 
However under the truth table for implication the DA 
and AC inferences are shown to be fallacious. This is because 
a conditional denoting Implication states that 'q' must be true 
when 'P' is true. It does not state that 'q' cannot also be 
true when 'p' is false. Since the validity of the inferences 
is determined from the false truth table cases, they are 
unaffected by whether or not the truth table is defective. 
So far we have only considered expressions with 
af+irmative constituents. Obviously expressions can be derived 
which incorporate negative antecedents and consequents. A 
convenient notation will be adopted by referring to rules as 
AA, AN, NA or NN. These notations describe four possible 
combinations of affirmative and negative antecedents and 
consequents in the conditional sentences which are shown below 
in Table 1.5 . 
Several experiments have manipulated the presence of 
negatives in conditional rules. On occasion these experiments 
have yielded data which have been of considerable theoretical 
interest. Some o+ these will be considered in the next section 
o+ this chapter. 
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Rule Notation 
If p then q. AA 
If p then not q. AN 
If not p then q. NA 
If not p then not q. NN 
Table 1.5 The notation used to describe the four possible 
combinations of affirmative and negative antecedent and 
consequent in conditional sentences. 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF CONDITIONAL REASONING 
Two paradigms which have been used in experimental 
studies of conditional reasoning will be surveyed in this 
section. These are: 
a) Inference tasks, and 
b) Psychological truth table tasks. 
a) Inference Tasks. 
In this paradigm the tendency of subjects to make or 
withhold each of the four inferences shown in Table 1.4 is 
considered. Generally subjects are presented with a conditional 
rule together with a premise which either affirms or denies one 
component of the rule. For example, given the conditional rule: 
If the letter is A then the number is 7, 
together with the premise' 
The letter is A, 
the subject might be asked to state what conclusion follows, if 
any. With the above example, a Modus Ponens inference would 
lead to the conclusion that: 
The number is 7. 
Alternatively, the subject mic)ht be presented with a 
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conclusion and asked whether it necessarily follows from the 
conditional rule and premise which have been given. Otherwise, 
he mic3ht be asked to assess the truth value of a c3iven 
conclusion assuminc3 that the conditional rule toc3ether with the 
premise which have been presented are true. 
If humans reason strictly in accordance with the 
principles of formal logic, a position advocated by Henle 
(1962), then we might expect their responses to such problems 
to reflect their interpretation of the conditional sentence. On 
the one hand, given a Material Implication interpretation, 
subjects might be expected to endorse MP and MT as valid but to 
reject DA and AC as fallacious. Whereas, on the other hand, 
given a Material Equivalence interpretation, they would be 
expected to endorse all four inferences as valid. Table 1.4 
illustrates these points. Group data might be expected to 
reflect both these interpretations and thus MP and MT should be 
consistently endorsed whereas DA and AC should be endorsed at 
some level between 0% and 100%, according to the proportion of 
subjects adopting a Material Equivalence -interpretation. 
Several experiments concentrating upon a++irmative 
conditionals have shown that, with adult subjects, MP and MT 
inferences are usually endorsed and DA and AC are endorsed more 
frequently than not (see Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972; Evans, 
1982). Such data has sometimes led to the conclusion that most 
subjects interpret the conditional as an equivalence. 
Let US consider the data from three experiments 
summarised by Evans (1982). The data shown in Table 1.6 give 
the percentage of adult subjects endorsing each of the four 
inferences in three separate studies. 
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Study 
MP 
Taplin (1971) 92 
Taplin & Staudenmayer (1973) 99 
Evans (1977a) 100 
Inference 
DA AC MT 
52 57 63 
82 84 E37 
69 75 -75 
Table 1.6 . The percentage of subjects endorsing each of the 
four inferences for an affirmative rule: 'If p then q'. (Data 
from Evans, 1982, table 8.1). 
Taplin (1971) looked at the consistency with which 
subjects made each of the four inferences over a long series of 
thematic problems. Although only 45% oi his subjects were 
consistent in their response, he found a tendency for all four 
inferences to be made. He concluded that the conditional rule 
was most usually interpreted as a biconditional having a truth 
table for Material Equivalence. 
Taplin and Staudenmayer (191-3, experiment I) 
replicated the Taplin (1971) study using abstract materials but 
with a higher degree o+ consistency. Evans (1977a) has reported 
data +or a+firmative rules which also +it the same qeneral 
pattern (: )+ results. However, as will be seen, the conclusion 
based upon this pattern o+ data - that subjects generally 
interpret the conditional rule as an equivalence - is not 
necessarily justified. 
A second experiment was performed by Taplin and 
Staudenmayer (1973, experiment 2) in which a slight procedural 
difference was introduced. Subjects were presented with a 
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conditional rule relating to the combinations of letters of the 
alphabet which were permissible together. They were also given 
a premise a++irmi-ng or denying one component oi the rule. 
In the first experiment subjects were asked to 
evaluate the conclusion as either 'true' or 'false' - yielding 
the data shown in Table 1.6 . In experiment II, however, 
subjects had the choice of three conclusions; 'always true,, 
'sometimes but not always true' and 'never true' (the word 
'false' was used for half of the subjects, but this had no 
influence on the data). Although no specific data are recorded, 
Taplin and Staudenmayer report a much lower frequency of DA and 
AC inferences. The pattern was more consistent with an 
interpretation of the rule a5 Material Implication. 
Obviously such a dramatic difference in results 
emanating from such a slight change in procedure emphasises the 
danger in extrapolating from single paradigms. However, a 
plausible explanation is offered by Evans (1978). He suggests 
that, with abstract materials such as those used by Taplin and 
Staudenmayer, there is no semantic basis to assist subjects in 
their interpretation of conditional rules as being equivalence 
or implication. When a less committal response category 
('sometimes but not always true) is introduced, this is 
selected as an expression of this ambiquit-ý- In a forced choice 
situation subjects opt for an equivalence interpretation on DA 
and AC. 
There are further considerable difficulties for the 
interpretation of reasoning experiments which follow from the 
introduction of negative components into the rules. In Table 
1.7 the four conditional inferences for rules involvin, 3 
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negative components are summarised. 
Rule In+erence 
MP DA AC MT 
Given Conclude Given Conclude Given Conclude Given Conclude 
AA p q 'P q p 
AN p Ei p q 
NA 'P q Ei p 
NN fs p -13 q p 
Table 1.7 . The four conditional inferences for rules involving 
negative components. ( ý5 = not p, q= not q ). 
Evans (1972b) required 
falsifying and verifying cases for ea 
He noted how, when AA rules are 
inferences become associated with 
negative conclusions. The acceptance 
inference type could well be affected 
using each rýule type, the extent 
subjects to construct 
ch of the four rule types. 
used alone, particular 
either affirmative or 
or rejection rate of each 
by this difference. By 
to which each inference 
produces affirmative or negative conclusions can be balanced. 
For instance, Table 1.7 shows that an MP inference is 
associated with a negative conclusion for AN and NN rules but 
with an affirmative conclusion for AA and NA rules. 
Evans (1972c) required subjects to make inferences 
from rules defining which letters were allowed to be paired 
with which digits in imac3inary letter-number pairs. Only MT and 
AC problems were studied in this experiment. The following is 
an example of one of the problems used: 
le 
Given: 1) If the letter is not G then the number is 9. 
2) Not 9 
Conclusion: G, Not G, Indeterminate. 
The correct answer here is Gv (a valid Modus Tollens 
inference), the choice 'Not GI would indicate susceptibility to 
the fallacious AC inference. If the minor premise had been '9' 
then the correct response would have been 'Indeterminate'. 
Table 1.8 presents the percentage of valid MT and fallacious AC 
inferences made with each rule type. 
Rule Inference 
MT AC 
AA 91 32 
AN 75 35 
NA 38 61 
NN 41 55 
Table 1.8 . The percentage of valid MP and fallacious AC 
inferences made with each rule type. (Data from Evans, 1972c 
experiment 1, table 2). 
Significantly more MT 
made on rules haviný3 affirmative 
affirmed significantly more n 
(1979) suggests the following as 
interpretations of these data: 
1) A response bias producing 
and less AC inferences were 
antecedents. Thus subjects 
egative conclusions. Pollard 
three possible alternative 
a preference for negative 
conclusions, 
2) The greater confusion of NA and NN rules produces more 
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erroneous responses, 
3) NA and NN rules tend to be interpreted as expressing 
Equivalence (If and only if not p then q) rather than 
implication. In this case the AC inference would be valid. 
However, Evans (1977a) has also shown that the 
pattern of response to each of the four inferences is affected 
by the manipulation of negative components in the rules. In 
this study subjects were required to evaluate each of the four 
inferences. That is, given the major and minor premises, they 
had to decide whether a given conclusion followed. The 
systematic effects of negatives are shown in Table 1.9. 
Rule In-ference 
Mp DA AC MT 
AA 100 69 75 75 
AN 100 12 31 56 
NA 100 50 ei 12 
NN 100 19 81 25 
Table 1.9 . The percentage frequency with which each 
inference was made for each rule type. For clarity, decisions 
which entailed the acceptance of a negative conclusion have 
been underlined. (Data from Evans, 1977a, table II) - 
Evans' data shows that the frequency of all 
inferences (except Modus Ponens which was smothered by a 
ceiling effect) varies significantly as a function of 
introducing negative components. As Pollard (1979) concedes, 
these data suggest that subjects are biased towards negative 
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conclusions. Both of his alternative explanations would predict 
more DA responses on rules having negative antecedents and this 
was clearly not the case. However, the 100% correct acceptance 
of the MP inference emphasises the strong tendency to respond 
in accordance with the logic of the problem. 
Studies of inference patterns, such as those outlined 
in this section have sometimes been considered as indirect 
measures o+ truth tables. Several authors have attempted to 
classify subjects as having a truth table for implication (when 
MP and MT in+erences are made and DA and AC are withheld) or 
for equivalence (when all four inferences are made), (eg. 
Taplin, 1971; Taplin & Staudenmayer, 1973; Staudenmayer, 1975; 
Marcus and Rips, 1979). However this sort of approach can only 
be justified if we accept the view that people reason logically 
given their particular interpretation of the rules. The work of 
Evans (1972b; 1972c; 1977a) illustrates that the frequency with 
which subjects respond to conditionqýl in+erence problems is 
distorted by a response bias producing a preference f or 
negative conclusions. 
it should be plain that the classification of 
subjects as possessing a particular truth table must take into 
account the consistency with which they conform to that 
particular truth table. It has already been noted that only 45% 
of Taplin's (1971) subjects were consistently truth-functional 
(ie. consistent with some kind of truth table) in their 
reasoning. Taplin and Staudenmayer (1973) found about 80% of 
subjects were consistent. In both these studies the majority 
were classified as 'equivalence'. However, in Taplin and 
Staudenmayer's second experiment when a third response choice 
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of 'sometimes true (or false )7 was added to the usual 'true' 
and 'false 7 options, only 50*/* were truth-functional and the 
majority of these were classified as 'implication'. As Evans 
(1982, p136) notes, quite apart from the "unimpressive" 
proportion of truth-functional subjects, the method of testing 
a subject's inferences should not influence their 
interpretation of the rules. He also shows how the inclusion of 
an indeterminate choice is logically necessary in certain 
circumstances. For instance, consider the problem below: 
Given' 1) If the letter is H then the number is 7 
2) The number is 7 
Conclusion: The letter is H. 
Assuming the truth of_ the premises, it is not possible to 
determine the truth of the conclusion in the above AC 
syllogism. Thus studies which have not allowed an indeterminate 
option are clearly somewhat lacking. 
Staudenmayer (1975), who included an 'indeterminate' 
option, found 78% consistency with' abstract, context-free 
materials but only 54.5% with concrete materials. Marcus and 
Rips (1979) claimed that the majority (52.5%) of their 
subjects' responses to conditional inferences in a variety of 
contexts (whilst including two and three choice response 
formats) were logically contradictory in the sense that no 
single truth-function could account for them. It is surprising 
that even with such low consistency levels, and it should be 
stressed that neither of these studies required absolute 
consistency, these authors still considered it worthwhile to 
classify their subjects into two types: those who interpret 
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conditional rules as 'equivalence' (biconditional) and those 
who interpret such rules as 'implication' (conditional). 
In any case, Evans (1982) points out that if subjects 
do consistently conform to a particular truth table, they are 
not necessarily ! Asin_g it. Some subjects may appear to be 
consistent by chance and others could be induced by non-logical 
factors to appear consistently truth-functional. These 
experiments can serve to illustrate that it is of paramount 
importance to fit the theory to the data rather than ignore 
data which does not fit a particular theoretical 
interpretation. 
b) Psycholoqical-Tr!,! th Table Tasks. 
The majority of authors referred to truth tables as 
either Implication or Equivalence and did not have any means of 
differentiating between non-defective and defective truth 
tables which were mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter. However, Wason (1966) suggested that subjects have a 
Defective Implication truth table (TF?? ) for a conditional rule 
(see table 1.3). That is, when the presupposition stated by the 
antecedent of a conditional is unfulfilled, no association is 
made and the rule is regarded as neither 'True' nor 'False', 
but as 'Irrelevant'. As Wason (1968, p274) puts it the 
"assumption is that individuals are biased, through a long 
learning process, to expect a relation of truth, correspondence 
or match to hold between sentences and states of affairs" and 
we merely use a proposition or statement that something is 
false in order to make a deduction. 
In a subsequent experiment, Wason (1968) used the 
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Truth Table Evaluation paradigm to investigate the hypothesis 
that subjects have a De+ective Implication truth table +or a 
conditional rule. In this paradigm subjects are presented with 
a conditional sentence together with examples of all four truth 
table cases (see Table 1.1) and are required to evaluate the 
rule as 'TrUe7, 'False' or 7 Irrelevant'. In fact, Wason found 
that the pattern which most often occurred was that defined as 
De+ective Equivalence in Table 1.3 . This result suggests that 
subjects were interpreting the conditional sentence as an 
Equivalence (or Biconditional) in this particular experiment. 
In support of Wason's general line of argument, when the 
presuppositions stated in the rule were unfulfilled (ie. the FF 
case) the rule was regarded as irrelevant to the situation at 
hand. 
Another experiment, reported by Johnson-Laird and 
Tagart (1969), was intended to discover which truth table was 
psychologically appropriate for the Implication relationship. 
They concentrated upon four alternative linguistic forms in 
which implication could be expressed: 
1) If p then q. 
2) There isn't p, if there isn't 
3) Either there isn't p, or there is q (or both). 
4) There is never p without there being q. 
It was expected that, i+ Wason's original hypothesis 
was correct, sentence 1) would be considered 'Irrelevant' when 
the antecedent was +alse. Also sentence 2), which is derived 
from the contrapositive 'If not q then not p', would be 
considered 'Irrelevant' when 'q' is true. However, sentences 3) 
and 4), which are not conditional sentences, would be less 
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likely to elicit 'Irrelevant' judgements and more likely to 
produce the truth table for Material Implication (see Table 
1.2). 
Subjects were presented with examples o+ each oi the 
four basic sentence types which expressed relationships between 
particular letters and numbers which could appear on the left- 
and right-hand side respectively of cards. A pack of cards with 
examples of all four truth table cases were given to the 
subject to be sorted into one of three categories: 'True', 
'False' or 'Irrelevant'. The 'p' and 'q' terms were falsified 
in one of three different ways which, although logically 
equivalent as falsifications, might not be psychologically 
equivalent. Either an alternative letter (or number), or a 
geometric shape or a blank was used. 
The authors did not report any differences between 
the three alternative ways of presenting false terms. It was 
found that for sentence 1) (If p then q), the most usual 
pattern of responding conformed to a truth table for Defective 
Implication, in accordance with Wason's (1966) original 
prediction. It was al. so found that, to a lesser degree, 
sentence 4) (There is never p without there being q) was most 
commonly interpreted as Defective Implication. However for the 
other sentences a wide range of responses was given. In 
summary, it was found that AA conditionals were most frequently 
interpreted as Defective Implication but also the linguistic 
form of the sentence used had a dramatic effect on the 
interpretation even though all sentences have the same truth 
table in formal logic. 
It was suggested by Evans (1972b) that Johnson-Laird 
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and Tagart, by giving the 'Irrelevant' category as a possible 
choice to subjects in their experiment, had introduced a strong 
demand characteristic for its usage. Evans decided to utilise 
an alternative procedure in order to check this possibility. He 
presented subjects with a series of abstract conditional rules 
concerning the relationships between various coloured shapes. 
An example of one such rule is: 
If there is a red triangle -on the left 
then there is a green square on the right. 
Subjects were also presented with an array of 
coloured shapes. Their task was to construct as many verifying 
and +alsifying cases o+ the given rules as possible. Since the 
procedure was exhaustive, Evans could infer that any logical 
cases which were not constructed were irrelevant. Another 
important innovation introduced in this experiment involved the 
manipulation of nec)ative components in the rules. Althouc3h 
Johnson-Laird and Tagart had used negatives in some of their 
rules, all of the sentences expressed the same logical 
relationship (p implies q) and so the truth and falsity of 
components was confounded with aff irmation and negation. By his 
procedure, Evans ensured that "overall the effect of instances 
matching (aff irming) or mismatching (negating) values named in 
the rules should cancel out" (Evans, 1972b, pl. 94). This is 
illustrated in Table 1.10 . 
It can be seen from Table 1.10 that each of the four 
possible matching cases (pq, Pý, ýq, 5ý) appears just once for 
each of the rules but they are mapped differently onto each of 
the loc3ical cases (TT, TF, FT, FF). 
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Rule Logical Case 
TT TF FT FF 
AA pq pq pq pq 
AN p Ei pq pq 'ý q 
NA j5 q q pq p -Ei 
NN i5 ý q pq pq 
pq = double matching case pq single mismatching case 
pq = single mismatching case ý54 double mismatching case. 
Table 1.10 . The combinations of affirmed and negated values 
constituting the four logical cases of the conditional rules. 
The results of Evans' study are shown in Table 1.11 
pooled over the four rules. 
Logical Case Classification 
True False Irrelevant 
TT 99 01 
TF 3 so 17 
FT 14 34 52 
FF 33 23 44 
Table 1.11 . Percentage frequency of construction of 
the four 
Logical Cases summed across the four Rules. N=24. (Data from 
Evans, 1972b. Table from Evans, 1982, table 8.5 - i, a). 
It can be seen from Table 1.11 that the modal 
responses, when pooled over the four rules, support the 
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prediction of the De4ective Truth Table. This data can also be 
analysed according to matching case summed across the four 
rules. Since each matching case appears equally often for each 
logical case, any effect of this can be said to be non-logical. 
The data are arranged in this way in Table 1.122 . 
Matching Case Classi4ication 
True False Irrelevant 
pq 34 52 14 
Pý 41 33 26 
j5q 40 27 33 
pa 34 25 41 
Table 1.12 Percentage frequency of construction of the four 
Matching Cases summed across the four Rules. N=24. (Data from 
Evans, 1972b. Table from Evans, 1982, table 8.5 - i, b). 
It can be seen that the percentage frequency of 
'Irrelevant-' items (ie. items not constructed) increases as the 
number of mismatches increases. Evans referred to this tendency 
to prefer to construct those values named in the rule as 
'Matching Bias'. Its discovery emphasises the weakness of other 
studies of deductive reasoning which, in concentrating their 
attention on affirmative rules, have confounded such a factor 
with the truth and falsity of a rule's components. Evans 
(1972b) managed to measure a three-value psychological truth 
table without mentioning the concept of 'Irrelevance' to 
subjects and, as a consequence, he has avoided the criticism Of 
a resultant demand characteristic. 
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In a succeeding study, Evans (1975) replicated his 
earlier results using a Truth Table Evaluation Task in which 
three possible choices were available to subjects. In this 
study two linguistic +arms were used +or the rules: 
I+ p then q, 
and p only if q. 
These were referred to as IT and 01 conditionals respectively. 
Whilst these rule +arms are logically equivalent, the 
distributions of responses to them differed slightly, as can be 
seen from Table 1.13 . 
Logical Case Linc3uistic Form 
IT 0I 
True False Irrelevant True False Irrelevant 
TT 89 5 6 82 2 16 
TF 9 81 9 11 58 30 
FT 19 29 52 13 57 30 
FF 30 11 57 44 16 40 
Table 1.13 . Percentage frequency of evaluation of 
the four 
Logical Cases summed across the four Rules for Linguistic Forms 
of the conditional. N=48. (Data from Evans, 1975, table I). 
As can be seen, for the IT Form the data is very 
similar to that presented in Table 1.11 which resulted from the 
Construction Task. However, the modal responses to the 01 Form 
correspond to a 'TFFT' Truth Table which is the truth table for 
Material Equivalence (see Table 1.2). The same data is 
presented, analysed according to 'Matching Bias' summed across 
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the four Rules in Table 1.14. 
Matching Case Linguistic Form 
IT 
True 
pq 42 
pq 39 
5q 34 
ýzi 32 
False Irrelevant True 
42 17 41 
32 28 48 
35 30 32 
18 50 29 
0I 
False Irrelevant 
56 3 
38 14 
26 42 
14 57 
Table 1.14 . Percentage frequency of evaluation of the four 
Matching Cases summed across the four Rules for Linguistic 
Forms of the conditional. N=48. (Data from Evans, 1975, table 
1). 
It can be seen that, for both rules, a similar 
tendency is present for 'Irrelevant' responding to increase as 
the number of mismatches inc reases. This tendency replicates 
that found by Evans (1972b) in the Construction Task. Thus it 
appears that the effect of 'Matching Sias' generalises to an 
alternative task and is not restricted simply to an 'if p then 
q' formulation of the conditional rule. 
y by Evans and Newstead (1977) measured Anotger stud, 
the latency of responding, -as well as frequency of response, in 
a Truth Table Evaluation task. They were testing the 
psycholinguistic hypothesis that, although IT and 01 forms can 
both be used to express Material Implication, the IT form is 
more natural when the antecedent event temporally precedes the 
consequent event and the 01 form is more natural when the 
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consequent event precedes the antecedent event. Evans and 
Newstead presented subjects with an IT or 01 rule (relating to 
the order of presentation of two letters) on one field of a 
three-field tachistoscope. Subjects were required to push a 
button to display the rule on the screen and a second button 
push indicated that they had understood the rule and were ready 
to perform the reasoning task. This interval is the 
Comprehens-ion time. Following the second key press, two capital 
letters were presented one after the other (for one second 
each) on the remaining two fields of the tachistoscope. The 
subject was required to decide whether the pair of letters 
'conformed to', 'conflicted with' or was 'irrelevant to' the 
rule and to indicate their answer by pushing the appropriate 
response key. The interval between the second and third button 
presses was the Verification Time. Although temporal order did 
not significantly affect the nature of the responses made, the 
latency data confirmed that both types of conditional sentence 
were processed faster when their linguistic directionality was 
congruent with the temporal order of the events they described. 
Their data also indicated a tendency for 
Comprehension and Verification latencies to increase as 
negatives were introduced into the rules. The effect of 
negatives in each component was additive. Verification 
latencies also increased for the more complex Truth Table Cases 
with the overall order being: TT < TF < FT < FF. In line with 
previous studies (Evans 1972b, 1975), Evans and Newstead 
reported that Logical and Matching tendencies were present. 
There was an overall Logical tendency to regard the 'TT' case 
as 'True' and the 'TF' case as 'False' and the effects of 
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'Matching Bias' were weakest on these two cases. Evans and 
Newstead account for this in terms of "some form of competition 
between the two tendencies" (Evans and Newstead, 1977, p280) - 
a point to which I shall return in the next section. 
The Evans and Newstead (1977) study was novel in that 
it measured latencies on a task known to produce large 
variations in response frequencies. Their latency data provided 
additional useful information which hel*ped in the 
interpretation of their results. Although the response 
frequency data did not show any effect of psycholinquistic 
temporality, significant effects were demonstrated in the 
Comprehension and the Verification latencies. They considered 
the distinction between Comprehension and Verification periods 
to be particularly important. The Comprehension Time measure 
was considered useful "for distinguishing interpretational from 
operational factors" - see next section - in that Comprehension 
latency can be "regarded as a 'pure' measure of interpretation 
in that it is measured prior to the commencement of any 
reasoning operations". Verification Time is harder to interpret 
16owing to the concurrent variations in response frequency" 
(Evans and Newstead, 1977, p281). Hot-sever, in this study, 
Verification Latency was found to reflect Interpretational 
Factors, for example relating to negatives in the rules, but 
also revealed the effects of Truth Table Case which clearly 
arose in the Operational Stage. 
In this section several important experiments, 
performed in two major reasoning paradigms, have been 
discussed. The effects of linguistic features were shown and 
various response biases were revealed. At this point it is 
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appropriate to consider the range of theoretical 
interpretations which have been developed to account for data 
such as these. 
THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF REASONING DATA. 
As Evans (1972a) noted, in many reasoning experiments 
the arbitrary criterion of correctness as provided by the rules 
of formal logic has been used. This is insufficient to explain 
adequately the observed behaviour which constitutes 
experimental results because it entails the assumption that 
reasoning problems are perceived and solved by the subject in 
the same sort of manner in which they are conceived by the 
experimenter - as logical problems. He claims that 
psychological factors quite unconnected with logic have often 
been ignored and, as a consequence, results have been 
misinterpreted and faulty theories have evolved. 
Evans (1972a) has distinguished three types of 
theories of reasoning including logical, illogical and 
non-logical. Each of these will be considered in relation to 
propositional reasoning. Perhaps the main proponent of a 
logical theory which I will consider is Mary Henle (1962). She 
proposed that reasoning essentially follows the laws of logic 
and that mistakes occur only when subjects misinterpret the 
given problem. Her claims were based on a selective analysis of 
the protocols of subjects who were given thematic syllogisms to 
solve. Specifically, she claimed that errors occurred due to 
premises being omitted, incorrectly interpreted, additional 
premises being added or to a failure to accept the logical 
task. Her theory led to a rationalist revival in the 
psychological literature emanating mainly from the USA (eq. 
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Staudenmayer, 1975). 
An effective challenge to Henle's position has been 
made by Evans (1972a). He points out that there are two types 
of factor which are likely to influence a subject's behaviour 
in reasoning experiments. One of these factors relates to the 
subject's comprehension of the sentence forming the rule and is 
referred to as an interpretational factor. In addition 'task 
variables' should be d-istinguished. These refer to "the 
influence of certain operational requirements of the task which 
act independently of the subjects' interpretation of the 
sentences" (Evans, 1972a, p376) and are referred to as 
operational variables. Two striking examples of operational 
variables were discussed previously. One, pertaining to the 
preference for negative conclusions, was found in the inference 
task. Since it is not limited to one kind of inference nor 
indeed to conditionals (Roberge, 1976, finds a similar effect 
with exclusive disjunction) it is referred to as an operational 
rather than an interpretational factor. The other notable 
example is that of 'Matching Bias' which was discussed in 
relation to the truth table paradigm and which also generalises 
over different reasoning tasks and rule formulations (Evans, 
1972b, 1975; Evans and Lynch, 1973). 
In assessing the rationalist viewpoint we should 
consider the consistency of subject's solutions to given 
problems. Staudenmayer (1975, p78), for instance, writes that, 
according to Henle and her followers, "once an individual 
accepts the most plausible interpretation for him, the 
evaluations follow consistently and logically". In fact the 
studies reviewed in the previous sections of this chapter 
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showed that such interpretations are +ar +rom consistent, 
particularly when abstract materials are used. In addition it 
has been shown that the introduction o+ negatives into the 
rules used in the in+erence task substantially a++ected the 
frequency with which particular inferences were endorsed. For 
instance, fewer AC and more MT inferences were made when the 
rules had affirmative antecedents - that is more negative 
conclusions were endorsed (Evans, 1972c). Now$ whilst Henle 
could argue that the introduction of negatives alters the 
interpretation of the rule, this viewpoint is hardly tenable 
since both implication and equivalence interpretations of the 
rule require the MT inference. An alternative hypothesis, 
proposed by Evans (1978, pIOO), states that "a non-logical 
response bias acts against any inference in which the subject 
is required to infer the falsity of a component which is 
negative". In this case, when the consequent is negative, less 
DA and more MP inferences would be expected. In support of this 
hypothesis, Evans (1977a) found that less DA inferences were 
made with AN and NN rules but, unfortunately, the MP inference 
suffered a massive ceiling effect and was always endorsed. 
Another non-logical response tendency (Matching Bias) has been 
demonstrated in various paradigms including truth table 
construction (Evans, 1972b), truth table evaluation (Evans, 
1975; Evans and Newstead, 1977) and in another paradigm known 
as the Wason Selection Task ((Evans and Lynch, 1973). The 
evidence observed in propositional reasoning is overwhelmingly 
against the extreme rationalist position advocated by Henle 
(1962). 
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The origins of certain non-logical response factors, 
are clearly linguistic in nature. Recently, Evans (1983a) has 
shown how linguistic features can even affect 'Matching Bias'. 
He presented subjects with a truth table task using conditional 
rules such as the following: 
If the letter is not K then the number is 3. 
The instances associated with such rules were varied for two 
groups of subjects. In the first group, instances employed 
implicit negation, as is usual with this task, to form the 
various logical cases . For instance the FF logical case for 
the above rule would be: 
The letter is K and the number is 5. 
The second group received instances which employed explicit 
negation, so that the named items in the instance al! w2a: es 
matched the items in the rule. An example is given in the 
following FF logical case for the above rule: 
The letter is K and the number is not 3. 
Evans found that the usual 'Matching Bias' effect was 
significantly reduced, although not completely absent, for the 
explicit negative group. Evans argues that the use of negatives 
in the instances could account for the residual 'Matching Bias' 
effect. After all negative statements can often be seen to 
cause difficulty or confusion in various tasks (see Evans 1982, 
chapter 3) and this could lead to greater use of the 
'irrelevant' response choice as the number of negatives in the 
instance increased. The logical performance of the explicit 
negative group was also significantly improved compared with 
the implicit negative group and this suggests that some general 
+acilitation occurs with explicitly negated instances. However 
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an alternative hypothesis which could explain 'Matching Bias' 
is not ruled out by Evans' demonstration. The alternative 
explanation of 'Matching Bias' involves the possible use of 
visual imagery but discussion of it is deferred until the next 
chapter where its plausibility will be established. 
In order to discuss illogical theories of conditional 
reasoning, it is necessary to consider'research concerning 
another reasoning paradigm, the Wason Selection Task. 
The Wason Selection Task. 
In its original form (Wason, 1966) subjects were 
shown an array of four cards and were told that every card had 
a letter on one side and a number on the other side. Only one 
face of each card was revealed and these displayed a vowel (p), 
a consonant (5), an even number (q) and an add number (q). The 
subject was then given the following conditional rule; 
'If a card has a vowel on one side, then 
it has an even number on the other side'. 
He was told that this rule related only to the +our cards in 
front of him. The subject's task was to name those cards, and 
only those cards, which must be turned over to disc*over whether 
the rule was true or false. The solution to this problem is p 
and ý, since only this combination can falsify the rule. 
However, the vast majority of subjects selected eitber tVie 
card alone or the p and q cards. 
Wason (1966) proposes that subjects assume a 
conditional rule to have three truth values: True, False and 
Irrelevant. Vowels with even numbers veri+y, vowels with odd 
numbers falsify and consonants with any number are irrelevant. 
In addition they are inclined to verify, rather than falsify, 
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the rule since in everyday life conditionals are only used if 
they are true. He suggests that "in adult experience truth is 
encountered more frequently than falsity, and vie seldom use a 
proposition orj ud gemen t that something is false in order to 
make a deduction" (Wason, 1968, p274). Although subjects cou Id 
determine, prior to a selection task, which combinations of 
letter and number would make the rule false, their selection of 
the q card was not facilitated in the task itself. In fact, 
several attempts to simplify the task by using binary stimuli 
and simpler forms of the rule (Wason, 1969) have had little 
effect. The possible confusion of referrinq to 'the other side' 
of the card - which could be interpreted as being the side 
which is face downwards - was eliminated by Wason and 
Johnson-Laird (1970) by presenting all of the iniormation so 
that it was potentially visible on the same side of the card, 
but to little avail. Even when therapy was introduced to 
induce insight into the correct solution after a selection 
task', by making subjects aware o+ the +alsi+ying case and that 
selection o+ the j case can produce it, several subjects still 
declined to revise their original selections in a subsequent 
task (Wason, 1969; Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1970). 
Johnson-Laird and Wason (1970) attempted to account 
for the results obtained on the selection task with an 
information processing model. Basically they assumed that 
subjects could be in one of three possible states of insight 
when performing the task: No insight in which subjects attempt 
to verify the rule, Partial insiqht in which the necessity for 
falsification is combined with the desire to verify, or 
compI_g. Lg__insi3ht in which subjects on 1 -/ select potential 
36 
falsi+iers. They assume that as the subject gains insight he 
switches his attention from verification to falsification of 
the rule. However since these states are defined in terms of 
the combinations of cards which subjects select (p or p&q, p 
q&q, p&q respectively), as a consequence their definition 
is circular. A point that has not escaped Evans (1977b). 
The previous research on the selection task had 
concentrated upon affirmative (AA) rules. However, the 
existence of 'Matching Bias' in the truth table construction 
paradigm (Evans, 1972b) suggested a plausible explanation of 
performance on the selection task without reference to 
verification bias (Evans and Lynch, 1973). Evans and Lynch 
introduced negatives into the conditional rules (see Table 1.5) 
used in four selection tasks and found that 'Matching Bias' 
exerted a powerful influence on responding. Overall there was 
no evidence of verification bias but a preponderance to choose 
logically correct values (p & q) was found. This could not be 
explained in terms of the insight model. 
However several authors have referred to their 
subjects' verbal protocols in defending insight models 
(eg. Goodwin and Wason, 1972; Bracewell, 1974; Smalley, 1974). 
The protocols seem to suggest that responses are due to 
interpretational factors or verification bias. Indeed Evans 
(1972a) has been criticised by Van Duyne (1973) for failing to 
include 'thinking alaud7 protocols in his 'Matching Bias' 
experiments. Unfortunately such evidence as is available comes 
exclusively from studies which used the affirmative (AA) form 
of the conditional rule. In order to rectify this state of 
affairs, Wason and Evans (1975) performed an experiment in 
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which the consequent of an abstract conditional rule was either 
negated or not. Two independent groups of 12 subjects each 
performed the selection task with both of these rules. One 
group performed the affirmative task first and the other 
perforined the negative task first. Subjects were asked to write 
down the reasons for their selections or non-selections of each 
of the four cards. As can be seen from Table 1.15 performance 
was dominated by 'Matching Bias'. 
Values Rule Type 
Selected A+4irmative Negative 
Order Ist 2nd Total 1st 2nd Total 
pq 6 6 12 96 15* 
p 2 2 4 24 6 
pa 0 0 0* 00 0 
Others 4 4 8 12 3 
N 12 12 24 12 12 24 
*= Correct response 
Table 1.15 . The frequency of responses 
in affirmative and 
nec3ative selection tasks. (Data from Wason and Evans, 
1975, 
table 1). 
However, the reasons given varied according to the 
logical consequence of the responses. With the affirmative rule 
subjects claimed that their selections were aimed at 
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veri+ication whereas, when the nec3ative was introduced, they 
claimed that their selections were aimed at falsification. 
Wason and Evans' (1975) explanation of this apparent paradox is 
discussed in the next section. 
The Dual Process_Theorýe_of_R2Asoninq. 
In explaininc3 data +rom the selection task, Wason and 
Evans (1975) proposed a non-Iogical model - the Dual Process 
theory of reasoning - which accommodates the subjects' 
performance and also their own explanations of their 
performance. The Dual Process hypothesis postulates that 
performance and introspection reflect different underlying 
processes. Two fundamental assumptions were entailed: 
1) Operational processes (Type 1) underlying reasoning 
performance (eq. Matching Bias) are not generally 
introspectible. 
2) Introspective reasons (Type 2) do not reflect the underlying 
thought processes which caused the selections, but are rather a 
justification of the subject's behaviour in the context of the 
experimental situation and instructions. 
Previously Evans (1972a) had been criticised for 
over-emphasising the importance of non-logical operational 
variables and for failing to indicate how they interact with 
interpretative processes in reasoning (Van Duyne, 1973). In the 
weaker form of their theory, Wason and Evans (1975, p150) 
suggest Ila process of rapid continuous feedback between 
tendencies to respond and consciousness rather than two 
temporally distinct phases". This being the case, one might 
wonder how a response is eventually selected. However, the 
stronger form of their theory assumes that response determines 
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conscious thought in which case the interpretative process is a 
consequence of selection behaviour. Circumstantial evidence for 
the hypothesis -has been claimed in an inductive reasoning 
problem - the '2,4,6 problem' - investigated by Wason (1960; 
1968). Here, subjects are required to discover a rule by 
generating triads of numbers. They are given feedback about 
whether the triads coniorm to the rule. It appears that 
subjects often reformulated, without awareness, the same 
hypothesis about the rule after the first formulation had been 
pronounced incorrect. Wason and Evans (1975, p1521) suggest that 
the first hypothesis "continues to exert itself unconsciously 
but allows a conscious displacement to fulfil the requirements 
of the task". 
Most of the supportive evidence comes from selection 
task experiments. Indeed the data of Wason (1969) has been 
reinterpreted in terms of dual processing (Wason and Evans, 
1975). Twenty subjects were given the correct solution in a 
selection task and asked to give reasons why it was correct. 
All subjects accomplished this and it was originally inferred 
that subjects were prevented +rom imposing their own erroneous 
structure on the task. In the light o+ their theory Wason and 
Evans (1975, p151) predict that 117 reasons' would be found to 
satisfy the purported correctness of any common wrong 
solution". This prediction was tested by Evans and Wason (1976) 
by giving one of several different 'solutions' to independent 
-groups of subjects each of whom was told it was correct. Their 
prediction was supported and, +urthermore, subjects generally 
expressed con+idence in the correctness o+ their reasons. 
As outlined above, the original form of the Dual 
42 
Process theory envisaged that the operational (Type 1) and 
interpretational (Type 2) processes ran in alternation. 
Unfortunately, this viewpoint could not be reconciled with 
another theory which explains reasoning performance in terms of 
a probabilistic mathematical model (Evans, 1977b). 
Evans' stochastic approach was developed in order to 
account for the observed variability of data collected in 
reasoning experiments. Whereas previous models of the reasoning 
process had accounted for variability in terms of individual 
differences such as experience or intelligence, Evans (1977b) 
considered the alternative possibility that reasoning behaviour 
is intrinsically probabilistic. For instance if all subjects 
have a 0.6 probability of making a certain response then about 
60% of a sample of subjects would make that response. 
In re-analysing the data from several selection task 
experiments, Evans found that card selections were 
statistically independent. Thus previous (eq. insight) theories 
which attached psychological significance to particular 
combinations o+ card selections were rendered unparsimonious 
since, as Evans (1977b, p624) writes, " the combination of 
selections observed in an individual would be the result of 
independent stochastic processes: a 'statistical accident' of 
no psychological significance in itself". 
The mathematical model incorporates Evans' (1972a) 
two factor approach and proposes that the probability of a 
particular response (r) reflects a combination of 
interpretational (I) and operational or response (R) factors. 
In more formal terms, it states that the probability of a 
particular response Pr(r) is equal to the weighted addition of 
4Z 
I and R factors: 
Pr (r) = O-C .I+ (I 
where Or- is the we i ght i ng f 
0 <= oc <= 
01 <= 
0 <= R ,0= 
- CC) .R 
actor and: 
1 
Now, as Evans (1980a) points out, this sort of additive 
probabilistic model implies parallel rather than sequential 
processing. This is because the response is made either on the 
basis of logic or on matching depending upon the value of the 
weighting factor. As a consequence it is not compatible with 
the initial formulation of the Dual Process theory of reasoning 
which, as stated above, envisaged alternating processes. 
The above leads to the first radical amendment of the 
theory. Evans (1980a) proposes that the underlying Type I and 
Type 2 processes operate in parallel. The Type 2 process is 
claimed to be involved jRLior to making the response and is 
eqýý'-k,, ( with the Interpretational component of Evans 
) (1977b) 
model. Thus, it is claimed to be responsible for the logical 
component of reasoning behaviour. This process competes, for 
the control of the response, with the Type I process now 
equated with Evans' (1977b) response bias factor. 
At this point, it is worth considering briefly how 
this approach can be used to explain the so-called 'thematic 
facilitation effect' which has been observed in various 
reasoning paradigms (see Evans, 1982; Griggs, 1983). It has 
been demonstrated by Evans and Lynch (19735) that, with abstract 
materials, selection task data reflects a combination of 
logical (I) and matching (R) tendencies. Several early 
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experiments have shown that thematic content (ie. anything 
other than arbitrarily related symbols and forms such as those 
commonly used in the task - cf. Griggs, 1983), in an 
appropriate context leads to improved performance (eg. Wason 
and Shapiro, 1971; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi, 1972). 
Such effects have caused problems for Piaget's 
classical theory of Formal Operations and have led him to make 
revisions to it (Piaget, 1972). However, the revised Dual 
Process theory can explain such effects quite adequately by 
proposing that, when the subject's understanding of the 
sentence is facilitated by thematic materials, more weighting 
is attached to the verbal, interpretational process than the 
operational one thus leading to improved performance. 
It should be stated that thematic materials' effects 
are elusive, however, as Griggs (1983) has shown in his review. 
He suggests that when substantial facilitation has been 
observed with thematic materials, the effect could have 
resulted from "the cueing of familiar relevant material in 
long-term memory, instructions that conceivably biased 
subjects' strategies, and a problem context that may have 
changed the nature of the selection task" (Griggs, 19839 P31). 
However, since the effect has lead to considerable research 
activity and debate in the literature (eq. Manktelow, 1978; 
Manktelow and Evans, 1979; Pollard, 1981; Griggs, 1983; Wason, 
1983), it is important that Evans' revisions to the Dual 
Process theory should encompass it. 
In another publication (Evans, 1980b), other 
important modifications are suggested. For instance, Evans now 
refers to the Type 2 process as verbal and the Type 1 process 
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as non-verbal rather than continuing with the somewhat vaguer 
conscious/unconscious distinction. Thus a verbal (Type 2) 
process is seen as a cause of reasoning behaviour, in parallel 
with a non-verbal (Type 1) process, rather than merely being 
adept at generating p2st_hoc rationalisations. 
It has been shown how the revised theory allows the 
possibility of a verbal rational process acquiring control of 
behaviour - for. instance, when realistic materials are used. 
However, since the verbal process is not introspectible, 
introspective reports are still viewed as rationalisations and 
as products of the Type 2 process, rather than a description 
of it. In certain circumstances subjects' rationalisations may 
appear wholly appropriate, when problems lie within their 
competence or experience. However, as Pollard (1979) states, 
this does not mean that one can use introspections to infer the 
process underlying behaviour in the way that Van Duyne (1973) 
suggests, since they are essentially g-22I. -hoc 
rationalisations 
(cf. Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). 
Speculation as to the origin of the dual processes 
was made by Evans (1980b) when he suggested a link with 
hemispheric specialisation. Much of the evidence reviewed by 
Cohen (1983) suggests that the left hemisphere is specialised 
for verbal and the right hemisphere for non-verbal processing. 
Some modest evidence in support of Evans' hypothesis was 
apparent from a study by Golding, Reich and Wason (1974). Their 
subjects performed a selection task using the tactile modality, 
in which information was presented to the right or left hand. 
Subjects were given the opportunity to revise their original 
selections following the presentation of the solution to one of 
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their hands. They found a. tendency- (just below si(3nificance) 
for better performance with information presented to the left 
hemisphere. Other stronc3er evidence (Goldinc3,1981) indicates 
that patients with right hemisphere lesions perform better on 
the selection task than those with left hemisphere lesions or 
than those in a control group. In a follow up study (Golding, 
1980) she found that ECT administered to the non-dominant 
(usually right) hemisphere led to improved performance on the 
task relative to a control group. This evidence is suggestive 
that "logical performance on the selection task is normally 
inhibited by competing influences from the right hemisphere" 
(Evans, 1982, p251). This suggestion is in line with the latest 
revised version of the Dual Process theory. 
The use of 4bstract materials in studying reasoning 
performance has been criticised by some authors who believe 
that onlj thematic problems are worth studying (eg. 
Johnson-Laird and Steedman, 1978; Fillenbaum, 1978). Whilst the 
study of reasoning with thematic materials is of considerable 
importance, it is di++icult with realistic materials to isolate 
the effects of the semantic context of the problem from purely 
logical ef+ects. For instance, a subject's prior belie+s or 
prejudices are likely tO influence judgement when realistic 
materials are used. As Evans (1982, p226) writes "the point 
about realistic materials is that they induce responses that 
are appn2pniate to our experience, which may or may not 
correspond to a logical definition of validity". The use of 
abstract content makes it impossible +or subjects to make 
direct use of their previous learned experience and so, as 
Evans (1983, p636) writes, "logical ability is, then, best 
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assessed on abstract problems, where prior knowledge can 
neither help nor hinder reasoning". On this basis it is 
considered wise to employ abstract materials which arouse few 
semantic associations in experiments designed to assess the 
nature of the processes underlying conditional reasoning 
performance. 
Whilst the Dual Process theory was initially 
developed to account for performance obtained on Wason's 
selection task, it is also applied to explaining performance on 
other reasoning paradigms (such as those considered earlier in 
this chapter) in which logical and non-logical processes are 
thought to operate. The revised formulation of the theory 
obviously renders it considerably broader in scope. Its 
increased precision also makes it more susceptible to testing 
and, in these senses, it is a better theory. Although several 
aspects of it are of considerable importance, the distinction 
between Verbal and Non-verbal processes is of particular 
interest in the present case. However, before this aspect is 
tested experimentally, some broader links with other ideas will 
be explored in order to formulate additional hypotheses about 
the nature of the dual processes. In the next chapter of the 
review, parallels will be drawn between the revised theory and 
other contemporary models of cognition. 
, 4; -; 
CHAPTER 2 
THE NATURE OF CODING PROCESSES IN HIGH-LEVEL COGNITION. 
One aspect of Evans' (1980a; 1980b) revised Dual 
Process theory of reasoning that is particularly interesting is 
the distinction between competing verbal and non-verbal 
processes which underlie the logical and non-logical factors of 
conditional reasoning performance (Evans, 1977b). The notion of 
dual codes in the elementary stages of cognition is not 
uncommon (eg. Posner, 1973). However Evans' hypothesis that 
dual processes influence the more advanced stages is much more 
controversial although the idea is not without precedents. 
A particular advantage of the verbal/non-verbal 
distinction lies in its connection with the theoretical 
proposals of others. Neisser (1963), for instance, proposes 
that a main sequence of verbal thought interacts with multiple 
pre-attentive processes. However in this case the main sequence 
is identified with consciousness whilst the multiple processes 
are said to be more effectively active at a pre-conscious 
level. A much more influential theory that distinguishes 
discrete verbal and non-verbal systems of thinking was derived 
from the Dual Coding Hypothesis originally proposed by Paivio 
in 1971. This theory will be considered in the following 
section. 
PAIVIO'S DUAL CODING HYPOTHESIS 
The idea of dual cognitive systems of equal status 
has been most obviously considered in the study of mental 
imagery. In 1971, Paivio published an important book in which 
the influence of imaginal and verbal symbolic processes wer--iý 
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assessed in relation to problems of meaning, perception, 
learning, memory and language. The empirical approach which he 
adopted involves the use o+ three types o-f converging 
operations which are all, in the words of Paivio (1971, p9), 
"conceptually linked by the postulated imaginal and verbal 
symbolic processes". These operations include: 
1) Attributes of. stimulus materials, with particular emphasis 
on their concreteness/abstractness properties, 
2) Experimental manipulations, such as differential task 
instructions, presentation rates and task demands, 
3) Individual di+ference variables. 
The evidence gathered f rom this approach led to the Dual Coding 
Hypothesis (Paivio, 1971) which postulates the existence, in 
memory5 oi two independent but interconnected coding systems - 
one verbal and the other imaginal - operating in parallel. 
More recently, Paivio (1975) has extended the notion 
of dual codes in memory to dual systems in thinking. He assumes 
(p147) that thinking involves a continuous interplay of 
non-ve-rbal imagery with verbal symbolic processes, "which 
though inter-connected_ are functionally distinct". As Paivio 
(p147) writes "however else it might be characterised, thinking 
clearly involves taking in or encoding stimulus information, 
organising and storing it in memory and retrieving that 
information according to the requirements of a given task". The 
differential effects of imagery and verbal processes on each of 
these elements of memory led to his proposal of the Dual Coding 
Hypothesis. 
He suggests that the imagery system is specialised 
for processing non-verbal information and is characterised by 
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concrete, analogical thinking. The imagery process contributes 
to the richness o+ content, +1exibility and speed oi thinking. 
By contrast, the verbal system is characterised as an abstract, 
logical mode of thinking which limits memory content and 
flexibility but contributes logical direction to thinking. The 
interconnectedness o+ the systems "means that representations 
in one system can activate those in the other, so that for 
example, pictures can be named and images can occur to words. 
Independence implies, among other things, that non-verbal 
(imaginal) and verbal memory codes, aroused directly by 
pictures and words or indirectly by imagery and verbal encoding 
tasks, should have additive eifects on recall" (Paivio and 
Lambert, 1981, p532 - 533). Paivio (1983, p309) identifies the 
imagery and verbal systems in terms of It synchronous and 
sequential processes, correlated with the contrast between 
analog and discrete representations". 
There are some obvious similarities between the 
theories of Paivio (1975) and Evans (1980a; 1980b) in that a 
logical process which is verbal in nature and a non-logical, 
non-verbal process are believed to operate in thinking. 
Admittedly Evans does not claim that his non-logical process is 
ima<3ery-based, but this would appear to be a reasonable 
possibility. The origin of 7 Matching Bias' could be derived 
quite plausibly from the operation of a visual imagery system. 
The focus on values which are perceptually present could reveal 
the influence of a concrete, visual system of thinking which 
interferes with the abstract logical thought that successful 
conditional reasoning necessitates. 
However, this kind o+ approach would be contested by 
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certain theorists (eg. Pylyshyn, 1973; Anderson and Bower, 
1973) who assume that the coding processes underlying memory 
and thought consist of abstract propositions that are neutral 
with respect to input modality, including the verbal/non-verbal 
dichotomy. Before the empirical evidence relating to Paivio's 
Dual Coding Hypothesis is assessed the theoretical dispute 
concerning the functional status of imagery will be outlined. 
THE IMAGERY DEBATE 
For several years there have been differing views 
expressed in the literature about the nature of the coding and 
processes underlying various cognitive acts. There are two main 
opposing theoretical camps in this debate and, in this section, 
some of the main points under consideration will be outlined. 
The so-called 'Imagist' position claims a functional 
role for mental imagery in cognition (eq. Kosslyn and 
Pomerantz, 1977; Kasslyn, Pinker, Smith and Shwartz, 1979; 
Kosslyn, 1981). Its main opposition comes from 
'Propositional iStS7 who suggest that all, including visual, 
information is internally represented by means of abstract 
propositions and that cognitive operations consist of their 
manipulation (eq. Pylyshyn, 1973; 1981) with no functional role 
for imagery envisaged. Both camps have cited empirical 
investigations, discussed the relevance of introspective 
accounts, proposed computer simulations and engaged in 
considerable philosophical discussion but still, to date, no 
consensus has been reached. 
Many propositionalists would regard imagery as 
epiphenomenal - as the result of a process rather than the 
process itself. Although it may be tempting to call upon 
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introspective reports to counter such a suggestion, their 
usefulness as explanations has, quite correctly, been 
questioned. For instance, Pylyshyn (1973, p2 - 3) notes that 
"what is available to conscious inspection may not be what 
plays the important causal role in psychological processes". 
However, other authors do not wish to ignore the fact that 
introspective accounts of performance on various tasks 
frequently include reference to mental imagery (see Paivio, 
1971; Richardson, 1980a). Although such accounts by no means 
establish that imagery plays a functional role, Kosslyn and 
Pomerantz (1977) claim that, nevertheless, they constitute 
important corroborative evidence and, as data in their own 
right, should be encompassed by any comprehensive theory in 
this area. Other dual coding proponents stress that the 
phenomenal experience of imaging is by no means essential to 
its usefulness as an explanatory construct (Bugelski, 1977). 
After all, there may not be a strong correlation between 
conscious awareness of imagery and the efficiency of a process 
involving it in various tasks (see Evans, 1980b, p282). 
The crux of the debate seems to rest not on the 
existence of the phenomenon called imagery, which very few 
psychologists would deny, but on what mental representations 
underlie it ( Anderson, 1978). One opponent of the imagery 
position (Pylyshyn, 1973) criticises the fuzziness of the 
theoretical construct of 'image'. Although, as Paivio (1969) 
claims, imagery has been operationally defined for the purposes 
of empirical research in different paradigms, Pylyshyn suggests 
that imagists may be unjustified in assuming that the various 
definitions converge on an equivalent theoretical construct. He 
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questions the inappropriate use o+ the 'Picture-in-the-head' 
metaphor. There is a persistent use, in describing imagery, of 
words and phrases which are more appropriate for describing 
pictures and the process o+ perception. This merely pushes all 
of the problems of perception onto an homunculus. Pylyshyn 
(197ý 3) suggests that the metaphor is inadequate in a number of 
respects. For instance, images are not re-perceived as pictures 
are perceived since they are already interpreted to a <3reat 
extent. When parts are missing from one's recollections these 
form meaningful units rather than being like the missing corner 
of a torn photograph. Furthermore he claims that the capacity 
needed to store just a few 'raw' picture-like images would far 
exceed that available in the brain. Another problem concerns 
the retrieval of uninterpreted images from amongst the wealth 
of images that people commonly claim. He dismisses the 
possibility of scanning prospective candidates before the 
'mind's eye' since the time taken for an exhaustive search 
would be prohibitive and no awareness oi searching is apparent 
but rather access appears to be direct. The alternative 
possibility Pylyshyn (1973, p9) suggests is that they are 
"tagged by some gross labels and associatively retrieved by a 
multiple-sort key". Pylyshyn dismisses this on the grounds that 
small, and even abstract, details of an event can be retrieved 
in fine detail without first being aware of calling up the 
entire scene. The point is that images behave as though they 
have been analysed. I+ this is accepted then, on grounds of 
economy, the 'raw' image can be dispensed with and the analysis 
alone can be assumed to be stored. 
In countering Pylyshyn's arguments concerninc3 the 
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absence of a precise definition of limage', Kosslyn and 
Pomerantz (1977) claim that, in the early stages of theory 
building, it is common and indeed advantageous to employ 
converging operations to investigate a construct whose 
de+iition is not precisely formulated. Also Kosslyn and 
Pomerantz (1977) and Paivio (1976) refer to the 
'picture-in-the-head' metaphor as a 'straw man' claiming that 
such a view is not held seriously as a working theory. They 
claim that images are more like the outputs of the perceptual 
system rather than their inputs. As to capacity limitations, 
the storage capacity of the brain remains unknown. The amount 
of information in an image has not been effectively defined but 
certainly the "relatively large, interpreted, perceptual 
'chunks'" envisaged by Kosslyn and Pomerantz (1977, p59) would 
require less capacity than the 'raw' pictures envisaged by 
Pylyshyn. In any case, the issue concerning capacity limitation 
could be similarly addressed to alternative propositional 
models of representation (cf. Anderson, 1978). With regard to 
accessibility, the speed of searching +or a particular image is 
simply unknown but, according to Kbsslyn and Pomerantz, 
possibly could be facilitated by assuming that verbal or other 
tags are associated with images. 
In reviewing the empirical evidence claimed in 
support of the Dual Coding-approach both Pylyshyn (197-3) and 
Anderson (1978) have been criticised for being "selective and 
incomplete" (Paivio, 1983y p310). Pylyshyn's (1973) critique 
has relied in the main on various logical arguments such as 
those outlined above. Even his later critique (Pylyshyn, 1981) 
has tended to concentrate on the experiments concerning 'mental 
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scanning, and 'mental rotation' transformations by Kosslyn and 
his colleagues. In explaining the results of such studies, 
Pylyshyn has suggested that tacit knowledge of what should 
occur in analogous real-life situations is employed by subjects 
to draw inferences appropriate to the experimental task and 
imagery instructions without the utilisation of mental imagery. 
However Kosslyn (1981) provides strong counter-arguments and 
Pylyshyn's view seems inadequate as an account of the 'mental 
scanning' da. ta derived in a recent study by Reed, Hock and 
Lockhead (1983). In any case, as will be shown, these kinds of 
task produce only a small amount of the overall empirical 
evidence claimed in support of Paivio's (1971; 1975) hypothesis. 
In his assessment of the debate, Anderson (1978) has 
stated that both propositional and dual code models can be made 
to -yield identical behavioural predictions and so the +orm o+ 
internal representation cannot be determined by appeal to 
behavioural data alone. The point he makes is that for any 
model postulating a particular internal representation, an 
alternative model which is behaviourally indistinguishable can 
be defined which uses another form of representation. This can 
be done by making compensatory changes in the accessing 
process. Although this argument is valid, Anderson's concl-usion 
that "barring decisive physiological data, 'it will not be 
possible to establish whether an internal representation is 
pictorial or propositional" (Anderson, ig7s, p249) appears 
unjustified. The reason is simply that no finite amount of 
data, even physiological, uniquely determines the correctness 
of a theory (cf. Popper, 1968). Appeals to other criteria such 
as parsimony and plausability, ef4icienc- and OPtimality are 
56 
not given sufficient weighting in Anderson's account. However, 
two of the major protagonists in the debate (Pylyshyn, 1981; 
Paivio, 1983) suggest that considerations such as 
generalisability and integrative value, constrai, -Iedness, 
predictive qualities, etc., are of considerable relevance to 
the dispute. 
As Paivio (1983, p311) writes "dual codinc3 and 
imagery based theories generally account +or a wide range o+ 
findings, which cannot be handled by abstract descriptive 
approaches except by the addition of p2At_lloc assumptions with 
each new turn in the data". Some propositionalists, such as 
Anderson (1978) and Kieras (1978), have even incorporated 
perceptual and linguistic propositions into their theories in 
order to accommodate exactly the same range of findings as the 
Dual Coding theory. However, Paivio (1963, p328) writes that 
"the two approaches would then become indistinguishable because 
the propositional model would simply be a conceptual variant or 
paraphrase of dual coding". Nevertheless Anderson's argument in 
favour of a tricode theory is worthy of consideration. He 
writes (p274): "it seems clear that the human must process 
three kinds of information: visual-spatial, verbal-sequential 
and, abstract-proposi t ion al...... the kinds O-f information 
representations optimal for these three domains are different. 
Therefore, it would seem that there would be a strong survival 
advantage pushing in the direction of three separate codes with 
the potential f or intertranslation among them". Although 
seemingly unparsimonious at +irst, the tricode theory approach 
is currently gaining +avour (eq. Snodgrass, 1984; Glucksberg, 
1984). Notwithstanding, the imagery debate is by no means 
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resolved. 
In fairness it must be said that the 
propositionalists have been more reactive in their explanation 
of empirical data. Indeed most of the empirical data have been 
generated by imagery researchers and, since a major aim of any 
explanatory theory is prediction, this is a criticism of 
propositional theories. Also many of the propositional models 
which are put forward appear to be limited in application to a 
narrow range of tasks and need modification to accommodate even 
slight changes in procedure (eq. Clark and Chase, 1972). 
Nevertheless, their underlying basis is claimed to have 
considerable generality. The dual coding approach on the other 
hand seems to be supported by a wide variety of different 
findings. In the next few pages of this chapter some of the 
empirical evidence relating to this debate will be considered. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE IMAGERY DEBATE. 
Paivio (1983) has identified about sixty rel'able 
empirical findings that lend support to the Dual Coding theory 
and appear to detract from the plausibility of propositional 
accounts. In his own words "the classes of findings include 
effects of item concreteness or imagery value, pictures as 
compared to words as stimuli, imagery instructions in various 
tasks, reaction time functions in such tasks as mental 
comparisons and figural transformations of various kinds, 
modality specific interference, perceptual and memory 
comparisons, effects of individual differences in spatial and 
verbal abilities, and functional differences in the two 
cerebral hemispheres" (Paivio, 1983, p311). Whilst the bulk of 
these experiments will not be considered in detail, a selection 
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of these and other studies will be assessed in the next few 
pages. 
As Paivio (1983) suggests "when a perceptual task 
selectively disrupts performance on a concurrent mental task or 
vice versa, it is generally assumed that common processing 
systems are involved". A classic series of experiments by 
Brooks (1967,1968) employ this sort of competing task 
methodology to demonstrate imagery suppression. 
The studies of Brooks demonstrate that the secondary 
task can be performed during the input or response output 
stage. An example of input interference is given by Brooks 
(1967) who shows that reading and hearing sentences describing 
a spatial array leads to poorer immediate recall than just 
hearing them. The reverse is the case when - nonsensical 
sentences are used. It appears that visual presentation 
interferes with the concurrent construction of an internal 
spatial representation. Output inteference is shown in another 
experiment in which written recall of a spatial message took 
longer than spoken recall although no difference was found for 
non-spatial control messages. 
It is worthwhile describing one of Brooks' (1968) 
follow-up experiments in some detail because of the importance 
of the selective interference methodology to the investigations 
that will be reported in the present experimental chapters. In 
this study he required his subjects to categorise each word in 
a remembered, aurally presented sentence as either a noun or a 
non-noun. If the sentence is recalled in an articulatory manner 
then vocally signalling the response sequence should be more 
disruptive than using a different, non-articulatory, mode of 
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responding. The subject was given one of three different ways 
of signalling the sequence: 
1) saying 'Yes' for a noun and 'No' for a non-noun. Thus the 
correct sequence would be "NO", "YES", "NO", "NO", "YES", NO", 
"NO", "NO", "NO" ,n YES", for the sample sentence na bird in the 
hand is not in the bush", 
or 2) tapping with the left hand for each noun and the right 
hand for each non-noun, 
or 3) pointing to a 'Y' for nouns and to an 'N' for non-nouns 
on an array such as that shown in Figure 2.1 . To produce the 
correct sequence for the sample sentence given above, the 
subject would point to the top "N", the second "Y", the third 
and fourth "N"s etc, in the figure. 
YN 
Y 
y N 
y N 
y 
y 
y N 
y 
yN 
Figure 2.1 A sheet such as those used for the pointing 
condition of Brooks' (1968) experiment 1. The letters were 
staggered to force close visual monitoring of pointing. (From 
Brooks, 1968, figure 1). 
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In another condition of the same experiment subjects 
were presented with a diagram such as that illustrated in 
Figure 2.2 
Figure 2.2 A sample of the simple block diagrams used by 
Brooks (1968) experiment 1. The asterisk indicates the starting 
point and the arrow the direction of working. (From Brooks, 
1968, figure 2). 
They were asked to categorise, from memory, each of 
the corners of block letters, such as that illustrated in the 
diagram, starting from the asterisk and proceeding in the 
direction of the arrow, as either extreme top, extreme bottom 
or as somewhere in between. I+ the letter is recalled in a 
visuo-spatial manner then responding visually ( tv) aý t is 
by pointing in the same manner as before) should be more 
disruptive than responding vocally. The results of this 
experiment are shown in Table 2.1 . 
Output 
Referent Pointing Tapping Vocal 
Sentences 9.8 7.8 13.8 
Diagrams 28.2 14.1 11.3 
Table 2.1 . Mean output 
time (seconds) for the six conditions 
of Brooks' Experiment I. (Data from Brooks, 1968, table I). 
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It can be seen from Table 2.1 that vocal output was 
slowest for categorising sentences whereas visually monitored, 
pointing output was slowest for categorising block letter 
diagrams. These differences were significant. These results 
suggest that images and percepts conflict with each other 
prov idi ng that they occur in the same modality and impose 
simultaneous demands on specific processing resources. Dual 
coding specifically appears to gain support from this sort of 
double selective interference since visuo-spatial and verbal 
information are apparently processed in separate 
modality-specific ways. 
However, it should be stated that the above 
interpretation of Brooks' data has been questioned by Phillips 
and Christie (1977). They argue that, since his designs lack 
control conditions in which no interference is present, it is 
inappropriate to infer specificity in both modalities from the 
results. After all, performance in the control condition might 
not be intermediate to the visuo-spatial and verbal 
interference conditions. Indeed their own experiments are 
interpreted as showing that visualisation is interfered with 
when a competing task (the adding of a series of visually or 
aurally-presented digits) demands concurrent use of a general 
purpose rather than a modality-speci+ic resource. They concede 
that mental addition (even of auditory digits) could involve 
mental imagery. Indeed individuals often claim to employ 
imagery in mental arithmetic tasks (Hayes, 1973). However, 
Phillips and Christie (1977, p648) argue that this possibility 
"seems unlikely, and if true would reduce the grounds +or 
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calling the visual processor 'special purpose'". 
Baddeley and Lieberman (1980) report a series of 
experiments which clarify Brooks' results and suggest that the 
disruption involves a spatial processing system rather than a 
visual one. However this does not seem to damage Paivio's Dual 
Process Hypothesis "because visual imagery is assumed to 
include spatial information as an essential component" (Paivio, 
1983 , p321). It is very difficult +or the propositionalists to 
accommodate results such as these, since they contend that all 
information is processed in a unitary amodal system. 
Furthermore, Baddeley and Lieberman (1980, p537) suggest that 
the evidence in favour of a spatially-based system "does not 
preclude the occurrence of a parallel system or component 
concerned with pictorial or non-spatial visual representation". 
The evidence of Atwood (1971) is indicative of such a system. 
Atwood's (1971) evidence is derived from a 
paired-associate learninc3 task in which pairs of nouns were 
incidentally memorised. The nouns +or recall were embedded in 
either highly visualisable, concrete phrases such as 'a nudist 
devouring a bird' or abstract phrases such as 'the intellect of 
Einstein was a miracle'. One group of subjects received the 
former kind of material and were asked to visualise the scene 
described. The other group received the latter kind of material 
and were asked to contemplate the meaning oi the sentences. An 
inter+ering task was interposed in the period between 
presentation and recall. This task involved the presentation of 
a digit (either 'I' or '2') to which the subject responded with 
the name o+ the digit which was not presented. This secondary 
task involved either the visual or the auditory modality. 
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control condition was also employed involving no interfering 
task. It was found that nouns embedded in visualisable phrases 
were recalled better*than other nouns in the control condition. 
Lower recall occurred with imageable phrases under the visual 
interference condition relative to the auditory interference 
condition, whereas the reverse effect occurred with the 
abstract phrases. This result has been replicated and extended 
by Ja . nssen (1976) who eliminated various methodological 
weaknesses of the original study. He found that the 
interference effect occurred with single nouns as well as 
paired associates and found that the magnitude of the effect 
decreased as the rated imageability of the nouns decreased. 
Kosslyn (1980) suggests that visual mental images are 
actively generated from information stored in long-term memory. 
He hypothesises that they are "like displays on a cathode ray 
tube that are generated by a computer programme (plus data)" 
(KossIyn, 1980, p5-6). However, he distinguishes these 
quasi-pictorial 'surface images' from their underlying 'deep 
representations'. The crux of the imagery debate concerns the 
nature and function of the 'surface images' and whether they 
possess emergen t properties which are not manifested in the 
underlying representations. Kosslyn and his colleagues 
(Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn, 1981; Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith and 
Shwartz, 1979) provide evidence that the 'surface images' have 
perceptual-like functional properties. Typical experiments 
require subjects to construct visual images and transform or 
inspect them in a systematic manner. 
It has been shown by Kosslyn (1976) that less time is 
taken to verify large rather than small properties of stated 
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objects (eq. 'cats - head' versus 'cats - claws') when subjects 
are instructed to use visual imagery. However, in the absence 
of imagery instructions, the effect is determined by the 
strength of the verbal association between the object-noun and 
the property-noun. In the above case the smaller property 
('claws'), being the stronger verbal associate, is verified 
more quickly. 
Other experiments reviewed by Kosslyn (1980) show 
that image scanning time is proportional to the distance 
between points in a spatial image. Also, larger objects seem to 
7over+low' sooner than smaller objects when subjects are 
requested to imagine the object at a distance and then to 
imagine approaching the object. These results suggest that 
visual images depict spatial extent which is limited by 
boundaries. Furthermore, the acuity of the image is claimed to 
decrease as one moves from the centre towards the periphery of 
the visual field, just as in visual percepts. The precision of 
Kosslyn's account is illustrated by the production of a 
computer simulation of the model (kosslyn and Shwartz, 1977; 
Kosslyn, 1980) which has considerable heuristic value in 
predicting new data. 
The review of Paivio (1969) has emphasised the 
effects of word imagery-concreteness in learning and memory. 
The use of concrete rather than abstract materials generally 
leads to superior performance. Whilst Paivio (1971) suggests 
that both verbal and imaginal codes are interrelated, he 
assumes that different kinds a+ stimulus material 
have 
differential access to them. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3ý 
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Stimulus 
Picture 
Concrete word 
Abstract word 
Coding systems available 
Imaginal Verbal 
++ 
+ 
Figure 2.3 . The availability of imaginal and verbal cod i ng 
systems as a function of stimulus concreteness. The number of 
plus signs indicates the degree of availability of the 
appropriate coding system. (Adapted from Paivio, 1971, figure 
7-1). 
Paivio suggests that highly concrete items evoke 
imagery more easily and facilitation in recall arises because 
imaginal representations serve as a supplementary memory code. 
However, this idea has been disputed (Anderson and Bower, 1973; 
Richardson, 1980b) and the alternative 22R. L_j2S! E hypothesis they 
suggest is that abstract words lead to poorer performance 
because they are more confusible owing to their greater lexical 
complexity and their greater number of dictionary definitions. 
The imageability and concreteness of words is highly 
correlated, however, although differential effects on each 
dimension have been shown experimentally (see Richardson, 
1980c). When imagery instructions are given the distinction 
between them breaks down and ease of learning is dominated by 
rated imageability. 
In order to investigate Paivio's (1971) hypothesis 
that the superiority of recall +or high over low imagery words 
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is occasioned by their access to a supplementary imaginal code, 
a series of experiments was performed by Baddeley, Grant, Wight 
and Thomson (1975). They employed identical basic tasks and 
materials to those of Brooks (1968) described earlier (ie. 
Block 'F' and sentences such as 'bird in the hand is not in the 
bush') to establish that performance on a pursuit rotor 
tracking task involves a visuo-spatial component. It was found 
subsequently that memory for aurally presented visualisable 
material (sentences describing the location of eight digits in 
a four by four matrix) was impaired more than memory for 
otherwise equivalent, non-visualisable nonsense sentences (cf. 
Brooks, 1967) whilst performing on the pursuit rotor task. Thus 
imagery as an active control process in visual Working Plemory 
can be disrupted by concurrent visual activity. However, recall 
performance in a paired-associate memory task did not 
demonstrate an interaction between concreteness of the 
materials and tracking aI though the usual main effect of 
concreteness was attained. Baddeley et al concluded that 
concreteness effects are not due to an imagery component. 
More recently, Mathews (1983) has investigated the 
same hypothesis by presenting for recall list s with equal 
number s of words high on both concreteness and imagibility 
rating scales together with some filler items. All o+. 
the words 
used were equivalent in familiarity ratings. 
During 
presentation of the lists, subjects were engaged in one a+ 
two 
concurrent visual activities. These were equivalent 
in their 
perceptual and motor demands but had been shown 
to differ in 
the degree to which they require the maintenance of information 
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by an image-like representation. Whilst high imagery words were 
recalled more e++iciently than low imagery words when the 
secondary task did not involve an imagery component, there was 
no such advantage when the secondary task required the 
maintenance of visual images. This latter result is supportive 
of the Dual Coding account. 
Further support for dual coding is given by the 
results of Klee and Eysenck (1973) who measured the ease of 
comprehension oi abstract and concrete sentences which were 
read to subjects under visual or verbal interference 
conditions. The sentences they used were either meaningful or 
anomalous, for example: 
Concrete meaninSiu_L: The veteran soldier rode the lame horse. 
Concrete anomalous: The large army beat the wild pearl. 
Abstract meanin_q±IA. I: The wrong attitude caused a major loss. 
Abstract anomalous: The mere knowledge brought the true hour. 
The visual interference was provided by visual presentation, 
between each word of the sentence, of separate five by five 
matrices with three of the squares blacked out. Verbal 
interference consisted of a separate digit being spoken in a 
distinctive voice between each word. After indicating via a key 
press whether the sentence was meaningful, the subjects had to 
recall the inter+ering stimuli. The mean comprehension 
latencies for co-ncrete and abstract sentences averaged over 
meaningful and anomalous sentences are shown in Table 2.2 . 
The interaction between interference condition and 
concreteness %,, ý, as significant and shows that comprehension 
latencies were longer with visual than with verbal interference 
for concrete sentences but vice versa for abstract sentences. 
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These results are consistent with the idea that visual imagery 
is used in comprehending concrete sentences and the processing 
of visual matrices interferes with image formation. 
Verbal interference 
Visual interference 
Abstract 
1.35 
1.18 
Concrete 
0.78 
0.97 
Table 2.2 . Mean comprehension latencies (in seconds) for 
concrete and abstract sentences under visual and verbal 
interference conditions. (Data from Klee and Eysenck, 1973, 
table 1). 
In spite of his earlier claim, noted above, 
Richardson (1980c, p87) has changed his position somewhat and 
he now claims that "while concreteness is a feature of lexical 
organisation and not a measure of image-arousing quality of 
verbal material, imageability is the effective stimulus 
attribute determining how easily it can be remembered". 
Furthermore, he writes (p96) that 7contemporary accounts of 
mental imagery, which identify stimulus imageability as a 
primary determiner of recall performance, are likely to be 
essentially correct". 
This sort of interpretation remains equivocal as 
studies with the congenitally blind illustrate. Zimler and 
Keenan (1983) compared the performance of congenitally blind 
and sighted individuals on a paired-associate learning task. 
The stimulus and response referents were either both high in 
visual (V-V) or high in auditory (A-A) imagery, or they were 
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mixed with one term coming from each category (A-V or V-A). 
Paivio (1971) has demonstrated that the imageability of the 
stimulus term is more critical than that of the response term 
in this task. I+ modality-specific imagery is used then blind 
subjects should perform worse when the stimulus term has a 
visual referent and the response an auditory one (V-A), rather 
than the other way round. Their results, which are shown in 
Table 2.3, were contrary to Paivio's hypothesis -in that blind 
subjects recalled items from V-V pairs better than other items 
overall, although their performance in this category was worse 
than that of sighted subjects. There was no difference between 
V-A and A-V pairs and A-A pairs for blind subjects even though, 
according to the hypothesis, better performance in the latter 
condition would be expected because imagery should be invoked 
to both stimulus and response terms. The only other significant 
difference was the poorer performance of sighted subjects 
overall with A-A pairs. Whilst this result +ails to replicate 
that of Paivio and Okovita (1971), it is essentially similar to 
other studies in the area. 
Subjects A-A 
B1ind . 40 
Sighted . 27 
Pair type 
A-V V-A V-V 
. 40 . 41 . 
47 
. 42 . 41 . 56 
Table 2.3 . Mean proportion of pair 
types recalled in a 
paired-associate learning task for blind and sighted subjects. 
(Data from Zimler and Keenan, 1983, table 1). 
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Zimler and Keenan's second experiment, using a free 
recall task, showed that blind subjects performed as well as 
sighted' ones on words grouped by colour and better on words 
grouped by sound. The fact that congenital IybI ind subjects, who 
cannot emp I cy vi sua I imagery as a supplementary memory aic4 
recall colour words as well as sighted subjects appears to run 
counter to Paivio's hypothesis and the claim o+ Richardson 
(1980c) noted above. 
Consideration o+ Figure 2.3 illustrates the rationale 
+or Paivio's hypothesis that pictures should be mnemonically 
superior to words. This is in fact the case as the extensive 
reviews o+ Paivio (1971) and Madigan (1983) illustrate. The 
material which they cite shows substantial improvement is 
occasioned in free recall by giving pictorial rather than 
verbal presentations 0+ task materials. The ef+ect is 
particularly marked in recognition memory when the amount C3 -f 
material presented is large (Standing, 1973). The superiority 
of pictures over words is durable and can extend up to several 
months. Standing also showed that with equally complex and 
detailed pictures, more unusual or vivid versions produced 
better recognition. Although increases in colour, detail and 
complexity seem to have no e++ects in recognition, they do lead 
to superior recall o+ associated verbal labels (Madigan, 198-3; 
Madigan and Lawrence, 1980). Nisbett and Ross (1980) have 
suggested that the facilitative effect of 'vivid' information 
on j%Adgement and inference may be the result of its greater 
availability in memory partially due to its imageability. 
Various explanations of the above picture-word 
differences have been proposed. For instance, the 'levels of 
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processing' approach of Craik and Lockhart (19721) has been 
invoked by Anderson (1978). However, this theory has been 
criticised for its circularity, amongst other things. 
Baddeley7s (197: 3) critique of this theory will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
Another possibility derives from the study of Nelson, 
Reid and Walling (1976) who investigated the relative effects 
of visual similarity and conceptual similarity of pictorial and 
verbal items in a paired-associate learning task, using 
unrelated words as responses. Items high in conceptual 
similarity came from the same taxonomic category (eq. 'tools' 
or 'animals') and items were selected so that they could be 
drawn to appear visually similar or dissimilar. If pictures are 
easier to remember than words because of the superiority of 
visual coding then high visual similarity should eliminate the 
effect. This was what occurred, visually similar pictures were 
no better than words at slow presentation rates, and were 
inferior at fast preSentation rates. Nelson (1979) concludes 
that the picture effect arises because of the visual features 
of pictures, particularly their discriminability, which leads 
them to be represented in an inherantly superior visual code. 
Further support for Paivio's account is given by the 
identification of orthogonal factors relating verbal abilities 
and imaginal and spatial abilities as measured in objective 
tests (Di Vesta, Ingersoll and Sunshine, 1971). There is 
evidence to show that objective measures can be successful in 
predicting performance on various tasks where imagery ability 
is postulated (see Ernest, 1977). This is not always the case 
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however (eq. Richardson, 1978). Some self-report measures of 
imagery have even been claimed as good predictors of 
performance (White, Sheehan and Ashton, 1977), but many of 
these tests are contaminated by influences of Isocial 
desirabilty'. 
Whilst most of the evidence mentioned above and a 
high proportion of that cited in the literature is compatible 
with the Dual Coding Hypothesis, the weight of negative 
findings is also growing. Paivio (1983) is able to dismiss many 
of these as due to misinterpretations of his theory. Other 
findings, which do not derive significant differences according 
to predictions of his theory and thus seem to offer support for 
the propositional approach, could be dismissed possibly as 
being due to failure to reject the null hypothesis. He admits 
that modifications to the theory are required to encompass both 
positive and negative findings within a single conceptual 
framework. Unitary propositional models do not appear adequate, 
nor do conceptual variants which distinguish perceptual and 
linguistic propositions. He claims that "the real challenge to 
dual-coding theory is the more specific one of explaining the 
discrepent findings in terms that are consistent with the 
general assumptions of the model, including the 
associationistic principles on which it is essentially founded" 
(Paivio, 1983, p328). All things considered, the argument of 
Anderson (1978), stated above, for a tricode approach could be 
gaining ground. 
In the next section of this chapter two problem 
solving tasks, both of which can be related to the imagery 
debate, will be considered. 
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Problem SolvinS_TAjkR_and the Ima3ery_2gbAte. 
At this stage it is appropriate to consider 
Anderson's (1978) argument concerning the role of propositional 
representations in inference making. He considers that 
propositions are especially suitable because their abstract 
truth-bearin(3 character means that they "only represent what is 
necessary to judge the validity (or plausibility) of an 
inference" (Anderson, 1978, p257). Pictorial representations 
cannot easily represent such properties as negation, except in 
binary circumstances. Also, as Cohen (198-37) points out, the 
representation of categories, rather than specific examples, 
seems intuitively difficult for pictorial images. How can image 
of a particular triangle serve for thinking about the general 
properties of triangularity? Negation and general properties of 
categories can be represented easily with propositions however. 
Whilst these problems are particularly relevant for some kinds 
of logicaI inference, spatial and relational inferences can be 
extracted quite readily from a spatial represention. 
The role of visual imagery in conditional reasoning 
has not been explored. However, there are certain classes of 
reasoning problem in which the role of visual imagery has been 
hotly contested. Two of these classes will be considered here. 
The first class is known N7ariously as the linear syllogism or 
the three-term series problem and its solution depends upon the 
making of valid transitive, otherwise known as relational, 
inferences. The second class involves the verification of 
sentences against pictorial representations. 
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a). Transitive Inference Tasks. 
Three-term series problems entail the presentation of 
two premises containing either the same comparative term or a 
comparative term and its converse, together with a question. An 
example of one such problem is given below: 
1) Harry is taller than John 
2) Harry is shorter than George 
Who is shortest? 
The premises in tne problem above can be represented 
schematically in the iollowing manner: 
1) B>C 
2) B 
where 'A' represents the most positively placed item, 'C' the 
most negatively placed and 'B' the middle term. Also '>' 
represents the comparative term when expressed positively and 
'<' when expressed negatively. For convenience, this notation 
will be used whenever appropriate. 
As Johnson-Laird (1972) puts it, "the fundamental 
problem in making a relational inference is to set up some 
internal representation-of the premises, be it abstract or 
concrete, that will allow the relation between those items, not 
specifically linked in a premise, to be determined". A 
controversy has existed for several years about whether such 
problems are solved in a visual way involving spatial imagery, 
or a purely verbal way involving an abstract propositional 
analysis. 
Each of these alternative viewpoints will be 
addressed with re+erence to some early studies initially. Since 
the greatest contrast between the two approaches can be seen 
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with relatively $pure' imagery and propositional theories, 
extreme examples of both types will be considered first of all. 
Eventually a theory which synthesizes aspects of both 
approaches will be outlined. 
Visual Ima_92ry_Theories. 
Two theories which impute spatial strategies in the 
solution of three-term series problems will be discussed in 
this section. The seminal imagery theory belongs to DeSoto, 
London and Handel (1965). Their basic proposal is that a 
unitary representation is constructed initially from the two 
premises. This consists of a linearly-ordered, vertically or 
horizontally orientated visual image. In addition, they suggest 
that arrays are constructed in accordance with certain 
fundamental principles which they apply in predicting the 
relative difficulty of various problem types. These principles 
will now be described. 
DeSoto et al have shown empirically that comparative 
dimensions can be assigned to vertical or horizontal arrays 
even when the relational term does not apparently have any ties 
with spatial phenomena. Certain of these assignments are fairly 
consistent across individuals. For instance 'good' is generally 
assigned to the top and 'bad' to the bottom of a vertical 
array. On the other hand, terms from the 'light - dark' 
dimension are not clearly oriented in such a manner, but show 
much qreater individual differences. The first principle is 
derived from a natural directional preference to construct 
vertical arrays from the top downwards and horizontal arrays 
from left to ric)ht. Any -general effect of directional 
preference on problem complexity will only be expected with 
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problems on which a clear spatial preierence exists. The second 
principle asserts that representations are easiest to construct 
from premises beginning with an 'end-anchor' (ie. 'A' or 'Cl) 
rather than with the middle term ('B'). How well these 
principles can be applied in an experimental situation to 
predict problem dif+iculty will be assessed in due course. 
Whilst the theory of Huttenlocher (1968) also assumes 
the use o+ an imagined array, it dif+ers +rom DeSoto et al7s in 
certain respects. Huttenlocher appears to rely much more 
heavily upon adult's subjective reports, than DeSoto et all in 
deriving her theory. She also draws a close analogy between 
production of imaginal representations in three-term series 
tasks and the physical construction of actual arrays in another 
task. In the concrete task, arrays are built by placing a third 
coloured bI ock onto a ladder so that a correspondence with 
sentences such as "the red block is on top of the green block" 
is achieved. She has found in her investigations of children's 
performance in the physical task (Huttenlocher and Strauss, 
1968) that the grammatical status (ie. Subject, Object) of the 
block to be moved has a considerable influence on difficulty, 
with grammatical subjects (in deep structure) being easiest to 
place. Accordingly, the principle of end-anchorin(3 is 
reformulated in such terms. 
Whilst the nett result of either formulation is 
equivalent as far as interpretation of the second premise is 
concerned, Huttenlocher's account does not predict a general 
end-anchoring effect for the first premise. It predicts that 
the item placed first will be the 'better' item where the 
relational term has an obvious spatial counterpart, otherwise 
77 
it will simply be the +irst item mentioned in the premise. 
Clark 7S (1969)_Linquistic Theory. 
Clark (1969) has criticised previous theories put 
forward to explain performance on three-term series problems 
for their lack o+ generality. He suggests a set o+ abstract 
linguistic processes which, he believes, can explain 
performance on a wide range of tasks. This linguistic theory is 
founded on three important psycholinquistic principles of 
sentence comprehension and ovies much to the work of Chomsky 
(1965). These , he claims, can be used as a basis for 
predicting the relative times it takes to solve two- and 
three-term series problems. Since many theories based on this 
kind of propositional analysis have been put forward in a 
variety of other situations, the application of Clark's three 
principles to transitive in+erence tasks will be described 
be I ow. 
The first two of Clark's principles characterise the 
comprehens-ion of premises, whi lst the third has more to do with 
the nature of the question posed. The first principle is that 
of the primacy of functional relations. Immediately after a 
sentence is comprehended certain important relations specifying 
such thinc3s as 'Subject-of', 'Predicate-of', 'Direct-object-of' 
and 'Main-verb-of' (cf. Chomsky, 1965) are stored "in a more 
readily available form than any other kinds of information, 
like that of theme" (Clark, 1969, p388). 
The second principle is that of lexical marking. It 
states that certain positive adjectives (eg. 'good', 'long', 
'interesting') are stored in a more readily accessible form 
78 
than their opposites. Clark cites evidence, suggesting that 
marked adjectives can be neutralised in certain contexts 
whereas unmarked ones cannot, in support of this principle. To 
illustrate this, consider the question 'How good is the fc3od? ' 
in which the an unbiased interrogator merely requests an 
evaluation of food, with the question 'How bad is the food? ' 
which implies that the interrogator is already biased towards 
the opinion that the food is bad but is asking for the extent 
of its badness. Additional support for this principle is drawn 
from the fact that the marked member serves as the name of the 
full scale (the name of the 'good-bad' scale is 'goodness'), 
whereas the unmarked member ('bad') names only half the scale. 
The third principle is that Of congruence. In 
answerinc) a question, the listener requires more than an 
understanding of the specific question as phrased. He will need 
to understand that other phrasings are congruent with it and, 
in searching memory, be guided by this in order to find the 
desired information and formulate an answer. Such congruency is 
at the level 0+ functional relations. The listener "cannot 
answer the question until he finds congruent information, or 
until he reformulates the question so that he is able to do so" 
(Clark, 1969, p390). 
Consider the comparative sentence below: 
John is better than Dick. 
According to Clark, the propositional representation o+ such 
sentences involves two base strings, eq.: 
John is good. Dick is good. 
containing the +unctional (Subject-predicate) relations, which 
are bound together by a comparative term (eg. 'more than'). In 
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the example this reads: 
John is more good than Dick is good. 
It is claimed that the functional relations are more readily 
available than the comparative term. However, consideration of 
the way in which children encode comparative premises (cf. 
Donaldson, 1963) leads to a slight amendment here in that the 
base propositions may incorporate additional information. In 
the above example this would signify that 'John' is the better 
one of the pair, and the propositions are abbreviated to: 
John is good+ 
Dick is good- 
The principle of lexical marking suggests that, 
whenever possible, sentences are interpreted in their unmarked 
sense, since the marked sense takes longer to store and 
retrieve from memory. Therefore it is predicted that 'better' 
premises are processed faster than 'worse' premises. 
The principle of congruence predicts that questions 
phrased in a form congruent with the representation of the 
prem i se (s) , eq. : 
Who is best? 
will be processed more quickly than those which are not, eq.: 
Who is worst? 
Clark (1969) gained support for these hypotheses in 
an experiment in which the materials were eight two-term series 
problems of the general form: 
A is better than B 
Which is worst? 
The surface structures of premise and questions were varied 
orthogonally with the deep structural analyses which, he 
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proposes, theY entail by incorporating negative equatives ('A 
isn't as bad as B') into the design. Clark suggests that his 
use of the 'negative equative' construction distinguishes his 
theory from the previous imagery theories. This is because the 
propositional representations of negative equative forms are 
radically different from comparative forms. 
The application of Clark's linguistic theory to the 
solution of three-term series problems is obviously complex. 
When encoding the second premise, for instance, individuals may 
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to assign the be required to employ a time consuminc3 stratec)- 
appropriate ordinal relationships to the propositions stored. 
Clark does not give details of how individuals proceed from 
this stage. In performing an information processing analysis o+ 
the task, Johnson-Laird (1972) notes that one of the terms will 
have been encoded twice. He suggests that the fact that it must 
be the middle term will be recorded. Thus the extremity oi the 
other two terms is established. Clark predicts that, when 
premise pairs have homogeneous relational terms, those in which 
the deep structural analyses are in terms of marked 
comparatives will be easier than those in terms of unmarked. 
comparatives. Also congruent questions should be easier than 
incongruent ones. However, problems with heterogeneous 
relational terms involve a further complexity in that the 
questions will be congruent with certain base strings and 
incongruent with others. The theory suggests that problems are 
easier when the answer is embedded in a base string which is 
congruent with the question. 
At this stage it is worth examining some experimental 
data from each of the above studies to see how they compare in 
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their predictions of problem difficulty. Initially the case 
involving comparative problems using assymmetrical relational 
terms will be considered. Unfortunately DeSoto et al only 
reported the frequency of correct solutions. Both imagery 
theorists reported their data averaged over different question 
types. Consequently the evidence for congruency effects can 
only be seen in Clark's data. Also Huttenlocher's latencies 
were measured from the presentation of the second premise and 
thus minimised the contribution of the first premise to problem 
dif+iculty. The relevant data are shown in Table 2.4 . 
Consideration of the predictions made by Clark's 
theory concerning problem difficulty will show that they are 
the same as made by the original imagery theory of DeSoto et 
al. If the unmarked adjective is that placed at the top of the 
imagined array, then lexical marking and 'direction of working' 
suggest the same order of difficulty for problems with 
homogeneous premises. In fact Clark's mean latencies and DeSoto 
et al's frequencies both show problems I and I' (in Table 2.4) 
to be easier than problems 4 and 4'. With heterogeneous 
premises,. predictions based on congruence and on 
2 and 'end-anchoring' both lead to the prediction that problems . 
2' should be easier than problems 3 and 31. This is in fact the 
case once again. 
According to the linguistic theory, the order of 
premise pairs should not make any difference to difficulty so 
that I and 1', 2 and 2', etc., should be equivalent although 
this is not in fact the case. Clark attempts to account for 
this result in terms of 'compression of information' so that it 
is easier to handle in memory. DeSoto et al predict that the 
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former problems would be easier in each case because the first 
term mentioned corresponds to the top of the imagined array and 
a top-down strategy is the prefer'red 'direction of working' 
with these kinds of problem. 
DeSoto et al Huttenlocher Clark 
(1965) (1968) (1969) 
Problem Comparative: -Better-worse Taller-shorter Better-worse 
Best? Worst? Mean 
1 A>B 60.5 155 542 610 575 
B>C 
11 B>C 52.8 135 498 552 525 
A<B 
2 A>B 61.8 141 5-75 534 534 
C<B 
2' C<B 57.0 142 484 584 532 
A>B 
3 B<A 41.5 157 500 602 549 
B>C 
3' B>C 38.3 157 612 545 577 
B<A 
504 547 4 B<A 50.0 142 59ý 
C>B 
4' C<B 42.5 161 627 653 640 
B<A 
% correct Latencies in centiseconds 
Table 2.4 Relative difficulty of three-term series problems 
from three studies. (Data from Evans, 19821, table 4.3). 
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Huttenlocher's theory predicts that the construction 
of arrays is facilitated, and hence problems are easier, when 
an end (eg. top or bottom) item appears as the grammatical 
subject of the premise. Thus whilst no differences would be 
expected for 2 versus 27 or 3 versus 3 7,4 and I' should be 
easier than 4' and I respectively. It should be recalled that 
Huttenlocher's latencies were measured from the presentation of 
the second premise. In the latter two comparisons, the 
grammatical subject of the second premise is an end item in 
both of the easier problem types. Although Huttenlocher's data 
fits well with these predictions, Clark's does not. 
In his account, Clark suggests that the effects of 
congruency and the use of 'negativq* equative7 premises are 
critical in differentiating his theory from imagery theories. 
However, this view has been questioned by Huttenlocher, 
Higgins, Milligan and Kauffman (1970) and they have provided 
further evidence in support of their spatial imagery 
interpretation. Although it was originally felt t-hat negative 
equatives could be used to differentiate between the linguistic 
and spatial theories, it is not clear what predictions should 
be made from Huttenlocher's theory about problems incorporating 
them. Both Johnson-Laird (1972) and Evans (1982) claim that the 
dispute was never really resolved. 
In summary) there are dif+iculties +or both o+ the 
approaches outlined here. On the one hand the imagery theory 
cannot explain the e+fects o+ congruence whereas, on the other 
hand, the linguistic theory cannot explain the e++ects o+ 
premise order. 
Nevertheless, both kinds of theory can 
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accommodate many important aspects of the data. Perhaps 
Johnson-Laird (1972) is correct in suggesting a compromise 
position. In solving a series of problems subjects may employ 
an imagery strategy at first, but "intellectual development" 
within the experiment might lead them to adopt a verbal one as 
they become more adept. It has also been suggested that "the 
main function of the imaginal aspect of performance may be as 
an aid to memory" (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972, p120). 
Other experimenters have concluded that the type of 
problem material is the crucial factor. Converging operations 
were employed by Shaver, Pierson and Lang (1975) in their 
investigations. They manipulated the characteristics of the 
problem materials in the same way as DeSoto et al (1965) whose 
data suggests that the comparative dimensions above-below, 
better-worse and lighter-darker decrease in the degree to which 
they suggest an imaginal representation. Following Brooks' 
(1967,1968) experiments which imply that reading interieres 
with visuo-spatial imagery, they argue that the interference 
occasioned by visual versus aural presentation would be 
greatest for problems easiest to image and least for problems 
most difficult to image. Whilst they obtained main effects of 
Presentation Condition and Dimension in the predicted 
directions, the crucial interaction between these factors fell 
just short of significance. They also analysed the subjects' 
self reports concerning their strategies into Visuo-spatial, 
Verbal or Mixed kinds and reported a significant correlation of 
this with the subjects' assessments of which Presentation 
Condition seemed more difficult for each Dimension. 
Un+ortunately, as Evans (1982) stresses, this correlation 
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should include reasoning 2erformance rather than two 
introspective measures if it is to add useful information to 
the debate. 
remarkable example of over-reliance on 
introspective reporting in this context is given by Quinton and 
Fellows (1975). Their subjects'sel+-reports concerning a whole 
series o-f pr-oblems could be classi+ied into two main types 
'thinking' and 7 perceptual'. When subjects were asked to 
implement their most e+fective strategy in a subsequent series, 
those claiming 'perceptual' strategies were most efficient. 
Furthermore two new subjects trained in the use of 'perceptual' 
strategies were faster than any of the previous subjects who 
had, supposedly, discovered this technique for themselves. 
Quinton and Fellows have summised that all psychologists need 
to do in order to resolve various debates concerning the 
processes underlying various cognitive tasks is to ask the 
subjects themselves. This naive approach is severely criticised 
by Evans (1976) not only with re+erence to the unreliability o+ 
introspective reports concerning processes, but also because 
Quinton and Fellows assumed that a causal connection could be 
inferred from purely correlational data. As Wason and Evans 
(1975; Evans and Wason, 1976) have noted, verbal reports may 
simply be rationalisations after the event. 
A recently reported study by Newstead, Manktelow and 
Evans (1982) also used an interference technique based on 
Brooks (1967) in investigating the role of imagery in linear 
orderings. In essence, this study had its antecedents in the 
work of Potts (1972,1974). Potts (1974) presented subjects 
with a passage in which details were embedded concerning the 
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relative ordering of adjacent pairs of terms from a four-term 
linear series (A>B, B>C, C>D). They were subsequently required 
to assess the truth value of all possible pairwise comparisons 
o+ terms that could be derived validly or otherwise +rom the 
passage. Subjects were found to be more accurate and +aster in 
responding to remote in+erences (eg. A>D) rather than to those 
which had been actually presented in the passage. This is the 
'symbolic distance' e++ect and it has been suggested (eg 
Lawson, 1977) that it is best accounted for in terms of an 
imagined integrated array rather than a propositional 
representation of the relationships presented in the passage. 
Newstead et al presented passages +or the linear ordering task 
either visually or aurally to different groups of subjects. A 
second comparable task concerning set-inclusion materials (eg. 
All A's are B's, All B's are C's, All C's are D's) was also 
presented. Imagery is not thou(3ht to play a part in the latter 
task. If imagery was involved then a Presentation Modality by 
Task interaction should be found (cf Brooks, 1967). Very slight 
evidence in favour of an imagery position was derived in that 
an interaction between the above two factors and a third factor 
concerning the rated imageability (high vs low) of the 
materials was significant. The authors argue that their test 
was possibly biased against an imagery explanation since a 
subsidiary mental arithmetic task which could disrupt certain 
kinds of imaginal representation was interposed between the 
presentation of the passages and presentation of inferences for 
evaluation. Unfortunately, their second experiment changed the 
modality-specific interference technique to the more complex 
one of Visual or auditory shadowing whilst also removing the 
87 
interpolated mental arithmetic task for some groups of 
subjects. On this occasion no evidence supportive of the use of 
mental imagery was derived. Although they use their results to 
argue against the imagery position, the authors also concede 
that their interpretation is based on the null hypothesis 
which, of course, cannot be proven. 
An alternative model su9g, _-. -Ed 
by Sternberg (1980) 
incorporates a mixture of linguistic and spatial components and 
is worthy of consideration. Sternberg suggests that the 
premises are first encoded propositionally as in the linguistic 
model. Next, the premises are encoded into separate spatial 
arrays. These arrays finally become integrated into a single 
representation when the pivot term (ie. that mentioned in both 
premises) is identified. The construction of the integrated 
begins with the terms of the first premise and ends with arra- 
those of the second premise. Next the subject reads the 
question. If it contains a marked adjective then an iiRcrease 
in response time occurs, owing to linguistic complexity and 
also to the difficulty of seeking a response at the 
less-+avoured end (usually the bottom) of the array. The 
response may be available quickly if the subject's active 
7mental location' (as determined by the position in the array 
o+ terms in the second premise) coincides with the answer. 
Otherwise the subject will mentally search the array for a 
response. Although it is not intended to discuss this model in 
any greater depth, it can be seen to owe much to the authors of 
the previous theories. Its recent origin serves to indicate 
that the debate between imaginal and propositional 
representation on three-term series tasks is still very much 
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alive. Also it is of interest to point out that it does not 
rest on the assumption of a unitary mental representation. 
Now, evidence concerning the existence of individual 
differences in task strategy will be considered. Shaver, 
Pierson and Lang (1975) found a significant correlation between 
scores on three tests of visuo-spatial ability and reasoning 
performance. Evans (1982, p62) questions the relevance of this 
result in the following manner: "since both measures can be 
assumed to load on general IQ there is no reason to assume that 
this arises from an imagery component". A more recent study of 
Sternberg and Weil (1980) is of relevance here. 
Sternberg and Weil believe that the efficiency of the 
particular strategy employed in linear reasoning tasks depends 
upon the pattern o+ a subject's verbal and spatial abilities. 
Subjects were split into three experimental groups and two of 
these were trained in a particular method and given practice in 
its application. Visualisation training involved instruction 
about how to construct and use spatial arrays. Algorithmic 
training involved instruction in the elimination strategy 
identified by Quinton and Fellows (1975). In this case subjects 
were told to "read the final question first. Then, "if the 
answer to the +irst statement is not contained in the second 
statement, the answer to the first statement is the correct 
response to the entire problem .... If the answer to the first 
statement is contained in the second statement, then the answer 
choice in the second statement is the correct response to the 
entire problem". 
Groups were asked to use the particular strategy in 
which they had been trained to solve a set of three-term series 
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problems. The Control Group was asked to devise their own 
strategy. Whereas Algorithmic training led to better 
performance overall, Visua'-,, -ýýtion training had no effect on 
performance relative to no training at all. An 
intercorrelational analysis of the mean response latencies for 
each p rob 1 em type between Groups supports the view that 
Visualisation and Control Groups were using a similar strategy 
in solving the problems and that untrained subjects "rely on 
visualisation at some point during the solution process" 
(Sternberg and Weil, 1980). These results were claimed in 
support of Sternberg's (1980) mixed Linguistic-Spatial model of 
linear syllogistic reasoning. 
In this experiment Sternberg and Weil agree that it 
is possible that, in spite of instructions, subjects within 
each experimental group were not using homogeneous strategies. 
Consequently their data were assigned to one of four new groups 
on the basis of which provided the best mathematical fit to 
their individual data. The groups were Mixed (82 subjects), 
Linguistic (15 subjects), Spatial (15 subjects) and Algorithmic 
(32 subjects). Solution latencies within these groups were 
correlated with two orthogonal factor scores derived from the 
subjects' performance on two verbal and two visuo-spatial tests 
of ability and an interaction was demonstrated. Whereas the 
Linguistic Group correlated highly with verbal ability but not 
with spatial ability and the opposite was the case for the 
Spatial Group, the Algorithmic Group correlated weakly 
(although significantly) with verbal ability but only 
marginally with visuo-spatial ability. The Mixed-model Group 
correlated significantly with both verbal and visuo-spatial 
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factors. Sternberg and Weil (1980, p2.14) claim that, for the 
Visuo-spatial and Linguistic models, their data "provide the 
first external validating evidence that subjects actually use 
the representations that proponents of the models claim 
subjects use when solving series problems by those, models". 
b). Sentence-Picture Verification Tasks. 
The sentence-picture veri+ication task typically 
involves the presentation of a simple sentence describing the 
location of two specified items, for example: 
Star is above plus. 
A picture is also presented in which the speciiied items are 
spatially depicted in a manner which either conforms (ie. or 
conflicts (ie. with the verbal description. Of course, the 
sentence and picture can be presented in either order and can 
be presented sequentially or simultaneously. The subjects' task 
is to decide whether or not the sentence and picture match. The 
reaction time data obtained with this paradic3m have been 
explained in terms of a pure propositional model (eq. Clark and 
Chase, 1972; Carpenter and Just, 1975) and also in terms of a 
model involving an interaction between propositional and 
imaginal representations (eq. Beech, 1980). These opposing 
viewpoints will be assessed by considering two speci+ic models 
in this section. 
Clark and Chase (1972) devised four types of 
sentence-picture combination by varying the truth value a+ the 
sentence and the polarity of its verb. Examples of these 
combinations are shown below: 
True a+firmative (TA) Star is above plus. 
False af+irmative (FA) Plus is above star. 
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False negative (FN) Star is not above plus. + 
True negative (TN) Plus is not above star. + 
They constructed an equivalent set of sentences using the 
relationship 'below' and varied the spatial location of the 
items in the pictorial design (ie. + to make sixteen 
distinct problem displays. In their experiments, Clark and 
Chase varied the relative locations of sentences and pictures 
by presenting one to the left and the other to the right of a 
tachistoscope screen, or vice versa. They directed their 
subjects, via instructions, to attend to either the sentence or 
the picture initially and measured verification latencies from 
initial presentation of materials to the subjects' responses 
which were made by pushing appropriate 'True' or 'False' 
buttons. 
Two models were derived which were used to predict 
the relative difficulty of the four basic problem problem types 
as measured by response latencies. The models differed in their 
applicability to sentence-first (model A) or picture-first 
(model B) conditions. In devising these models Clark and Chase 
made the important a_pLiori assumption that "for a sentence and 
a picture to be compared they must be represented, ultimately, 
in the same mental format" (Clark and Chase, 1972, p473) which, 
it is claimed is propositional in nature. Both of the models 
incorporate four sequentially ordered information processing 
stages, the order of which depends on the particular model 
concerned. The total response latency is derived from the 
simple addition of times spent at each stage. The four stages 
are: 
1) Formation of the mental representation of the sentence, 
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2) Formation of the mental representation of the picture, 
Comparison o+ the two representations, 
4) Response production. 
However, the third stage is split into additional substages in 
both models according to discrete comparison processes which 
will be defined. 
The sentence-first model has the orderinc3 of stages 
as outlined above with the coding of the picture contingent 
upon the coding of the sentence. Clark and Chase argue that it 
is easier to encode the term 'above' than 'below' and the use 
of the latter term will increase processing time in stage I by 
a constant amount ('a' milliseconds). They also assert that the 
encoding of negatives will increase processing in this stage by 
a constant amount ('b' milliseconds). These claims are based on 
linguistic considerations and the data of Clark (1969) which 
was considered earlier (see also Chase and Clark, 1971). The 
encoding of pictures is assumed to be in a propositional form 
based on the relational term used to encode the sentence. 
However, since no linguistic features are present in the 
pictures it-is concluded that all pictures in this task take 
the same time to encode. 
In comparinc3 the representations o+ the sentence and 
picture it is sugc3ested that a truth index is used. Durinc3 the 
comparison stage this index can flip between true' and 'false' 
settings. The identity of i) inner propositions (embedded 
strings) and ii) outer propositions (embedding strings) of the 
sentence and picture are assessed. Consider the most complex 
sentence-picture combination which is given below. Alongside 
the surface form of the sentence and picture are shown their 
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respective propositional representations: 
Surface form Pro2ositional re2L! E. ReL1tation 
Sentence: Star is not below plus (False(Star below plus))sen 
Picture: (Plus below star)pic 
It is supposed that the initial setting of the truth index is 
7 true', under the supposition that the sentence is true unless 
evidence is found to the contrary. Since the subject terms 
(7 star' and 'plus') embedded in the two inner propositions 
mismatch, the truth index is flipped from its initial setting 
to a value of 'false'. This change is assumed to take time ('c' 
milliseconds). Next the outer propositions are compared. The 
representation for the picture contains an implicit 'true' in 
the outer proposition although it is not shown. Once again a 
mismatch is apparent and so the truth index is flipped back 
again to 'true' taking time ('d' milliseconds). 
For the final stage the outcome of the truth index is 
translated into a response - in the above case a push of the 
'true' button. The total time taken to respond is the basic 
time to perform the operations common to all sentence-picture 
combinations ('tO' milliseconds) plus the extra time occasioned 
with sentences employing negatives and the 'below' term, 
together with any extra time taken in in the comparison stage 
when the truth index requires changing. In the above example 
the total reaction time is 'tO +a+b+c+ d' milliseconds, 
whereas with the simplest sentence-picture combination ('star 
is above plus', +) this would be just 'tO' milliseconds. 
Clark and Chase (1972) predicted that verification 
latencies on the sentence-first task would be accounted for býý 
four parameters. These are 1) Below time ('a'), -27) Negation 
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time ('b' + 'd'), 3) Falsification time ('c') and 4) Base time 
('tO'). The observed and predicted data from Clark and Chase's 
(1972) first experiment are shown in Table 2.5 The 
sub-components of the latency value for each problem type are 
illustrated. 
Problem Sentence Picture Components 0. P. 
TA above Star is abbve plus + to 1744 1763 
TA below Plus is below star + tO+a 1875 1856 
FA above Plus is above star 
A 
to +c 1959 1950 
FA below Star is below plus + tO+a +c 2035 2043 
TN above Plus is not above star to +b+c+d 2624 2635 
TN below -tar S is not helow plus + tO+a+b+c+d 2739 2728 
FN above Star is not above plus to +b +d 2470 2448 
FN below Plus is not below star tO+a+b +d 2520 2541 
Table 2.5 . Breakdown of latencies (in milliseconds) observed 
(0. ) and predicted (P. ) by the sentence-first model (A) for 
eight types of problem. (Data from Clark and Chase, 1972, table 
2). 
Clark and Chase argue that, in general, pure visual 
imagery models run into logical difficulties because it is not 
possible to construct a single image to correspond with 
negative sentences. However, they admit that in the case of 
their own experiments a single visuo-spatial representation 
could be predicted because of the binary nature of the 
particular materials employed. claim that a pure 
imagery model would still not be able to explain why positive 
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and negative sentences behave differently with respect to truth 
and falsity. For instance, in a pure imagery model 'star is 
above plus' and 'plus is not above star' could both be 
represented as +. However, the truth of the sentence can not be 
established until the image constructed from the sentence is 
compared with that of the picture, "therefore, the original 
form of the sentence - whether it was positive or negative - 
cannot enter into the comparison process: if true is faster 
than false for positive sentences, then true must also be 
faster than false for negative sentences" (Clark and Chase, 
1972, p499). However, there was a highly significant Truth 
Value by Sentence Polarity interaction which disconfirmed the 
pure imagery model. Beech (1980) has also argued that a pure 
imagery model is not compatible with the data of Clark and 
Chase (1972, experiment 1). However he is not willing to 
dismiss all imagery models as they do. He proposes a model 
combining visual imagery and propositional representations 
which predicts exactly the same data as that of Clark and 
Chase. The sentence-first model of Clark and Chase (1972) and 
Beech's (1980) model combining imaginal and propositional 
coding are shown in Figure 2.4 . 
The application oi Beech's model will be considered 
using, once again, the most complex problem ('Star is not below 
plusl 
+ 
,+ The sentence is encoded as an image ( #) which is 
associated with a negative proposition. The time taken to 
encode this includes an additional amount of time (vrl 
milliseconds) because 0+ the use of the marked term ('below'). 
Extra encoding time ('s' milliseconds) is also necessitated 
because the sentence includes a negative. In stage 3, when the 
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a) ClarV and Chase's (1972)_pýILR_pn2222itional model A. 
Encode Encode Do Do Exe 
tc 
C) 
j: t 
t C: 
Yes --Kubj ects Yes Zlentence Picture - Subjects 
tc tc 
No 
Change 
Index 
No 
L; nange 
Index 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3(i) Stage Stage 4 
b) Beech's (1980) mixed_U. Lgp22itional/imaS2. L: ý model. 
9 
tc 
Visuali 'se Encode Do Respond 
SentencieD-ýPicture Images Yes with 
Proposition tc 
NO 
H. otate 
and 
Change 
Proposition 
Stage I Stage 2 Stage 3 Stac)e 4 
Figure 2.4 . The discrete processing stages 
involved in the 
sentence-picture verification task (sentence-first condition) 
according to a) the propositional model of Clark and Chase 
(197-21), and b) the mixed propositional/imagery model of Beech 
(1980). (Figures from Clark and Chase, 1972, table 1, and 
2) Beech, 1980, figure ý 
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images are compared, they do not match and so a rotation occurs 
to the image generated by the sentence. In view of this 
rotation the associated proposition is changed from negative to 
positive. These operations take additional time (it, 
milliseconds). The rotation that Beech proposes need not 
involve imagined items circling one another which might be 
expected to take considerable time even with simple stimuli 
(eg. Cooper and Shepard, 1973). Instead it could involve one 
item sliding vertically over the other which might occur more 
rapidly. Finally the images match and, since the proposition 
associated with the sentence is positive, the subject respond5 
'true'. In a similar manner to Clark and Chase, Beech assumes a 
certain base time corresponding to 'tO'. In addition it can be 
seen that 'r' and 'a', 't' and 7c79 and is, and ' b+d' are 
equivalent for the two models and thus both predict the same 
data. However, Beech rejects the model o+ Clark and Chase on 
the grounds of parsimony since it requires an extra processing 
stage. 
However, an adequate explanation of sentence-picture 
verification needs to be able to account for circumstances in 
which the picture is presented or attended to before the 
sentence. In fact Clark and Chase modify their model 
substantially to accommodate such a task. Apart from the 
obvious reversal of the order of the first two stages, they can 
no longer assume that the encoding of the picture is contingent 
upon the relationship depicted in the sentence. Instead they 
suggest that pictures are alwa), s encoded propositionally in 
terms of the simpler ('above') relationship. However, their 
comparison stage also needs modi+ication because, unlike the 
98 
previous model, the relationship depicted in the embedded 
string (ie. 'above' or 'below') might not match that of the 
picture which is always in terms of the simpler relationship. 
In this model the comparison stage is broken down into three 
substages. It is suggested that first of all the subjects of 
the embedded strings are checked for identity and, if they do 
not match the sentence is transformed from '(star above 
plus)sen' to '(plu-s below star)sen' or vice versa. This 
requires extra time ('e' milliseconds). In the second 
comparison substage the propositions in the embedded string are 
compared and, if they do not match, the truth index is flipped 
occasioning extra time ('f' milliseconds). In the final 
comparison substage the embedding strings are compared and., if 
they do not matchthe truth index is flipped requiring extra 
t ime ('d milliseconds) as previously. Thus two further 
parameters (V e' and Vf7) are required to account for a 
relatively small change in the nature of the task. 
Clark and Chase were able to account for differences 
in the relative difficulties of problems within the 
sentence-first and picture-first conditions of their second 
experiment using models 'A' and IBI respectively. However they 
did not explain the mean difference between the base times of 
both conditions. The base time for the picture first condition 
(tl=1793 milliseconds) was significantly larger than that of 
the sentence-+irst condition (tO=1603 milliseconds) by an 
average of 190 milliseconds. 
Whilst Beech (1980) could account for the relative 
difficulty of problems within tasks as effectively as Clark and 
Chase (1972), lNe also has difficulty in accounting for the mean 
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difference between conditions. This is because no difference 
should occur whether pictures or sentences are encoded first as 
both are transformed into images prior to comparison. However, 
Beech put forward a plausible 2ost hoc suggestion that visual 
interferen-ce occurs when the picture is presented first and its 
associated image disrupts the more difficult task of 
translating the sentence into a visual image thus entailing 
longer processing time. 
The above interpretations serve to indicate how, in 
the sentence-picture verification paradigm, explanatory models 
can be constructed which are founded upon abstract 
propositional or imaginal codes. Indeed MacLeod, Hunt and 
Mathews (1978, p506) argue that "untrained subjects will attack 
a task with a variety of strategies"... and their data collected 
on the same task indicates "that strategy choice is a 
predictable function of subject abilities as measured by 
psychometric tests". They found that for one group of subjects 
apparently those using a linguistic strategy - reaction time 
scores on the task correlated highly with verbal abilities but 
not with spatial ability whereas the reverse was the case for 
those using an imagery strategy. In a follow-up study Mathews, 
Hunt and MacLeod (1960) found that the differences were most 
obvious when subjects were instructed to use an imagery 
strategy, but not when a linguistic strategy was required. 
Consideration of the literature reviewed in this 
section shows that the nature of representations and processes 
underlying various tasks is by no means resolved. It has been 
argued that the data from two problem solving tasks involving 
a) transitive inference and b) sentence-picture verification 
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can be explained linguistically. However, interpretations of 
these data in terms of models employing mixed propositional and 
imaginal codes are, if anything, more e++ec'tive in each case. 
The studies of Sternberg and Weil (1980) and of MacLeod and his 
colleagues (1978; 1960) indicate the same general finding that 
both linguistic and spatial processes are involved. In both 
cases a clear relationship was found between the strategy 
employed and ability scores on psychometric tests. As Sternberg 
and Weil (1980, p234) claim "the effectiveness of a given 
strategy .... depends on one's pattern of abilities" and this may 
be predicted from scores on psychometric tests (MacLeod, Hunt 
and Mathews, 1978; Mathews, Hunt and MacLeod, 1980). It appears 
that mental imagery can play a functional role in various 
problem solving tasks although it is not necessarilly employed. 
THE POSSIBLE NATURE OF PROCESSES- IN REASONING. 
Whilst the dual coding approach of Paivio and his 
colleagues (see Yuille, 1983) remains the subject of 
theoretical debate, it has generated considerable data in its 
support. However, the dispute between imagists and 
propositionalists concerning the nature of internal 
representations and the processes operating upon them is by no 
means resolved. Recently arguments have been put forward in 
support of three separate codes which have functional roles to 
play in various situations (eq. Anderson, 1978; Glucksberg, 
1984). The elements of a tricode theory with multidirectional 
mapping relationships have been outlined by Cohen (1983) and 
these are illustrated in Figure 2.5 . 
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Figure 2.5 . The elements 0+ a tricode theory showing 
multidirectional mapping relationships. From Cohen (1983) 
f igure 13. 
Snodc3rass (1980; 1984) includes aspects of both dual 
coding and propositional coding theories in her tricoding 
approach. She suggests that verbal and visually-based imagery 
systems are capable of accessing an underlying propositional 
system. Unlike Paivio's model "the meaning of images is not 
contained in the image system, but in the propositional system, 
and interconnections between the two systems are typically made 
via the propositional system rather than directly" (Snodgrass, 
1984, p17). Although her model will not be given detailed 
consideration at this stage, it will feature prominently in the 
concluding part of this thesis. At this stage we are more 
ypotheses, additional to those of Evans concerned to formulate h-ý 
(1980a; 1980b) about the nature o+ the processing underlying 
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conditional reasoning performance. 
This review has shown that the major alternative to 
verbal or linquistically-based coding is a s-,.,, stem based on 
mental imagery. In the case of Paivio, his theory of dual codes 
in memory (Paivio, 1971) has been extended leading to the 
proposal of dual systems in thinking (Paivio, 1975). In 
Paivio's theory the verbal system is seen as logical and 
sequential, whilst the imagery system is seen as capable of 
synchronous analogical thinking. Evans' (1980a; 1980b) modified 
theory also postulates dual processes which account for 
conditional reasoning per+ormance. A verbal process is supposed 
to account for logical performance on conditional reasoning 
tasks and this could be allied with Paivio's verbal system. 
Could the non-verbal process of Evans, which is supposed to be 
responsible for non-logical aspects of performance, be allied 
with Paivio's imagery system? 
The plausibility of distinct verbal and non-verbal 
processes operating in high level cognition can be related to 
work-on hemispheric specialisation. In a review o+ work based 
on a variety of methodologies Cohen (1983) points to increasing 
evidence that the le+t hemisphere is specialised +or verbal 
cognitive functions, whilst the right hemisphere carries out 
non-verbal including visuo-spatial functions. This evidence 
provides an obvious base for specific verbal and imagery-based 
systems. It will be remembered that in the concluding part of 
chapter 1 empirical evidence was mentioned which supports the 
link between verbal and non-verbal processes in reasoning and 
hemispheric specialisation (Golding, 1980; 1981; Golding, Reich 
and Wason, 1974). 
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It appears plausible that the non-verbal process 
hypothesised by Evans (1980b) corresponds to an imagery-based 
system. I-F this is the case then it is implied, perhaps, that 
'Matching Bias' has an imagery component. Increasing the ease 
with which an imaginal representation can be constructed, by 
manipulating the concreteness or pictorial qualities of the 
material employed in conditional reasoning, might be expected 
to lead to a corresponding increase in 'Matching Bias'. This 
possibility will be explored experimentally in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
-AL IMPLICATIONS OF ARTICULATORY THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGIC 
-': - 10 N SUPPRESý 
As outlined in chapter 1, Evans (1980a; 1980b) has 
suggested modifications to the Dual Process Theory of Reasoning 
(Wason and Evans, 197/5) to explain the pattern of responses 
that are given in reasoning tasks. He suggested that, two 
different thinking processes operate in parallel on such tasks. 
Evans (1980b) allies logical performance to the operation of a 
verbal reasoning process which competes with a non-verbal 
process responsible for various response biases. In the 
previous chapter, parallels were drawn between this hypothesis 
and another theory (Paivio, 1975) which attributes reasoning to 
verbal systems of thinking and more analogical, less sequential 
thought to non-verbal (possibly imagery related) systems. 
Several studies, referred to in chapter 2, have 
employed selective interference techniques to identify the 
nature o+ processes underlying cognitive per+ormance. It is 
thought that such a methodology would be appropriate to 
distinguish the verbal and non-verbal processes that Evans 
(1980b) postulates. Initially it was decided to attempt to 
inter+erýe selectively with the supposed verbal process whilst 
leaving the non-vprbal process undisturbed. A particular 
technique, known as articulatory suppression, might be expected 
selectively to disrupt the verbal process and it could, 
therefore, be a useful tool in the present experimental series. 
In this chapter some relevant theoretical and methodological 
aspects of it will be discussed. 
1.05 
Articulatory suppression can be defined as the 
articulation of something irrelevant by subjects as they 
perform on a. criterion task. This is thought to prevent the 
articulatory system from playing its usual role in the 
criterion task. Levy (1971, p124) has claimed that "if the 
speech apparatus is physically engaged in verbal processing, 
the S cannot simultaneously be 'internally articulating'". 
Although it is conceded that the verbal thought 
process hypothesised by Evans (1980b) might not involve 
articulatory mechanisms, the possibility of such involvement 
does appear worthy of investigation. After all, the importance 
of speech-based processes in cognition has been the subject of 
extensive investigation. Several early theories have assigned 
verbal processes a central role in thought. 
For instance, the behaviourist approach of Watson 
(19ZO) assumed that-implicit speech contributed the essential 
ingredient in thinking. A Russian tradition stemming from 
Pavlov refers to language as a 7secondary signalling system' 
which confers on man the unique ability to regulate his own 
behaviour. A development of this tradition can be found in the 
writings of Luria (1959). In similar vein, Vygotsky (1962) has 
suggested that the egocentric speech typical of youtýq children 
becomes internalised by adulthood and forms the basis of 
logical thinking. Sokolov (197-21) has reviewed much of the 
recent Russian literature which attempts to demonstrate the 
importance of implicit speech processes in thought. 
Furthermore, evidence from electromyographic techniques shows 
that electrical activity in muscles required for speaking 
accompanies silent reading (McGuigan, 1970), problem solving 
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and other cognitive tasks (McGuigan, 1966; Sokolov, 1972). 
Articulatory processes have been implicated in a 
variety of situations including, for instance, short-t&rm 
memory, word recognition and reading. Some of the relevant 
studies will be considered below. After considering this 
literature, the effectiveness of articulatory suppression as a 
technique will be assessed. 
ARTICULATOPY SUPPRESSION ANDS 'HORT-TERM RECALL. 
Many authors, whose experiments will be discussed in 
due course, have concluded that short-term memory is 
speech-based and, consequently, visually presented words 
require translation into a speech-like code before their 
integration into meaningful sentences (ie. reading) can occur. 
Some authors have deduced that visually-displayed verbal items, 
presented for short-term recall, are preferentially encoded in 
a speech-based form. 
This conclusion has been drawn because, for instance, 
phonological similarity amongst the items presented visually 
for short-term recall inhibits the subject's ability to retain 
the order in which the items were presented (Conrad, 1962; 
Conrad, 1964; Conrad L Hull, 1964). A speech-based code is 
presumed to be established by the subject's vocalisations at 
the time of presentation and, if subjects are required to 
produce irrelevant vocalisations at this time, the use of such 
a code should be prevented and the effect of phonological 
similarity would be attenuated. If the items to be recalled are 
presented visually, in which case speech-recoding is thought to 
be entirely prevented by enforced irrelevant articulation, then 
the phonological similarity effect should be eliminated 
10" 
altogether. 
Murray (1967,1968) studied the e++ect o+ minimising 
articulation in order to compare immediate serial recall o+ 
visually and aurally presented lists of letters. He either 
allowed the subject to articulate the item presented for recall 
or suppressed articulation by requiring the subject to vocalise 
the competing wo rd 'the' t %--j i C: e every second durinq 
presentation. It was found that, when suppression was employed, 
recall was substantially reduced and the effect of phonological 
similarity was removed for visually presented lists but there 
was little effect with auditory lists. 
Peterson and Johnson (1971) made a more strenuous 
ef f ort than Murray to minimise articulation in their 
experiment. Their subjects were required to count from one to 
nine repeatedly. This sequence, which involves a variety of 
sounds, was uttered at a faster rate (nine items every two 
seconds) than Murray had required. They found that the 
superiority of serial recall for acoustically dissimilar 
material (eq. K, M, R, S, W, Y) over acoustically similar material 
(eg. B, C, D., P, T, V) was not apparent under suppression when the 
material was presented visually. Under auditory presentation 
such a superiority was established. 
The specific nature of the speech-based code was 
examined more fully by Conrad (1964). He noticed in his 
experiments on the memory span for consonant sequences that 
errors often sounded similar to the target item although visual 
presentation was used. When the same letter vocabulary was 
identified ac; ainst a background of white noise, the confusions 
which arose were highly correlated with those letters confused 
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in recall. This suggested to Conrad that items were stored in 
short-term memory in an acoustic manner. 
This conclusion was investigated further by Hint--man 
(1967) who indicated that at least two hypotheses about the 
nature of short-term memory for visually presented materials 
were consistent with Conrad's data. First, the visual stimuli 
could have caused a strongly associated auditory image to be 
formed. Alternatively the subject could have subvocally 
pronounced the items to be remembered. In the latter case 
articulatory features of the items to be stored are 
particularly important. Hintzman attempted to determine whether 
the basis of the effect was auditory or articulatory. He 
classified six consonant sounds by voicing and place of 
articulation. A voiced consonant requires vibration of the 
vocal chords (eq. B, D, G) whereas an unvoiced one does not (eg. 
P, T, I<). Place of articulation refers to the part of the mouth 
which is constricted during production of the sound. Thus 
consonants can be articulated in the front (eg P, B), middle 
(eq. T, D) or back (eq. K, G) of the mouth. If the basis of 
short-term memory is auditory then acoustic confusions should 
be influenced by the same variables that cause auditory 
perceptual confusions. Miller and Nicely (1961) demonstrated 
that these generally occur within the voiced and unvoiced 
categories and are not typically influenced by place of 
articulation. However if the basis of short-term memory for 
visually presented material is mediated by an articulatory code 
then acoustic confusions should be influenced by place of 
articulation in addition to voicing. 
Hintzman constructed nonsense syllables each 
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beginning with one of the letters P, T, K, B, D and G and 
ending with AV or AF. Subjects were visually presented with 
thirty random sequences of six syllables each. After each 
sequence the subject was required to write down the items 
presented. It was found that memory confusions were contributed 
to both by voicing and place of articulation. The conclusion 
drawn was that short-term memory for visually presented verbal 
information is mediated by an articulatory rather than an 
auditory image. Conrad's (1970) subsequent investigations of 
y deaf support this view. recall in the congenitall, 
Another researcher, Levy (1971), has assessed the 
changes in performance which arise from variations in overt 
acoustic and articulatory activity on the recall of aurally and 
visually presented material from short-term memory. Her 
subjects were given an immediate probed recall test of items 
which were presented visually with or without a simultaneous 
auditory presentation. The availability of articulat-ory 
information was varied by requiring subjects to mouth the 
StiMUIUS items or an irrelevant word ('hiya') during 
presentation. Articulatory suppression led to poorer 
performance except when acoustic information was available. 
Therefore, it was suggested, both acoustic and articulatory 
features might be encoded in short-term memory. 
It has been pointed out by Richardson, Greaves and 
Smith (1980) that the evidence concerning the effect of 
articulatory suppression on phonological material is equivocal. 
For instance, although Levy (1971) varied the phonological 
similarity (of her stimulus materials, as was done in the 
studies of Murra,,, (1967.1968) and Peterson and Johnson (1971), 
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she reports only a main ef+ect o+ this iactor and not the 
expected interaction with auditor)l/visual presentation modes. 
Richardson, Greaves and Smith claim, after a close inspection 
of Peterson and Johnson's results, that the use of visual 
presentation did not merely remove the auditory source of 
phonological information and thus reduce overall per+ormance. 
In fact, although the effect of phonological similarity was 
attenl-). ated with visual presentation, whether or not subjects 
were counting aloud, overall performance was actually improved 
in comparison to that with auditory presentation, although the 
presentation times were shorter (2.2 versus 5 seconds) in the 
visual condition. It was suggested that visual presentation 
induced subjects to employ a more eificient method o+ encoding 
the stimulus material which was distinct +rom a phono log ical 
representation. The experiments o+ Hiles (197-7) suggest that a 
visual code might have been utilised. 
Hiles (1973) reported three experiments on 
recognition memory in which memory and test letters were 
presented in either upper or lower case. When vocalisation was 
suppressed and the memory and test items were in di++erent 
cases, subjects were slower and less accurate in their 
recognition. Subjects who did vocalise showed no such effect. A 
fourth experiment showed that visual similarity of target and 
test letters increased recognition time under suppression 
whereas acoustic similarity increased recognition time when 
relevant vocalisation was required. Thus, Hiles claimed, if 
vocalisation is Suppressed, visual material can be encoded as a 
visual representation in short-term memory. 
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Richardson et al (1980) report a study which attempts 
to clarify the picture concerning the effects of articulatory 
suppression and phonological similarity on serial recal 1 C3 f 
visually presented letters and words. The>, found that the 
effect of phonological similarity was reduced to insignificance 
when subjects were concurrently articulating irrelevant 
information. They claim that, taken together, the empirical 
observations support the theoretical conclusion that the 
employment of phonological coding in short-term memory 
"requires the availability of either acoustic or articulatory 
information" (p419 - 420). Moreover they suggested that 
artictilatory suppression abolishes the use of phonological 
coding with visually presented material. 
Another secondary task which has been utilised to 
prevent speech recoding is shadowing. In an attempt to 
demonstrate the existence of modality specific short-term 
stores, Kroll, Parks, Parkinson, Bieber and Johnson (1970) 
required subjects to shadow a stream of letters to occupy the 
period between presentation and testing of a single letter 
which was to be remembered. The target letter was presented 
amongst the shadowed letters although it was differentiated by 
being spoken in a different voice or presented visually. Even 
thirty seconds following presentation, visual target letters 
were better retained than auditory ones. Incidentally, this 
result is in accordance with the subjects, claimed strategies 
of remembering visually presented letters as images but 
rehearsing aurally presented ones subvocally. The above result 
has often been taken to mean that shadowing prevents 
phonoloqical recoding which would normally take precedence over 
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a. visu. al code. 
In the previous pages several studies, mainly 
performed in the 1960's and early 1970's, were considered which 
employed an interference methodology, known as articulatory 
suppression, in an attempt to determine the nature of 
short-term memory. Given a whole series of disparate sensory 
buffer stores such as echoic and iconic memories, the question 
ad dr essed was what is the preferred modality of the short-term 
system into which they feed? Most of the authors cited have 
concluded that the short-term store is phonologically based 
although there has been some dispute about whether it involves 
specifically acoustic or articulatory mechanisms. 
Such investigations of memory were typical of that 
period. One of their major concerns was to distinguish the 
properties of short-term and long-term storage. The memory 
system was viewed as a relatively passive entity used for 
storage of information which might or might not be used in 
other coc3nitive tasks. However, since then, memory research has 
been dominated by a more functional approach in which 
information storage is viewed as a central part of the dynamic 
system necessary for information processing. This sort of 
approach will be considered next. 
THE THEORY OF WORKING MEMORY. 
At this point it is considered pertinent to consider 
the development of an influential theory which claims that 
memory occupies a central role in human iniormation processing. 
The authors of this theory, Baddeley and Hitch (1974), claim to 
have identified a number of interacting subs), stems of memory 
whose functions in various laboratory and everyday tasks have 
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been explored. As a result 0+ these explorations the notion of 
,, system 
has been developed. In a general purpose Working Memor- 
essence the Working Memory system that has been proposed 
consists of an executive component as a central processor, 
which interacts with a variety of cognitive subsystems such as 
an articulatory rehearsal loop, long-term storage and the 
sensory stores (Ba. ddeley and Hitch, 1977). The theory of 
Working Memory was intended to provide a broad unity between 
several previously distinct areas of investigation in memory 
and cognition. The development of this theory will be 
considered below. 
The term 'working memory' is taken from the well 
known model of memory which was presented by Atkinson and 
Shif+rin (1968,1971). In their view, raw environmental 
information first enters a modality specific register. It is 
+ýirther processed by being read into a phonologically-based, 
limited capacity, short-term store. The short-term system was 
conceived as a temporary working memory in which the raw 
information is joined by relevant associations from a 
semantically-based, long-term store. For example a visually 
presented. word will be associated with its verbal name and 
meaning. The short-term system was responsible for directing 
the flow of information into and out of long-term storage, for 
decision making and functioned as a controlling executive 
system. 
However, as Baddeley (1976) states, many problems for 
this model occured when modality effects were found in 
short-term storage (Murdock and Walker, 1969). Also 
neuropsychological evidence was inconsistent with the idea that 
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the short-term system is essential for long-term learning and 
retrieval. Shallice and Warrington (1970) described a patient 
whose short-term span was grossly impaired but whose long-term 
learning ability appeared quite normal. 
As an alternative to the modal approach, the levels 
of processing theory of Craik and Lockhart (1972) was 
developed. Here the emphasis was away from separate stores with 
different coding processes and towards a theory of memory which 
is viewed as Ila continuum from the transient products of 
sensory analysis to the highly durable products of 
semantic-associative operations" (p676). In other words a 
deeper analysis would lead to a more persistent memory trace 
although material could be retained by "recirculating 
information at one level of processing" (p67/6). 
However Baddeley (1978) suggests that this approach 
is theoretically barren for a number of reasons. First, 
experimenters within this framework have usually relied upon an 
intuitively plausible assumption of the hierarchy of levels of 
various types of processing. The failure to find an independent 
measure of 'depth' (eg. Craik and Tulving, " 1975) has limited 
the theory's usefulness. There is no experimental evidence 
which supports the idea of a cont i nUUM Of processing rather 
than a series of discrete domains. The basic assumption of the 
theory that deeper processing leads to a more durable trace is 
not necessarilly true. Indeed, apparently superficial 
characteristics of stimuli, for example the location of a 
written word on a page of text (Rothkopf, 1971) can lead to a 
very persistent memory. The assumption of a simple hierarchy 
of levels, for instance with words, from ph-, ý, sical features to 
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phonological features to a semantic level, is not born out 
experimentally by the work of Marcel (1983). He has shown that 
subjects who are unaware of the orthographic properties of 
printed words can nevetheless be influenced by their semantic 
properties. 
The alternative Working Memory approach, +avoured by 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Hitch and Eaddeley, 1976), analysed 
human memory into specific subcomponents and investigated the 
contribution of these to a number of tasks. This approach has 
been developed in many subsequent articles by the authors which 
will be considered in due course. In the next few pages the 
series of experiments which led to its inauguration will be 
described. First, a little more context will be considered. 
Although the short-term store has o+ten been assumed 
to play a vital role in many cognitive tasks, little 
experimental evidence had been provided for this view. Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974) endeavoured to determine 'experimentally 
whether the same Working Memory system is involved in a number 
of tasks including reasoning, language comprehension and 
learn i ng. 
There was much disagreement at that time about the 
nature of the short-term store which, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) 
believed, stemmed from the different paradigms which were used 
in its investigation. Two main approaches were apparent. As 
shown in the previous section, studies of the memory span 
suggested a limited capacity store which was concerned with 
order information and was closely associated with speech. On 
the other hand, evidence relating to the recency effect in 
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immediate free recall (the tendency to recall the last few 
items in a list -first and best, eg. Postman and Phillips, 1965) 
showed a resistance to semantic or speech-based variables 
(Glanzer, 1972) whilst also suggesting aI imi ted capacity 
store. 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) decided to concentrate upon 
the point o-f agreement between paradigms by attempting to 
demonstrate the limited capacity of the Working Me mor y system 
which they postulated. The effect of a concurrent memory load 
upon performance in reasoning, comprehension and free recall 
should be to absorb some of the limited storage capacity of the 
system thus occasioning substantial disruption. 
The verbal reasoning task which was used (Baddeley 
and Hitch, 1974; Hitch and Baddeley, 1976) was derived by 
Baddeley (1968) and has been claimed to be "typical of a wide 
range of studies on reasoning" (Baddeley, 1976, pl. 70). In this 
task subjects are presented with a sentence which describes the 
order of occurence of two letters together with an instance 
consisting of the two letters mentioned. They are required to 
decide whether the sentence is true or false. For example, 
given the sentence 'A is followed by B' and the two letters 1B 
A' , the subj ect shou 1d respond 'True'.. A series of such 
problems were given whilst the subjýect was concurrently holding 
up to six items in memory. If interference occurred then it 
could be assumed that both tasks were mak-inr3 demands upon a 
single, limited capacity system. The complexity of the 
reasoninc; problems was varied by manipulating various features 
of the sentence (voice, truth value and polarity). It was 
hypothesised that, since more complex problems should require 
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increased space in Working Memory, they would be more 
susceptible to interference. That is, if the store was really 
of limited capacity. 
Their data indicated that, whilst subjects could hold 
up to two items in memory without impairment in reasoning 
latency or accuracy, inter+erence was +ound when six items were 
retained. However, the increase in reasoning latency was 
roughly constant across problem types. Since a memory preload 
technique had been used in these studies, it was possible that 
the increase in latency was due to subjects consolidating 
memory items by rehearsal prior to reasoning rather than due to 
strictly goncunLent interference. 
Consequently they adopted a new procedure in an 
attempt to eliminate this possibility. Subjects were required 
to rehearse the memory items aloud repeatedly whilst reasoning. 
Other conditions were included in which overlearnt sequences 
('the the the' or 'one two three iour +ive six') were recited 
cont i nuous ly in order to assess the effects 0f purely 
articulatory interference. Using this new procedure, they found 
a non-significant tendency for articulation g2L_12 to slow down 
performance, although a previous investigation had achieved 
si(3ni+icance with an alternative overlearnt sequence 
(Hammerton, 1969). The solution latencies from Baddeley and 
Hitch's (1974) study (experiment III) are shown in Figure 3.1 
The results illustrated in Figure 3.1 suggested to 
Baddeley and Hitch that verbal reasoning, like the memory span 
task, might have an articulatory component. The fact that a 
substantially greater interference effect due to memory load 
Ila 
occurred, which interacted with problem type such that more 
complex problems suffered more disruption, was taken as support 
for the existence of a Working Memory system consisting of a 
limited capacity work-space which could be flexibly allocated 
either to storage or processing. 
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Figure -3.1 . The effect of types of concurrent articulation on 
mean reasoning solution latencies. (From Baddeley and Hitch, 
1974, f igure 2) . 
Baddeley and Hitch's next experiment investigated the 
effects of phonological and visual similarity of the letter 
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pairs used in the verification task. Phonological similarity is 
known to have e+fects on the memory span (see previous section) 
but little ef-fect of visual similarity has been found 
(Baddeley, 1966). In -fact, phonological similarity had 
comparable effects in the reasoning task. When the letters in 
the sentence to be verified were similar phonologically, fewer 
problems were correctly solved in three minutes, and no effects 
o+ visual similarity were found. Baddeley and Hitch proposed 
that this result was consistent with memory span and 
verification sharing a common component. 
In order to assess the role of Working Memory in 
comprehension, subjects were required to listen to prose 
passages whilst concurrently holding one, three or six digits 
in memory. On a subsequent comprehension test it was found 
that, whereas small memory loads led to only a slight 
performance deficit, a more substantial decrement occured with 
loads nearing the memory span of six items. 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) reasoned that if 
comprehension utilised short-term memory then phonological 
similarity of the material to be understood would impair 
performance. In order to test this, another experiment was 
performed in which subjects were required to decide as quickly 
as possible whether sentences, half of which contained a high 
proportion of phonologically similar words, were possible (ie. 
grammatical and meaningful) or not. In this case they found 
that, although a post-test showed phonologically similar 
sentences took no longer to read, subjects did take longer to 
make acceptability judgements. 
Thus verbal reasoning and comprehension studies had 
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both yielded data in support of the Working Memory hypothesis. 
These have shown that the system suffers from the demands of a 
near-span additional memory load and is disrupted by the 
presence of phonological similarity. 
Subsequently, the effects of memory preload, 
concurrent memory load and articulatory suppression in free 
recall learning were investigated. In this way it was hoped to 
implicate the Working Memory system in a broader range of tasks 
than sentence verification and comprehension. It was also of 
interest to assess its role in long-term learning. 
Free recall of aurally presented lists of sixteen 
unrelated words was studied under a memory preload o-f zero, 
three or six dic3its presented visually. Since the memory span 
and the recency effect were both thought to make demands on a 
common short-term store, a dramatic interference was expected 
in this task. However, a memory preload did not have any effect 
an the characteristic recency e++ect which was obtained, as 
expected, with immediate +ree recall and abolished, as usual, 
after a thirty second delay. The effect C) f memory load was 
restricted to the long-term component oi recall, with increased 
load leading to po. orer retention. Since subjects might have 
suceeded in transfering the preload items into long-term 
storage by the time that the word list had been fully 
presented, their lack o+ inter+erence upon recency was not 
considered surprising. 
In an attempt to eliminate this artefactual 
explanation another experiment was performed which was similar 
to the previous one except that a concurrent load was imposed. 
Once ac3ain, the recency effect obtained with immediate recall 
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was unaffected by memory load although the long-term storage 
component showed the usual deficit as memory load increased. 
Thus Baddeley and Hitch (1974) were drawn to the conclusion 
that the recency mechanism is independent of the mechanism 
involved in the memory span task. 
Finally, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) refer to an 
unpublished study by Richardson and Baddeley which examined the 
effects of articulatory suppression upon free recall of 
visually or aurally presented word sequences. Suppression 
impaired retention as much for early serial positions as for 
recently presented items and appeared to be most marked for 
visually presented items. This result is cited as being 
consistent with the idea of a Working Memory operating on 
phonologically coded information and transferring it to 
long-term storage. 
In summary, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) showed that 
phonological similarity, articulatory suppression and a 
concurrent memory load each, individually, impaired performance 
in verbal reasoning, comprehension and free recall. They 
claimed that these results constituted "prima facie evidence 
for the existence of a working memory system which plays a 
central role in human information processing" (p2337). However, 
they made more specific theoretical proposals about the nature 
of the system. This was because their results showed that, 
despite disruption., subjects were still capable of reasoning, 
comprehending and learning even when a near span memory load of 
six items was retained and were hardly affected at all by a two 
or three item load. In order to encompass these findings it was 
suggested that part of the Working Memory system consists of a 
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relatively passive phonoloc3ical response buffer of limited 
capacity. This could be used to supplement a fairly flexible 
central executive processor which is required for information 
processing, decision making and transfer to long-term storage. 
Subsequently, Baddeley, Thomson and Buchanan (1975) explored 
the capacity and the characteristics of the phonological 
response bu+fer proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (19-4). They 
tested the subjects' memory span +or words of varying length as 
measured by number of syllables. Subjects were required to 
recall lists of aurally presented words in their serial order 
and it was found that the span was less for longer words. 
However the polysyllables differed from the monosyllables in 
terms of their abstractness, imageability and in other ways. 
These linguistic factors were controlled for in an experiment 
of similar design in which the words to be remembered were 
names o+ countrys and thus came -f rom the same 1i nqu i st ic 
category. Similar results to the previous study were obtained. 
However, the two experiments described above did not 
determine whether the word length effects were due to temporal 
duration or because of their articulatory complexity. In an 
attempt to resolve this issue, Baddeley et al (1975) tested 
retention for two -groups of words which were matched for number 
of syllables but which differed in the time they usually take 
to utter. An example of a long duration word is 'cyclone' and a 
short duration word is 'bishop'. Subjects were able to recall 
more items from the lists of short duration words. Even when 
the words were presented visually and subjects were requested 
to rehearse the items aloud, fewer lonc-:; words (as measured by 
articulation and reading rate) were recalled. In fact it was 
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shown that subjects could recall as many words as they could 
read out in about 1.6 seconds. 
The above results suggested that the phonoloc; ical 
buffer is time based and is analogous to a tape loop of about 
1.5 seconds duration (e(3. Hitch and Baddeley, 1977, p103). The 
relationship of memory span and articulation rate together with 
the existence of a word-lenqth effect even with visually 
presented material implicates an articulatory rather than an 
auditory memory system. The latter system has also been ruled 
out by the finding that reducing the temporal duration of the 
auditory stimuli, via a computer pr9ramme which removes 
sections of the spoken item without reducing its 
intelligibility, does not lead to improved memory performance 
for compressed compared with normal digits (Hitch and Baddeley, 
1977). 
Further evidence suggesting an articula. tory system in 
the word length effect was provided when it was shown that, 
with visual presentation, the word length ef+ect disappears 
under articulatory suppression. The e+fect o+ suppression, as 
noted earlier, depends upon presentation modality (Levy, 1971; 
Peterson and Johnson, 1971) and, as we shall see later, on 
whether articulatory suppression continues during output. 
However, in their final experiment, Baddeley et al (1975) found 
that with auditory presentation the word length effect remains 
even under suppression. 
Although the modality specific result is not 
consistent with the view that suppression blocks the 
articulatory system upon which the wor d length ef+ect is 
dependent, Baddeley et al (1975) have explained it. They argue 
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that the transformation of a visual stimulus into a 
phonological representation is stopped by articulatory 
suppression and thus access to the articulatory loop is 
prevented. Auditory material is, however, presumed to be 
already established into a phonological code. 
Eventually the articulatory rehearsal loop Was 
related to the buffer system underlying speech production 
(Morton, 1970) and its relation to the central executive was 
stated more clearly. It has been claimed that the verbal loop 
"is able to store a limited amount of speech-like material in 
the appropriate serial order" (Baddeley, 1976, p176) and its 
capacity has been shot-in to be "limited by time rather than by 
the amount of information or number of events" (Baddeley, 1976, 
p178). It has been suggested that the articulatory loop 
functions as a Islave system' of limited capacity which 
supplements the central processor on occasion. 
The articulatory loop which is subject to temporal 
decay is described by Hitch (1980, p166) as an "actively 
controlled system for retaining sub-vocal output" which 
distinguishes it from "a relatively passive 'input register' 
underlying recency" which is item-based rather than time-based 
(cf. Waugh and Norman, 1965). However, Baddeley (1976, p178) 
suggests that "since STM in general appears to be 1 im i ted in 
number of items held rather than time, it seems unlikely that 
the central executive component of the system is also 
time-based". Interference with the central processor would only 
be observed when the loop's capacity is exceeded and the 
executive has to devote some of its information processin-3 
capacity to storage by alternative means. 
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Although the bulk of tasks considý---red in the previous 
pages have concerned verbal material, some consideration should 
be given to peripheral components of the Working Memory system 
which are specialised for storing and manipulating visual 
material. The sensory storage o+ visual in-formation in iconic 
memory iS subject t C3 masking and has a large, though 
instantaneous capacity (see Baddeley, 1976; Coltheart, 1963; 
Neisser, 1967). However, there is a growing body of evidence 
which points to the existence o+ another visual store o+ longer 
duration (see Phillips, 1983). This, unlike iconic memory, has 
a limited capacity and is not subject to masking. 
Unpublished evidence cited by Baddeley and Hitch 
(1974), which showed that visual recognition of pictures could 
compete with a concurrent mental arithmetic task, led them to 
propose the existence of a peripheral memorial component based 
on the visual modality. However, the case for a single central 
processor, forming the core of the Working Memory system and 
implicated in both visual and verbal memory tasks, is 
maintained. The results of Baddeley, Grant, Wight and Thomson 
(1974), Baddele, /7 and Lieberman (1980) and Oakhill and 
Johnson-Laird (1984) all seem to in. dicate a spatial s-.,,! stem 
speci+ically. This is re+erred to as the 'visuo-spatial scratch 
pad'. Baddele-ý, (1980) even suggests that the dichotomy between 
propositional and analogical views of imagery (discussed in 
chapter 2) may be a +alse one. He writes (p20) "it is +or 
example quite likely that the scratch pad is a device which 
takes propositional codes from long-term memory and manipulates 
and displays them via an analogical peripheral system". 
Some recent modi+ications to the model of Working 
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Memory will be considered next. The notion o+ the articulatory 
loop, as described above, has been able to account +or a wide 
range of experimental findings relating to phonological 
similarity, word length and various effects of articulatory 
suppression on immediate memory, word length and similarity 
providing the tasks employ visual presentation. However, as 
discussed previously, with auditory presentation anomalous 
results of articulatory suppression on phonological similarity 
and word length are found. If the word length and phonological 
simi I arity ef +ects stem +r om the articulatory process, then 
articulatory suppression would be expected to prevent the 
effects occurring regardless of presentation modality. Although 
several authors have argued for the existence of an auditory or 
acoustic component in short-term memory, which could explain 
these discrepant results, none was envisageO within the 
original Working Memory model except +or the relatively 
peripheral Precategorical Acoustic Store of Crowder and Morton 
(1969). However, recent evidence presented by Baddeley and his 
colleagues, which will be discussed below, now argues in +avour 
of such a store. 
The first study of relevance is that of Vallar and 
Baddele- investigated short-term retention of y (1982) who 
visually presented meaningless trigrams under various 
inter+erinq conditions. Recall was not seriously impaired a+ter 
a five second interval under articulatory suppression, 
commenced immediately following presentation, although there 
was a decrement after fifteen seconds relative to a silent 
control condition. However, the Peterson and Peterson (1959) 
technique of counting backwards by threes had a drastic effect 
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at both intervals. Vallar and Baddeley argued the possibility 
that, with visually presented letters, the most crucial 
function of the articulatory loop is in converting the visual 
stimulus into a phonological code. Although they reasoned that 
this should be disrupted if articulatory suppression commenced 
at input, a second experiment employing such a procedure showed 
no disruption after five or fifteen seconds retention, relative 
to asi1ent condition. They argue that the disruption 
engendered by the counting technique in the +irst experiment 
might have occurred due to its increased demands on the limited 
capacity central executive component. However, they speculated 
that the maintenance of the visually presented information 
could have occurred in an acoustic store which "is sufficiently 
powerful to take over the role oi subvocal rehearsal, at least 
,,, span situation" 
(p59). The manner in which in the memor- 
visually presented in+ormation is translated into a form 
suitable to enter such a store when articulation is prevented 
is not stated. 
A series of experiments by Salame and Baddeley (1982) 
are also relevant at this point. They investigated the effects 
of auditor), interference on immediate memory for visually 
presented digits. They found that unattended speech impaired 
subjects' performanc e compared with -a Siltnt control condition, 
even though instructions were given to ignore the speech. The 
effect is not at a semantic level however, since similar 
effects accrue whether the unattended speech consisted of 
meaningful or nonsense words. Since the effect occurred whether 
or not the unattended speech was synchronised with the visual 
presentation of dic3its it is unlikely to be due to attentional 
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distraction. 
Another experiment (, Salam-ý and Baddeley, 1982, 
exper iment -? 3) was designed to test the possibility that 
unattended material was gaining access to the articulatory loop 
and thus disrupting subvocal rehearsal of the visual material. 
Articulatory suppression - sayin C) 7 the' 
employed in order to prevent availability 
rehearsal. Under these conditions the 
speech disappeared. Salam6` and Baddeley 
appears to be some conflict, manifested 
repeatedly - was 
C3 f the 1 oop f or 
effect of unattended 
argue that there 
in the articulatory 
loop, between the inner speech occasioned by subvocal rehearsal 
and irrelevant speech which the subject is attempting to 
ignore. Their next experiment (4) examined the possibility that 
irrelevant speech is somehow gaining access to the loop and 
therefore disrupting performance. If this were the case then 
irrelevant speech containing words of longer duration should 
cause more disruption. This is because the capacity of the loop 
is t iTne-I imited and and sensitive to the ef iect of word length 
(Baddeley et al, 1975). In fact an equivalent amount of 
disruption occurred with long and short duration words. 
The alternative possiblity considered was that 
unattended speech causes disruption by feeding into another 
memory store which can also be fed by the articulatory loop. 
Since white noise had previously been shown to produce less 
drastic impairment than speech, the effect could depend on 
phonological similarity between unattended speech and the 
visual digits. Salame and Baddeley's (1962) final experiment 
established that this is indeed the case. More disruption was 
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occasioned when phonologically similar materials were used in 
both the unattended speech and the materials presented visually 
for remembering. Salam& and Baddeley's results support the 
assumption that two separate memory systems exist - "one based 
an phonological coding and accessible either thro,,. ýiý audition or 
articulation, whilst the second is used to store visually 
presented material" (pl6l). This is inconsistent with the 
original Working Memory-model (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974) since 
that assumes the existence of an articulatory store alone. The 
latest model of Working Memory with which the author is 
familiar (Baddeley, 1983) revises the concept of the 
articulatory loop. The nature of this is discussed below. 
The revised concept of the articulatory loop "assumes 
a phonological input store supported by an articulatory control 
process" (Baddeley, Lewis and Vallar, 1984, p249). This concept 
of the articulatory loop was tested in a series of five 
experiments by Baddeley et al (1984). Initially they performed 
three experiments which replicated Murray's (1968) finding by 
showinc3 that articulatory suppression did not eliminate the 
phonological similarity effect with auditory presentation and 
written recall. This was the case whether suppression occýjrred 
just at input. or both at input and output so that the 
possibility that the effect emerged during a silent recall 
period was eliminated. It was concluded that the phonological 
similarity effect reflects the nature of the coding in a 
phonoloc3ical input store. Auditory material is automatically 
registered in this store regardless of articulation conditions, 
but with visually presented material, suppression - which 
prevents articulation during the presentation period, removes 
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the phonological similarity effect. 
A further two experiments were performed to examine 
the word length effect which is assumed to depend on 
articulatory rehearsal. Since long duration words can be 
rehearsed less quickly, their memory trace is less frequently 
refreshed and hence recall is diminished relative to short 
words under silent conditions. Under articulatory suppression 
no advantage for short duration words would be expected 
regardless of presentation modality. An apparent contradictory 
result reported by Baddeley et al (1975) showed that with 
visual presentation the word length effect was abolished but 
this was not the case with aLLditory presentation. However, it 
should be pointed out that Baddeley et al (1975) did not extend 
suppression into the spoken recall period. The word length 
effect could have been emerging at that time if subjects were 
rapidly shifting information from an auditory to an 
articulatory mode before recalling the material. In contrast, 
Baddeley et al (1984) found the word length effect to be 
virtually abolished under suppression maintained during input 
and written recall with both visual and auditory presentations. 
The above results were argued to support the revised concept of 
an articulatory loop which, Baddeley et al (1984) suggest, 
explains a wide range of findings in a parsimonious manner. 
The Working Memory framework is proving extremely 
fruitful but, as would be expected with any influential theory, 
it is not without critics (eq. Monsell, 1984; Klapp, Marshburn 
and Lester, 196--; Richardson, 1981; Richardson, 1984). Some 
criticisms will be considered in Chapter 71, after the present 
series 0+ experiments has been described. In the years 
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following its inception, the Working Memory model has been 
considerably refined. This is not really surprising in view Of 
the range of experimental situations that have subjected it to 
testing and analysis. Indeed Hitch (1980, P157, argues that it 
is necessary "to consider evidence +rom as wide a variety oi 
sources as possible in order to provide 'converging operations' 
for testing models and hypotheses". Hitch's (1978) application 
of the model in studying the processes underlying mental 
arithmetic serves to demonstrate its generality in a relatively 
everyday task. Investigations into the role oi Working Memory 
in another everyday task, reading, will be discussed in the 
next section. 
The present section has shown how the concept of 
Working Memory (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; 1977; Hitch and 
Baddeley, 1976) involves a modification of the modal account of 
memory favoured by earlier investigators. Baddeley and Hitch 
are not content with the narrow approach which views memory 
simply as a system necessary for the recall of previous events. 
Whilst this is undoubtedly an important function of memory, 
they argue, along with other authors, that many cognitive tasks 
(including problem so Ivi ng, understanding speech and reading 
for instance) require some interplay with the memory system. 
Their intention is made clear by Hitch (1980). It is to avoid 
the detailed, but veryilimited, study of a narrow range of 
recal 1 and recognition paradigms and t C3 pursue a more 
ecologically valid course. 0+ course, useful information can 
still be gained from traditional memory paradigms, but the 
overall aim, engendered in the Working Memory approach, is to 
determine the function of memory in general cognition. 
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The hope was that theoretical links between 
previously separate topics in cognitive psychology would become 
established through the Working Memory approach and that, 
within this broader context, questions about the nature of 
basic mechanisms would be formulated more easily. Since 
research and theory development in conditional reasoning has 
suffered harshly through its isolation from more popular 
cognitive areas, the present author can only endorse this 
laudable aim. The relevance of thýe present series of 
experiments will be considered in the context of Baddele-,, and 
Hitch's theory. 
ARTICULATORY SUPPRESSION AND READING. 
The studies reviewed earlier in this chapter have 
suggested that irrelevant articulation hampers the phonological 
coding of visually presented materials. This has encouraged its 
use as a technique in the investigation of the processes 
involved in reading. In a very early investigation of the role 
of 'inner speech' in reading, Pintner (1913) showed that a 
secondary counting task did not impair the subjects' 
comprehension of text which they were reading simultaneously. 
Unfortunately the rate of articulation was not, specified in 
this case although this would appear to be a crucial 
consideration. For instance, Peterson and Peterson (1959) 
showed that when a similar distracting task is used in a 
short-term memory paradigm, in which subjects count in the 
interval between presentation and recall of test material, the 
rate of counting determines the amount recalled. 
Many subsequent authors have studied the role of 
phonological recoding in visual word recognition and reading by 
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requiring sii. biects to engage in an irrelevant articulatory tasý, 
and measuring the extent of the interference caused. In one 
study Levy (1975) required subjects to learn sets of three 
short (seven word) unrelated sentences (eq. 'the attractive 
girl kissed the surprised fellow'). They were then presented 
with a test sentence and were asked to indicate whether it was 
identical to any of the previous three. On half of the 
occasions no difference was" apparent. However, on the other 
trials, a di+ferenc e was found. One of three types of change 
was possible: 
I)Lexica. 1 - in which a synonym was substituted for one of the 
nouns, 
2)Semantic - in which subject and object nouns were 
interchanged, 
3)Filler - in which a verb or an adjective was changed. 
Subjects were required to perform the task under one of four 
experimental conditions; 
a)Visual Silent - in which subjects read the sentence silently, 
b)Visua. 1 Vocalised in which subjects read the sentence aloud, 
c)Visual-Si-kDn-ressed in which subjects read the sentence 
whilst concurrently articulating the numbers from one to ten 
repeatedly, 
d)Auditgr: ý - in which the subject listened to the sentence 
whilst remaining silent. 
Levy found that articulatory suppression reduced the ability to 
detect lexical and semantic changes whilst no comparable effect 
was found in the auditory condition. `: he concluded that 
concurrent articulation prevented the formation of a 
phonological representation necessary for comprehension. 
134 
Most 0+ the evidence suggests that individual words 
can be understood without phonological recoding, although some 
authors claim that recoding often occurs prior to lexical 
access (Levy, 1978; Underwood and Holt, 1979; Kleiman, 19775; 
Baddeley, 1979). However, phonological recoding appears to be 
useful in order to retain words, phrases or sentences in 
Workinc) Memory until comprehension has occured (Kleiman, 1975). 
Kleiman (1975, experiment III) had subjects shadowing 
aurally presented digits whilst making decisions about short 
visually presented sentences. One of four types of jýAdqament was 
required. For the first three types, an initial target word was 
written above the sentence. The decisions were; 
1)Phonoloqica. 1 - Is there a word in the sentence which sounds 
I ike the tarc3et? 
2)Graphemic - Is there a word which looks like the target in 
its spelling? 
3)Cate_92r-y - Is there a word which names a member of the 
category named by the target? 
4)Accej2tabilit. y - Do the five words, in the order written, form 
a semantically acceptable sentence? 
He found that shadowing disrupted Phonological decisions more 
than either Graphemic or Category decisions and concluded that 
accessing the meanings of word pairs does not require 
phonological recoding. In his previous experiment (Kleiman, 
1975, experiment II), Graphemic decisions about phonologically 
similar (eq. BLAME FLAME) and dissimilar (eq. COUCH TOUCH) 
materials were made with or without shadowing. Since shadowing 
hindered both types o+ decision equally, he concluded that 
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speech recoding is not essential for Graphemic decisions. 
However, when judgements about the acceptability of the five 
word strings were needed, a marked disruptive effect of 
shadowing was found. It was suggested that this sort of 
Acceptability decision required the simultaneous evaluation and 
intec3ra. tion of several word units and entailed a similar 
storage load to that entailed in normal sentence comprehension. 
Kleiman (1975) argues that his data is consistent with a 
working memory model containing both a visual and an 
articulatory store. Phonological recoding, he suggested, is 
required to keep word units available in working memory for 
more extensive processing such as that involved in reading. 
However comprehension occurs via a direct visual to meaning 
route when the information load is small, for instance when 
words can be monitored individually. 
More recently Baddeley (1979) has assessed the 
possible role oi Workinq Memory in reading. He has pointed out 
that Kleiman's (1975) implication that the articulatory loop 
would be required +or normal reading, is equivocal. Shadowing, 
Baddeley suggests, is a demanding task which is likely to 
occupy the loop as well as requiring some contribution from the 
central executive. This claim is supported by Kleiman's data 
which indicated that per+ormance is impaired with Graphemic and 
Category decisions although this was less than that arising 
with Phonological and Acceptability judgements. Therefore the 
extra disruption could be due to Acceptability decisions making 
c3reater demands upon the central executive rather than the 
loop. Also, with Kleiman's Acceptability judgements, close 
monitorinq of word order was often necessary if a correct 
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decision was to be made. Baddeley suggests that this sort of 
task might require use o+ the articulatory loop toagreate r- 
extent than normal reading would. 
Indeed, Baddeley, Eldridge and Lewis (1981) have also 
criticised Kleiman (1975) methodologically suggesting that, 
with his +irst three decison types, an implicit memory task 
could have been involved in that the subject holds a target 
word in memory whilst processing the sentence. Furthermore they 
argue that "a subject about to make a phonological judgement 
would be most likely to maintain the word phonologically, 
whereas the graphemic and semantic judgements might be more 
likely to be supported by visual and semantic representations" 
(Baddeley et al, 1981, p441). As a consequence, his effects 
might have arisen due to the interference between the shadowing 
and phonologically maintaining the target word, rather than 
shadowing and reading. Even Kleiman's 'Acceptability' 
condition, which was not open to the criticisms above, was not 
beyond reproach. Mter all, shadowing is a demanding task which 
is likely to act not only as an articulatory suppressor but 
also to impart a large cognitive load on Working Memory. The 
decrement in this condition, it was suggested, arises because 
of in-formation overload rather than the suppression of 
articulatory coding. 
Baddeley (1979), in assessing the circumstances in 
which the loop would be utilised, cites a study of simple 
sentence verification by Hitch and Baddeley in which a 'Yes/No' 
decision to a sequence such as 'Wasps have oars' is requested. 
It was found thatwhereas a memory load disrupted performance, 
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concurrent articulation 2er se had no effect relative to silent 
controls. This result suggests that the loop is not needed for 
reading or comprehension of simple sentences. Baddeley refers 
to another unpublished study with Simmonds investigating the 
effect c)+ suppression on reading of a wide range of passage 
types. Although an occasional increase in reading speed was 
noted, suppression had little effect on performance. 
The sort of results noted above have induced Baddeley 
in his later writing to de-emphasise the contribution of the 
loop for normal reading and comprehension. However he has 
specified occasions when the loop would be beneficial. 
Phonological comparisons benefit through usage of the loop 
although they aan be made without it (Baddeley, 1979). Certain 
difficult material, particularly where order information is 
required, would probably require the loop (Baddeley, 1979; 
Baddeley, and Lewis, 1981). Therefore on tasks requiring 
attention to these kinds of information, articulatory 
suppression would be expected to drastically disrupt 
performance at least with visually presented materials. 
AN APPRAISAL OF THE ARTICULATORY SUPPRESSION-TECHNIQUE. 
At this stage it is necessary to appraise techniques 
which have been utilised to assess the contribution of various 
processes in cognition. As has been shown in this and the 
previous chapter, the methodology known as selective 
interference appears to be commonly employed for this purpose. 
In essence this methodology relies upon the fact that 
it is sometimes difficult to execute two tasks concurrently 
although each alone is undemanding. This difficulty is 
sometimes explained in structural terms by claiming, -for 
138 
instance, that both tasks are competing for use of a specific 
perceptual or motor mechanism (eq. Brooks, 1968). On other 
occasions the difficulty of dual task performance has been 
explained in terms of competition for a general, limited 
capacity resource (eq. Broadbent, 1958). Kahneman (19-77) 
incorporates both structural and capacity considerations within 
his explanations of interference tasks in relation to attention 
and effort. 
In addition to the classic imagery suppression 
studies of Brooks (1967; 1968), described in some detail in the 
previous chapter, another example of structural interference 
between imagery and a percept in the same modality is given by 
Segal and Fusella (1969). The), found that the detection of a 
weak signal WaS more difficult if subjects were imagining a 
visual scene. Detection of a weak tone was more difficult if 
subjects were imagining a sound. The interference was presumed 
to occur because of the competition of the internal image and 
the external signal for a common process. 
On occasions when concurrent task interference is due 
to capacity limitations then it should arise whether or not the 
tasks require the use of common mechanisms. Kahneman (1973) has 
reviewed the literature with the above points in mind and has 
claimed to find considerable support for them. An example which 
he quotes is that of Posner and Rossman (1965). They required 
subjects to retain three letters for a brief period whilst they 
were engaged in concurrent mental tasks of varying difficulty. 
They found that there was a decrease in the efficiency of 
retention as task difficulty increased. Kahneman interprets 
this result by assuminc; that rehearsal of the memory load 
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demands considerable attention or effort. Whenever the 
interpolated task pre-empts attention, the rehearsal will be 
disrupted and retention will suffer. 
Recently Allport (1980) has disputed the usefulness 
of concurrent interference tasks in investigations of capacity 
limitation. He states that this is because most if not all such 
theories which impute a limited capacity resource are 
unfalsifiable since they permit an escape clause. "If two tasks 
can in fact be performed concurrently, each independently of 
the manipulated difficulty of the other, then perforce one or 
both of the tasks must be 'automatic'. That task is therefore, 
by definition, irrelevant to the evaluation of the theory" 
(Allport, 1980, p. 143). 
However, Allport has not denied the utility of 
concurrent interference tasks in assessing the nature of 
cognitive structures or processes. Indeed he suggests that all 
dual task interference arises through structural/process 
limitations. In assessing the nature of the dual processes 
which are hypothesised to underlie conditional reasoning 
performance (Evans, 1980b), competing task methodology seems to 
be appropriate. The issue now to be addressed is whether 
articulatory suppression is an appropriate competing task for 
the present purpose. 
Most of the studies discussed in this chapter have 
utilised articulatory suppression as an interference technique. 
Besner, Davies and Daniels (1981) have reviewed the evidence 
concerning its effects and are not satisfied that the 
assumptions upon which it is based have received sufticient 
critical attention. For instance they claim that Kleiman's 
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conclusions might be ill-founded since they ignore "the 
distinction that can be drawn between phonology used for 
accessin, 3 the lexicon (prelexical phonology) and phonology that 
can be retrieved from the lexicon (postlexical phonology) after 
access for the purpose of naming, or other phonological 
operations" (Besner et al, 1981, p418). They point out the 
logical possibility that rhyme judgements could be made using 
either prelexical or postlexical phonology. If rhyme judgements 
require the use of postlexical phonology, Kleiman's finding 
that they are affected by suppression is entirely irrelevant to 
the question of whether prelexical phonology is utilised in 
making decisions of synonymity. It is quite possible that 
prelexical and postlexical phonology are not affected by the 
same variables. 
An experiment which Besner et al (1981) consider to 
be of importance in assessing the locus of suppression effects 
is that of Martin (1978). 'She studied the effects of concurrent 
articulation on performance of a Stroop- colour word 
interference task (Stroop, 1935). The Stroop task involves 
presentincj a subject with a row of letters printed in coloured 
ink. The subject is asked to name the colour of the ink. When 
the letters form a word, latency of response is increased. if 
the letters spell a. colour (eg. Red) then the response is 
delayed even further (Dyer, 1973). 
Martin (1978) assumed that the Stroop interference 
should be reduced if the colour words were made more difficult 
to read by engaging in irrelevant concurrent articulation 
which, she assumed, inhibits the speech recoding of visually 
presented material. If (prelexical) phonological recoding is 
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necessary for lexical access of visually presented words then 
its prevention should lead to improved performance on the 
Stroop test. In support of her hypothesis she f ound that Stroop 
interference was attenuated under concurrent articulation. 
I+ this result is genuine, then Besner et al (1961) 
claim that concurrent articulation could be used with some 
confidence as a technique for studying the role of prelexical 
phonology in reading. Martin's (1978) result is particularly 
surprising since it has been argued by Coltheart (1978) that a 
visual access route to the lexicon is faster than a 
phonological access route. It is claimed that this would lead 
to an expectation of Stroop interference from the colour word 
condition (due to interfering lexical access of the colour word 
via a visual route) even under the suppression condition. 
Besner et al therefore decided to attempt a partial replication 
of Martin's experiment but did not find any reduction of the 
Stroop effect under concurrent articulation. 
Besner et al (1981) admit that their failure to 
replicate Martin (1978) is not conclusive. Indeed, a recent 
study by Chmiel (1984) has indicated that a possible 
methodological difference, based on the labelling of bins into 
which cards are sorted, could account. for the differences 
between their results. Using patch labels, as in Martin's 
study, he replicated her results showing a decrease in the 
Stroop effect under concurrent articulation relative to a 
silent control condition. However, when labels consist of 
colour names printed in black ink, Besner et al's result is 
replicated in that no reduction in the Stroop effect occurs 
under concurrent articulation, in fact there is a slight 
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increase in efficiency. Unfortunately it is not known which 
labelling technique Besner et al used. Chmiel's data, collected 
on 11 -troop and reverse Stroop tasks (in which the cards have to 
be sorted according to the name of the colcur-word rather than 
the ink colour) suggest that different codes are used based on 
the labelling of bins into which cards have to be sorted. He 
claims (pý '118) that "concurrent articulation must, at least, 
have an effect on postlexical phonology" but it is unlikely to 
affect phonology prelexically. 
Besner et al's (1981) experiments tend to support 
this view. They required a task in which either a prelexical or 
postlexica. 1 phonological code must be used in order to test 
whether it is affected by suppression. In their third 
experiment they required subjects to work speedily through 
lists of ten irregular word pairs or ten non-word pairs and 
tick only those pairs which rhymed. Half of the items within 
each list did so. In half of the trials, concurrent 
articulation of irrelevant information was required whilst on 
other occasions silence was maintained. 
If Kleiman's (1975) claim that prelexical phonology 
is affected by suppression is correct, then rhyme judgements of 
non-words should be more affected by suppression than those of 
non-regLklar words. After all, Besner et al stress, rhyme 
judgements with non-words must rely exclusively upon prelexical 
phonological recoding. On the other hand the rhyming 
characteristics of irregular words can only be determined by 
accessing the lexicon visually and retrieving information 
postlexically. This is the case since the grapheme-phoneme 
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correspondence rules do not apply to irregular words. The 
results of their experiment show that the latency ef+ectB of 
concurrent articulation were confined to the word condition. 
The lack. of any latency effect of suppression in the non-word 
condition suggests that prelexical phonology was not a++ected 
by it. However, the ef+ect o+ suppression on error rates was 
common to words and non-words. 
The interpretation given by Besner et al (1981) of 
what articulatory suppression does is at odds with that of 
other authors (Kleiman, 1975; Plartin, 1978). They suggest that 
phonology used to gain access to the lexicon is not affected by 
suppression. However Besner et al decided to assess its effects 
on another task before coming to a conclusion. Subjects had to 
indicate whether the items in a. list sounded like real words or 
not under silent and suppression conditions. This task requires 
access of the internal lexicon on the basis of purely 
phonological information. Although no latency effect was 
observed, there was an effect on errors such that performance 
was worse under suppression. 
rn order to eliminate the possibility that the rate 
of articulatory suppression was the important variable, a final 
experiment was performed using a similar task in which this 
rate was slowed (from the fastest possible rate to one of about 
170 utterances per minute). The latency data were not 
supportive of the interpretation that subjects were alternating 
between the suppression and phonological lexical decision 
tasks. Since there was no effect of suppression on reaction 
time or errors, they concluded that suppression does not 
specifically prevent or impair the derivation of a prelexical 
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phonological code. 
If articulatory suppression is to be used as an 
experimental tool then a more precise understanding of what it 
does is required. Besner et al (1981) attempt this in their 
closing paragraphs. They compared the results of their final 
experiment with those of Baddeley, Thomson and Buchanan (1975) 
in which the suppression rate and materials were similar. It 
will be remembered that Baddeley et al observed that the 
superiorit'y of recall of short over long words was eliminated 
with visually presented material under suppression. Their 
conclusion, that suppression prevents the translation of Yisual 
material into a phonological code is not consistent with the 
data from Besner et al's final experiment which required the 
use of a phonological code. 
Besner et al (1981) give an alternative 
interpretation that suppression prevents the translation o+ 
print into an articulatory rather than a phonological code. 
Furthermore they suggest that phonological recoding which is 
not affected by suppression may be used sometimes for lexical 
access. However, they write "if the text is difficult and 
requires elaborate syntactic processing, or 
specific wording, then comprehension 
information about 
may involve the 
maintenance of phonological information in a short-term buffer 
for several seconds ..... Such maintenance may 
be mediated by an 
articulatory code that is sensitive to suppression" (Besner et 
al, 1981, p432). 
It should be clear -From reading chapter I that 
conditional reasoning tasks generally lead to high error rates 
and could therefore be said to involve difficult material. The 
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positioning of negatives and the relative ordering of terms in 
antecedent and consequent are vital factors for consideration 
if a correct solution is to be achieved. The fact that errors 
and latencies increase systematically with the introduction of 
negatives in the rule (eg. Evans, 1977a; Evans Newstead, 
1977) points to their increasing syntactic difficulty. 
Conditional reasoning problems appear to satisfy the various 
criteria of Besner et al (1981) which were given above. 
Consequently their solution may involve the maintenance of 
phonological information in a short-term buffer. If Besner et 
al are correct and this information is mediated by an 
articulatory code then it should follow that performance on 
such problems, when presented visually, would be drastically 
affected by articulatory suppression performed at an 
appropriate rate. 
The decision about what is an appropriate 
articulation rate in suppression studies is not an easy one. On 
the one hand, slow articulation rates may allow subjects to 
intersperse an occasional subvocal rehearsal whereas, on the 
other hand, overly fast rates "may have the drawback that more 
general impairment occurs, possibly due to the involvement of 
the central executive" (Baddeley et al, 1984, p247). Besner et 
al (1981) demonstrate that 170 utterances per minute is too 
slow a rate to cause interference, but maximum rate is likely 
to be too fast in view of the argument stated above. The 
experiments reported in the next three chapters employ 
concurrent articulation at a constant rate similar to that used 
by Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Hitch and Baddeley, 1976), ie. 
between 240 and 300 utterances per minute. This should be an 
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appropriate rate, after . all the development of the Working 
Memory hypothesis relied on several experiments which 
successfully employed articultory suppression at such a rate. 
Another important methodological point arises from 
the studies of Baddeley et al (1984). They show that, in their 
memory tasks using auditory materials, the effects of 
art*iculatory suppression depend upon its occurrence at 
presentation and recall. Other studies have shown that, with 
visual materials, suppression at the presentation stage alone 
is sufficient to engender interference (eg. Baddeley, Thomson 
and Buchanan, 1975). Several of the experiments described in 
the next three chapters will employ articulatory suppression at 
a constant rate of between 240 and 300 items per minute. 
Although visual presentation of materials is employed, whenever 
suppression is used, it is maintained throughout each 
experimental trial. 
Finally, let us restate the position of Evans (1980a; 
1980b). In developing the Dual Process theory of reasoning 
(Wason and Evans, 1975), he has allied 1 og i Cal perfomance on 
reasoning tasks with a verbal process which, he suggests, 
competes with a non-verbal process responsible for various 
non-logical response biases. If the verbal process is 
articulatory in nature then we might expect the use of 
articulatory suppression to diminish its influence on the 
resulting data in a conditional reasoning task. Some of the 
experiments contained in the next few chapters will investigate 
this possibility. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENTS I AND II. 
EXPLORING THE NATURE OF PROCESSES IN REASONING. 
The experiments reported in this chapter were 
designed to test the Dual Process theory of reasoning (Wason 
and Evans, 1975) in its revised version (Evans, 1980a; 1980b). 
The original theory, together with Evans' revisions, has been 
discussed extensively in previous chapters and possible links 
with Paivio's (1975) theory of dual systems of thinking have 
been explored. Essentially, the research reported here 
investigates the possibility that the data observed in 
reasoning experiments reflect two distinct types of thought. 
In brief, Evans developed the original Dual Process 
theory of reasoning by supposing that the logical component in 
reasoning data is due to a verbal (Type 2) process and the 
non-logical component is due to a non-verbal (Type 1) process. 
It is suggested that both the Type 1 and the Type 2 processes 
are in+luential prior to a subject making his response in a 
reasoning task. In order to test this theory it was decided to 
adopt a selective inter+erence methodology. At this early stage 
the decision was made to concentrate upon the verbal/non-verbal 
distinction outlined above. Accordingly, an interierence task 
was sought which would selectively disrupt one of these types 
of process. 
It is recognised that the attribution of logical 
reasoning to a verbal process associates it with language 
although not necessarily with speech functions. However the 
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existence o+ an important tradition implicating implicit speech 
as an essential ingredient in thinking (eg. Watson, 1930; 
Luria, 1959; Vygotsky, 1962; Sokolov, 1972) assisted in the 
decision to concentrate on disrupting articulatory processes. 
In this context the accepted interference task is that of 
concurrently speaking aloud irrelevant verbal material. This 
technique is known as articulatory suppression and much of the 
literature pertaining to its use in investigating the role of 
implicit speech in problem solving and the role of articulatory 
processes in short-term memory, word recognition and reading 
has been considered in chapter 3. 
The specific procedure adopted was similar to that of 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Hitch and Baddeley, 1976) in their 
investigations of the Working Memory hypthesis. This is 
discussed in chapter 3. In investigating their hypothesis with 
respect to reasoning, Hitch and Baddeley (1976, experiment III) 
required subjects to solve a verbal reasoning problem under one 
of three conditions: 
1) Control - no competing task, 
2) Articulation subjects said either ' the - the - the' or 
71 -2-3-45 6' repeatedly whilst performing the task, 
3) Memory - subjects were presented with a difierent six digit 
number at the start of each trial and they were required to 
recite it aloud continually. This adds a short-term memory load 
to the concurrent articulation task. 
Although the present series of experiments was motivated 
di+ferently to theirs, a similar procedure to that descibed 
above was adopted. The particular problems used in conditional 
reasoning paradigms, such as we are concerned with, are much 
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more complex than those o+ Hitch and Baddeley and they are 
known to produce systematic errors under normal conditions (see 
chapter 1). 
Whereas Hitch and Baddeley's prime dependent measure 
was the latency o+ responding, the present study Was more 
concerned with the nature oi responses made. It was expected 
that the verbal interference conditions would selectively 
disrupt the logical component of performance relative to the 
non-logical component. However since Hitch and Baddeley 
observed interference in latency scores with their problems, a 
similar measure was employed in the present study. In view of 
the exploratory nature of the research, it was decided that no 
directional prediction would be made for statistical purposes. 
EXPERIMENT I 
The Effect of Articulatory___S! Appression on Conditional 
Inference. 
The first experiment employed a set of reasoning 
problems in which subjects are invited to make each of four 
inferences, for each of four problems, thus producing sixteen 
distinct logical-problems (as shown in Table 1.7). As we noted 
in chapter 1, only two of these_in+erences (MP and MT) are 
considered valid in formal logic. We should also bear in mind, 
however, that in natural usage the conditional sentence is 
sometimes used to express equivalence rather than implication. 
In this case all four inferences are valid. 
It can be seen from Table 1.7 that each of the four 
inferences results in an affirmative conclusion on two rules 
and a negative conclusion on two rules. Previous research, 
which was discussed in chapter 1, has shown that, all else 
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being equal, subjects prefer to accept negative conclusions 
(Evans, 1972c, 1977a; Roberge, 1978; Pollard and Evans, 1980). 
This has been interpreted as a non-logical response bias, and 
according to Evans (1980b) should be under the control of 
non-verbal processes. Hence, this nec3ative 'Conclusion Bias' 
should not be vulnerable to the verbal interference tasks. 
In the first experiment, performance of subjects on 
the sixteen problems was assessed under similar conditions to 
those of Hitch and Baddeley (1976) except that one of the 
Articulation Groups ('the-the-the') was dropped. 
METHOD. 
Desi_qn 
Three experimental c3roups, each consistinc3 of six 
male and six female subjects, were tested on an inference task 
using conditional rules. 
In the Control group subjects were required to remain 
silent during the task. In the Articulation group subjects were 
instructed to repeat the heavily overlearnt counting sequence 
'one-two-three-four-five-six' repeatedly at a rate of between 
four and five words per second. In the Memory group the 
subjects heard a spoken sequence of six random digits at the 
start of each trial. They were required to speak the sequence 
repeatedly at a rate of between four and five words per second. 
In this condition alone the sequence to be articulated was 
changed on each trial. 
Within groups, subjects were required to evaluate 
each of the 16 types Of inference shown in Table 1.7. To assess 
the effects of practice, 3 blocks of the 16 problems usinc3 
different lexical content were constructed. A different 
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randomised order of presentation of problems within each block 
was used during each session. Also the order of presentation of 
the 3 blocks was varied systematically within groups. Each 
subject thus received a total of 48 problems. 
S! Abiects 
Thirty six students at Plymouth Polytechnic, having 
no previous experience with this type of task, served as 
subjects on a paid volunteer basis. They were tested 
individually. 
Task and Materials 
Subjects were presented with the two premises of each 
argument, together with the appropriate valid or fallacious 
conclusion (cf. Table 1.7). They were required to decide 
whether or not the conclusion necessarily followed logically 
from the premises. 
All of the arguments concerned shape-colour 
relationships. One of four shapes (Triangle, Circle, Square or 
Diamond) together with one of four colours (Red, Blue, Yellow 
or Green) were named in systematically randomised combinations 
for each probl-em. 
The materials may be illustrated with the following 
sample problem which uses an AC inference with an AN rule: 
Given: 
1. IF IT IS NOT A TRIANGLE THEN IT IS NOT RED 
2. IT IS NOT RED 
Conclusion: 
IT IS NOT A TRIANGLE 
Problems were presented on a two-field tachistoscope 
whose onset and offset was synchronised with an automatic 
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timer. 
The subjects' task was to decide whether or not the 
conclusion necessarily followed logically and to signal his 
response by pressing a toggle switch to indicate 'YES' or 'NO'. 
Procedure 
Subjects in all three experimental groups were given 
the following written instructions initially, which were read 
aloud to them by the experimenter: 
"Instructions 
In this experiment I am interested in the ability of people to 
make loc3ical inferences without the benefit of formal training. 
I am not, however, concerned with assessing the intelligence of 
individuals. Your data will be treated as confidential and 
reported as a component of general statistics averaged over a 
number of people. 
You will be given a series of reasoning problems concerning 
imaginary coloured shapes. On each problem you will be given a 
rule which defines a-relationship between the shape and the 
colour of possible figures. The rules may or may not contain 
negatives. For example: 
IF IT IS AN OVAL THEN IT IS PINK 
or IF IT IS A RECTANGLE THEN IT IS NOT ORANGE 
or IF IT IS NOT A CRESCENT THEN IT IS BROWN 
or IF IT IS NOT A HEXAGON THEN IT IS NOT PURPLE 
For each problem you will be shown one such rule an a card, 
followed by a second statement relating either to the shape or 
to the colour of a +ic3ure which con+orms to the rule. 
Beneath this will be a conclusion which may or may not 
necessarily follow logically from the rule and the statement. 
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I+ you think the conclusion necessarily follows please press 
the 'YES' key, if not, press the 'NO' key. 
Althouc3h you will be timed, it is more important to be accurate 
than +ast, so please do not rush on the problems. 
Have you any questions? " 
Following this, instructions concerning the practice 
session were read aloud to the subjects. These were: 
"In order to check that you understand the procedure and to 
familiarise you with the equipment, I will give you some 
practice problems first of all. These will be identical in 
format to the test problems except that the phrasing of the 
rules will be different". 
Then eight practice trials using disjunctive rules, 
and different shape-colour combinations, but an otherwise 
identical format were presented to them, in randomised orders, 
for evaluation. 
Immediately preceding the experimental trials, the 
folIowing instructions, dependant upon which group subjects had 
been randomly assigned to, were read aloud to them: 
Control Group 
"Do you understand what you have to do? 
We will now start on the main problems. I will give you the 
signal 'READY, START' as in the practice session ....... 
Articulation_Group 
"Do you understand what you have to do? 
We will now start Dn the main problems. 
I would like you to carry out an additional task whilst solvin(3 
these problems. Please say aloud the sequence of numbers '1 23 
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45 6'. Speak them repeatedly at an even pace, like this (A 
demonstration was given), when I give the signal 'READY, 
START'. You may stop counting as soon as you have indicated 
your answer to the problem by pushing the key. 
I cannot tell you the purpose of this procedure at this stage, 
but I will be happy to discuss it with -you after the 
experiment. Do you understand what you have to do? 
I will give you the signal 'READY, START' as in the practice 
session 11 
Memory-gL2uR 
"Do you understand what you have to do? 
We will now start on the main problems. 
I would like you to carry out an additional task whilst solving 
these problems. Please say aloud the sequence of numbers which 
I will give you a+ter the 'READY' signal. Speak them repeatedly 
at an even pace, like this (A demonstration was given), when I 
give the signal 'READY, NUMBER'. You may stop counting as soon 
as you have indicated your answer to the problem by pushing the 
key. 
I cannot tell you the purpose of this procedure at this stage, 
but I will be happy to discuss it with you after the 
experiment. Do you understand what you have to do? 
I will give you the signal 'READY, NUMBER' as in the practice 
session 
When the experiment was completed the subjects were 
debriefed. In the Articulation and Memory Groups the problems 
were presented immediately after subjects had commenced 
articulation. The experimenter was vigilant for any perceptible 
drop in articulation rates throughout the experimental trials, 
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and prompted subjects to maintain the required rate as and when 
necessary. 
In all the experiment took between thirty and forty 
minutes per subject. 
RESULTS. 
Separate analyses of variance were performed on the 
response frequency and latency data arising from this 
experiment. These will each be discussed below. 
ResP2nXe_F. ne_quencies 
Since the known response bias on these problems 
relates to the polarity (affirmative/negative) of the 
conclusion presented, the analysis of variance was organised in 
terms of this +actor, pooling data from different rules. Four 
other factors included in the analysis were Groups (3 levels), 
Sex, Inferences (4 levels) and Blocks (3 levels). Groups and 
Sex were between subjects factors and the remaining factors 
were within subjects. Conclusion Type and Inference are the 
non-logical and logical factors respectively. Since there were 
no significant effects including either Sex or Blocks, the 
percentage frequencies shown in Table 4.1 are pooled over these 
+actors. 
It was expected that logical performance might be 
interfered with by either Articulation or Memory load 
conditions. However, the main effect of Groups was not 
significant (F2,30=0.68). In fact, although there was a highly 
significant main effect of Inference (FI, 30*=37.65, p<0.001), 
this factor did not interact significantly with Groups 
(F2,30=1.58). The general pattern of acceptance rate over the 
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four inferences was similar to previous studies of conditional 
inference (eg. Evans, 1977a). 
Group Conclusion 
CONTROL Affirmative 
(Mean=73) Negative 
Mean 
ARTICULATION Affirmative 
(Mean=67) Negative 
Mean 
MEMORY 
(Mean=76) 
Mean 
Affirmative 
Negative 
Mean 
Inference 
MP DA AC MT Mean 
97 46 76 43 66 
97 63 86 76 81 
97 54 al 60 
90 46 69 35 60 
93 68 69 67 74 
92 57 69 51 
90 67 88 58 76 
85 58 82 76 75 
88 63 85 67 
92 58 78 59 
Table 4.1 . The percentage of 'YES' responses (arguments 
accepted) in each condition of Experiment 1, broken down by 
polarity of conclusion. Each point is based on 12 subjects. 
Total N=36. 
The predicted non-logical bias is that negative 
conclusions should be accepted more than affirmative 
conclusions. A significant main effect of Conclusion Type 
confirmed this prediction (FI, 30=20.76, p<0.001) but this factor 
interacted significantly with two others. 
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A Conclusion Type x Inference interaction 
(F1,30=10.25, P<0.01) is not surprising, since previous 
research has failed to find a 'Conclusion Bias' on the MP 
inference where performance is normally near to 100% correct 
(ie. Evans, 1977a). In this case the effect of Conclusion Type 
seems restricted to the DA (one-tailed t45=2.47, p<0.01) and MT 
(one-tailed t45=6.77, p<0.001) inferences, however. Much more 
surprising was a significant Conclusion Type x Groups 
interaction (F2,30=5.58, P<0.01). it appears that the 
non-logical factor is the one affected by verbal interference. 
Breakdown analysis revealed that the 'Conclusion Bias' effect 
was significant for Control (one-tailed t30=4.08, p<0.001) and 
Articulation (one-tailed t30=3.90, p<0.001) Groups only. 
Degrees of freedom for conservative F tests (Edwards, 1967) 
have been used throughout the experiments reported in this 
thesis. 
Resp2. n2e_Latencies 
Response latencies were analysed using a4X4X3X 
2X3 split plot analysis of variance based on a logarithmic 
transformation. There were three within subjects factors., 
Rules, Inferences, Blocks, and two between subjects factors: 
Sex and Groups. 
The data is summarised in Table 4.2 . Since there 
were no sex differences, data from male and female subjects 
have been combined. Also the scores are not broken down by 
Blocks in Table 4.2 since, although there was a significant 
reduction in response time with practice (FI, 30=18.51, 
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p-'%0.001), this did not interact with other factors. 
Group Rule Inference 
MP DA AC MT Mean 
CONTROL AA 6.03 8.30 5.94 7.33 6.90 
(Mean=8.59) AN 6.67 10.00 9.85 8.71 6.81 
NA 6.96 9.87 8.28 10.08 8.80 
NN 7.64 10.01 9.85 11.85 9.84 
Mean 6.83 9.55 8.48 9.49 
ARTICULATION AA 4.23 5.70 4.29 6.08 5.07 
(Mean=6.13) AN 5.36 6.95 6.73 5.71 6.19 
NA 4.83 6.96 5.98 7.94 6.43 
NN 5.61 7.22 7.41 7.11 6.84 
Mean 5.01 6.71 6.10 6.71 
MEMORY AA 9.39 11.70 9.37 10.26 10.18 
(Mean=11.63) AN 9.29 11.92 11.36 13.22 11.45 
NA 9.34 13.83 12.83 14.64 12.66 
NN 9.53 12.67 13.53 13.13 12.22 
Mean 9.39 12.53 11.77 12.81 
Mean 7.07 9.59 8.77 9.67 
Table 4.2 . Mean solution latencies (seconds) for each 
condition in Experiment 1. Each mean is based on 12 subjects. 
Total N=36. 
Both the type of rule used and the type of inference 
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required affect the psychological complexity of the task and 
might be expected to affect response latency. A significant 
effect of Rules was observed (FI, 30=14.97, p<0.001), due to a 
tendency +or response times to increase with the introduction 
of necjative components as found previously (Evans, 1977a; Evans 
and Newstead, 1977). The Inference factor was also significant 
(FI, 30=24.89, P<0.001) with the marginal means showing a 
similar pattern to that found by Evans (1977ai. 
Neither of these factors, however, interacted with 
Groups, the respective F ratios were both less than 1. The 
Groups factor was itself significant (F2,30=9.66, p<0.001), but 
in an unexpected manner. The means shown at the left of Table 
4.2 suggest that while the Memory Group produced the slowest 
latencies as expected, the fastest were observed in the 
Articulation Group. 
The nature of the Groups effect was assessed further 
by computing the mean logarithmic time for each subject, and 
comparing each pair of groups with two-tailed t tests. The 
Memory Group was significantly slower than Control (t22=2.27, 
p<0.05), and the Articulation Group was significantly faster 
than Control (t22=2.14, p<0.05). Not surprisingly the 
difference between Articulation and Memory was highly 
significant (t22=4.42, p<0.001). 
(The Analysis of Variance tables for Experiment I are shown in 
Appendix B). 
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DISCUSSION. I. 
The results of Experiment I are surprising for a 
number of reasons. From the outset it was expected that the 
conditions imposinc) articulatory suppression would selectively 
interfere with the logical (Inference) factor rather than the 
non-loc3ical (Conclusion Bias) factor. Thus an interaction of 
Groups and Inference was expected. However the pattern and 
extent to which inferences were accepted was not affected by 
the articulatory condition to which subjects were assigned but 
was consistent with previous studies throughout. 
Owing to the ambiguity of the conditional sentence, 
we can only clearly classify acceptance of MP and MT inferences 
as correct whether an implication or equivalence interpretation 
of the rule is adopted. The percentage correct on these 
inferences combined are: 
Control 79%, Articulation 71%, Memory 78%. 
Since there is no significant difference between these rates of 
acceptance, there is little support for the hypothesis that 
articulatory suppression (with or without memory load) 
selectively af+ects the logical +actor. 
As a whole the results show a typically high 
incidence of loc3ical errors. The normal systematic non-loc3ical 
bias to prefer negative conclusions Was observed and the 
expected interaction o+ conclusion with in+erence type is in 
line with the previous literature. However, the non-logical 
factor was not expected to interact with Groups althoucjh, 
surprisingly, such an interaction was observed with 'Conclusion 
Bias' completely absent in the Memory Group. Although this 
findinc3 appears to contradict Evan S7 (1980b) suggestion that 
162 
response biases are mediated by non-verbal processes, we can 
see that it is the presence of a memory load rather than 
articulation per se that appears responsible. Since the usual 
effects of inference type were observed in this condition this 
result cannot be explained by the suggestion that subjects were 
guessing in this Group. The finding that an increased memory 
load does not seem to affect a fairly complex task of 
distinguishing inferences but can affect a fairly low level 
response bias is difficult to interpret. Perhaps speculation is 
unwise at this point and we should wait to see if a comparable 
result will occur with another response bias in an alternative 
reasoning paradigm in the next experiment. 
Let us now consider the latency data. The finding of 
slower responses in the Memory Group is not surprising and this 
result is consistent with the data of Hitch and Baddeley (1976) 
and their theory Of Working Memory. However the finding of 
significantly faster responding in the Articulation Group 
appears to be inconsistent with their data. Hitch and Baddeley 
f ound that interference conditions significantly increased 
latencies and this interference increased with more complex 
problems which made more demands upon working memory. 
The model of working memory consists essentially of a 
central executive plus an articulatory loop which is used for 
subvocal rehearsal. The effect of articulatory suppression is 
supposedly to prevent use of the loop. Although Baddeley (1976, 
1979) has suggested that some activities (eg. skilled reading) 
do not involve use of the loop and are consequently not slowed 
down by articulatory suppression, he has not suggested 
conditions under which a 'speeding-up' effect should occur. 
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Other effects observed in the present experiment 
appear inconsistent with the model of Hitch and Baddeley 
(1976). For instance none of the manipulations affecting 
problem complexity (eg. presence of negatives and inference 
type) interacted with the Groups factor as their model 
predicts, since more complex problems demand more space in 
working memory. 
One problem of interpreting latency data on these 
tasks arises because subjects are making variable responses. 
Although there was no significant effect of Groups on the 
frequency analysis a check was made of possible confounding. 
Over all problems the mean time for a 'Yes' response was 8.27 
seconds, and for a 'No' response 10.95 seconds. On a 
significant majority of problems the 'No' response was slower 
(p<0.02, two-tailed binomial test). However, this could not 
explain the difference in reasoning speed observed between the 
Groups. The percentage of slow, 'No' responses was greatest in 
the Articulation Group and least in the Memory Group. Any 
effect of this bias, then, was exactly opposite to the Groups 
effect observed. 
The results o+ Experiment I are interesting and 
surprising then +or a number o+ reasons. However no detailed 
speculation will occur until these e++ects have been replicated 
on another conditional reasoning paradigm. 
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EXPERIMENT II 
The Effect of Articulatorj__gýjpjRression on Truth Table 
Evaluation with Conditionals_, 
__gMpl2: 
ýinq 
_Venbal 
or Pictorial 
Instances. 
In view of the surprising nature of the results 
discussed above, it was decided to design a similar experiment 
using an alternative reasoning paradigm, of similar complexity, 
known as Truth Table Evaluation. A detailed review of the 
psychological literature pertaining to this task is given in 
chapter 1. This change of paradigm should permit some 
generalisation of the effects observed in Experiment I. 
Truth table evaluation bears some resemblance to 
sentence-picture verification tasks which have been discussed 
in chapter 2. Subjects are presented with a conditional rule, 
together with an instance, and they are asked to evaluate the 
truth value of the rule. The extra complexity engendered by the 
conditional rule demands the use of three response categories: 
True, False and Irrelevant. This new paradigm also permits 
response times to be split into Comprehension and Verification 
periods as was achieved in the study of Evans and 
Newstead 
(1977). 
On truth table evaluation tasks the operation of 
another non-logical response bias, called 'Matching Bias', can 
be observed. This bias relates to the inclination of subjects 
to regard an instance which matches the values named 
in the 
rule as relevant to the rule. That is they will perceive 
it as 
True or False. Other instances which do not match the values 
named in the rule tend to be regarded as Irrelevant 
to it. 
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Whilst Experiment I investigated the hypothesis of 
Evans (1980b) that logical responses may be mediated by a 
verbal thought process, in the present case it was decided to 
investigate an additional hypothesis also. This is that 
non-logical responses may be mediated by a non-verbal thought 
process (Evans, 1980b). It will have been noticed from <hapter 
2 that the main alternative to verbal processes that have been 
considered in cognitive psychology is a system based on a 
visual code (Paivio, 1971; 1975). The possible influence of 
visual imagery in reasoning processes was discussed previously. 
A recent interpretation of 'Matching Bias', which was 
discussed in chapter 1, suggests that it may have a linguistic 
basis (Evans, 1983a). However, an interpretation of it in terms 
of visual imagery processes is still quite attractive 
particularly in view of the parallels drawn in chapter 2 
between the modified Dual Process theory of Evans (1980a; 
1980b) and the dual coding approach to cognition (eg. Paivio, 
1971; 1975). The focus on values which are perceptually present 
could reveal the influence of a concrete visual system of 
thought, which interferes with the verbal/abstract thought 
required for a logical solution. 
In the following experiment a strong attempt will be 
made to encourage the use of visual processes. According to 
Paivio (1971), visual processes are liable to influence 
processing of verbal material when it is concrete and 
imageable. It is considered plausible that the 'Matching' 
tendency is imagery related and this could be facilitated when 
pictorial presentation of the instance is used. Given a rule 
such as: 
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IF IT IS A TRIANGLE THEN IT IS RED, 
subjects could tend to form a visual image of a red triangle, 
and be biased to consider only instances including one or 
preferably both of these features. This would also lead them to 
disregard the logical signi+icance of negative components, 
which is a +eature oi the 'Matching Bias' phenomenon. Thus it 
was decided to manipulate the nature of the instance in an 
attempt to encourage the use of an imagery related process. 
In a verbal condition a TT case for the above rule 
would be produced by printing the words 'red triangle' and in a 
pictorial condition by a picture of a red triangle. As usual, 
false values are generated by alternatives such that a TF case 
could be a verbal description or a picture of a yellow triangle 
for instance. If the presentation of instances in the pictorial 
mode encourages the use of a visual code, then the same 
increased tendency to +ocus on matching values might be 
expected. 
The second experiment continues the investigation of 
the articulation effect and it is expected, following 
Experiment I, that the overt rehearsal of an overlearnt 
sequence will lead to faster respondinc3. 
METHOD, 
Desi_gn 
Sixteen subjects in each of three experiemntal 
Groups, were tested on a truth table evaluation task using 
conditional rules. Control, Articulation and Memory groups were 
required to Perform the reasoning task concurrent with a 
subsidiary task as specified in Experiment I. 
The Groups were further subdivided according to 
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whether pictorial or verbal instances were to be evaluated. 
Each subject attempted 16 distinct logical problems (four rules 
X, four logical cases, cf Table 1.10). The problems were 
presented in three randomised Blocks, each containing the 
sixteen logical forms, so that each subject received 
+orty-eight problems in all. I-Olubjects were permitted to give 
one of three t-ý, pes of response. They could decide that the 
instance conformed to the rule (equivalent to a truth table 
value of 'True'), conflicted with the rule (equivalent to a 
truth table value of 'False'), or else was irrelevant to the 
rule. In addition to the type of response made, latencies of 
comprehension (CT) and verification (VT) were recorded. 
Subjects 
Forty-eight students of Plymouth Polytechnic, hav i nc3 
no previous experience with this type of task, served as 
subj ec tsona paid volunteer basis. They were tested 
individually. 
Task and Materials 
Subjects were presented with a conditional rule on 
one field of a three-field tachistoscope. When they had read 
and understood it, they pushed a switch causing a particular 
instance of a coloured shape (either pictorial or written) to 
be superimposed under the rule. The subjects' task was to 
evaluate whether the instance conformed to, conflicted with, or 
was irrelevant to the rule, and to signal their response by 
pushing the appropriate 'Conforms', 'Conflicts' or 'Irrelevant' 
button. The tachistoscope was coupled to automatic timers so 
that CT and VT could be measured. 
All of the problems concerned shape-colour 
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relationships. The materials may be illustrated with the 
following sample problem which uses an FT logical case (written 
form) with an NA rule: 
Rule: IF IT IS NOT A TRIANGLE THEN IT IS GREEN 
Instance: GREEN TRIANGLE 
Procedure 
Subjects in all Groups were given the following 
preliminary written instructions, which were read aloud to them 
by the experimenter: 
nInstructions 
This is an experiment to see how well people who are untrained 
in formal logic are able to understand sentences which define 
logical relationships. If you have had any training in formal 
logic please inform the experimenter. 
The experiment is not intended as a test o+ your intelligence. 
Your data will be treated as confidential and will be reported 
only as a component of general statistics averaged over a 
number of people". 
The particular logical task was then described in the 
following manner: 
"You will be presented, on the screen, with a series of rules 
def ini ng the relationship between the colour and the shape of 
possible figures. 
The rules may or may not contain negatives. For example: 
IF IT IS AN OVAL THEN IT IS PINK 
or IF IT IS A RECTANGLE THEN IT IS NOT ORANGE 
or IF IT IS NOT A CRESCENT THEN IT IS BROWN 
or IF IT IS NOT A HEXAGON THEN IT IS NOT PURPLE 
When you are satisfied that you understand each rule you should 
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move the toggle switch (marked 'X') to the left or to the 
right. This will cause a particular instance of a coloured 
shape to appear on the screen underneath the rule. 
You have to decide whether that coloured shape conforms to, 
conflicts with, or is irrelevant to that rule and to indicate 
your decision by pushing the appropriate button firmly. 
Although you will be timed it is more appropriate to be 
accurate than fast, so please do not rush on the problems. 
Have you any questions? " 
The experimenter then read instructions, concerning 
the practice session, to the subjects. These were identical to 
those used in Experiment I. Following these, eight practice 
problems were given. These differed from the experimental ones 
in linguistic form (disjunctive rather than conditional) and in 
the colours and shapes used. 
Immediately prior to the experimental trials subjects 
received appropriate verbal instructions, again identical to 
those used in Experiment I, dependant upon which Group 
(Control, Articulation or Memory) they had been randomly 
assigned to. 
In the Articulation and Memory Groups the problems 
were presented immediately after subjects commenced 
articulation. Once again, the experimenter was vigilant for any 
perceptible drop in articulation rate during the trials and 
prompted subjects to maintain the required rate as and when 
necessary. 
When the experiment was completed subjects were 
debrie+ed. In all the experiment took about 35 - 40 minutes per 
subject. 
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RESULTS. 
As with Experiment I, separate analyses of variance 
were performed on the response frequency and latency data 
arising from Experiment II. Since the typical effects of 
'Matching Bias' are shown in the frequency of responding and 
linguistic effects (eq. presence of negaives in the rule) are 
shown in the latency of responding (Evans and Newstead, 1977), 
appropriate factors are introduced into the respective analyses 
of varianc'e. These analyses are discussed below. 
Resp2nkg_EL2_qu2. ncies 
The modal responses to each logical case were in line 
with the 'defective' truth table. That is the TT cases were 
most often said to conform to the rule (89%), TF cases to 
conflict with the rule (82%), whereas FT and FF cases were most 
frequently described as 'Irrelevant' (56% and 60% 
respectively). On the basis of previous literature these 
responses represent the subjectively correct answers, and any 
interference in logical performance expected due to a competing 
task of a verbal nature might be expected to lower their 
frequency in favour of a more random use of the three available 
response categories.. 
In order to assess this, separate analyses of 
variance were performed on the frequency of modal responses to 
each logical case. The factors in each analysis were Groups, 
Instance, Matching Case and Blocks (3 X2X4X 3), the last 
two factors being within subjects. The main effect of Blocks 
was significant +or each of the analyses (TT case - FI, 42=5.66, 
p<0.025; TF case - FI, 42=6.56, p<0.025; FT case F1,42=7-14, 
p<0.01; FF case - Fl, 42=14.74, p<0.001), showing a steady 
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increase in subjectively correct responding with practice. 
Since Blocks did not interact significantly with any other 
factor, the percentage of correct responses for each analysis 
is collapsed over it in Table 4.37 . 
Table 4.3 Percentage frequency of responses to each of the 
four logical cases in Experiment II conforming to a defective 
truth table. Each point is based on 8 subjects. Total N=48. 
(i) TT_as_. 'Con+orms' 
Group Instance Matching Case 
pq pý 5q ýia mean 
CONTROL Verbal 100 100 Be 83 93 
(Mean=95) Pictorial 100 100 96 92 97 
Mean 100 100 92 Be 
ARTICULATION Verbal 96 E33 Be 50 79 
(Mean=85) Pictorial 100 96 96 75 92 
Mean 98 90 92 63 
MEMORY Verbal 100 83 88 63 83 
(Mean=86) Pictorial 96 88 96 79 90 
Mean 98 (35 92 71 
Mean 99 92 92 74 
(Rule) (AA) (AN) (NA) (NN) 
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(iv) TF_a, s 'Conflicts' 
Group Instance Matching Case 
pq pý 'ýq mean 
CONTROL Verbal 96 92 83 79 91 
(Mean=89) Pictorial 100 96 Be 79 91 
Mean 98 94 85 79 
ARTICULATION Verbal 92 as 50 42 68 
(Mean=79) Pictorial 96 100 92 71 90 
Mean 94 94 71 56 
MEMORY Verbal 79 92 63 50 71 
(Mean=77) Pictorial 83 96 75 75 82 
Mean al 94 69 63 
Mean 91 94 75 66 
(Rule) (AN) (AA) (NN) (NA) 
1 -7 3 
(iv) FT_a. s 'Irrelevant' 
Group Instance 
CONTROL 
(Mean=67) 
Verbal 
Pictorial 
Mean 
Matching Case 
pq Pý ýq Mean 
54 67 75 92 72 
46 63 58 83 63 
50 65 67 as 
ARTICULATION Verbal 13 21 25 58 29 
(Mean=40) Pictorial 29 38 54 83 51 
Mean 21 29 40 71 
MEMORY Verbal 42 58 50 67 54 
(Mean=59) Pictorial 63 71 54 71 65 
Mean 52 65 52 69 
Mean 41 53 53 76 
(Rule) (NA) (NN) (AA) (AN) 
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(iv) FF_as 'Irrelevant' 
Group Instance Matching Case 
pq pa ýq mean 
CONTROL Verbal 54 75 75 83 72 
(Mean=70) Pictorial 54 67 67 83 68 
Mean 54 71 71 83 
ARTICULATION Verbal 4 33 25 71 33 
(Mean=44) Pictorial 33 50 58 79 55 
Mean 19 42 42 75 
MEMORY Verbal 46 54 67 75 60 
(Mean=65) Pictorial 63 63 83 71 70 
Mean 54 58 75 73 
Mean 
(Ru I e) 
42 57 63 77 
(NN) (NA) (AN) (AA) 
Matching Case produced a significant effect in all 
four analyses, in each case in line with 'Matching Bias' (TT 
case F1,42=15.80, p<0.00i; TF case F1,42=16.77, p<0.001; FT 
case F1,42=14.38, p<0.001; FF case FI, 42=16.81, p<0.001). The 
effect was that determinate responses (to TT and TF) decreased 
with more mismatches, whilst irrelevant responses to FT and FF 
increased with more mismatches. In none of the analyses did the 
expected interaction between Instance and Matching Case occur. 
The extent of 'Matching Bias' was no greater for pictorial than 
for verbal instances. 
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There was evidence of interference with responding 
due to the competing tasks. In all four analyses Groups exerted 
a significant effect. In the case of TT and TF, the correct 
responses were less frequent in both the Articulation and the 
Memory Groups relative to Control (TT case F2,42=3.74, p-'%0.05; 
TF case F2,42=4.82, p<0.025). In the FT and FF analyses, 
however, the decrease in subjectively correct 'Irrelevant' 
responses, appears to be largely restricted to the Articulation 
Group (FT case F2,42=3.82, p-% 10.05). '0.05; FF case F2,42=3.53, pl 
Unexpectedly, the Instance factor proved to be 
significant on the TT (FI, 42=6.21, p<0.025) and TF 
(Fl, 42=11.89, p<0.01) cases. More correct responding was made 
when the instance was presented in a pictorial rather than a 
verbal manner. The means were: 
TT case Pictorial 93%, Verbal 85% 
TF case Pictorial-88%, Verbal 75%. 
Response Latencies 
Both CT's and VT's were submitted to analyses of 
variance based on logarithmic transformation. In the case of 
CT's there was on-e between subject factor (Groups) and two 
within subject factors (Rules and Blocks). In the VT analysis 
there was an additional between subject factor of Instance, and 
an additional within subject factor of Logical Case (these last 
concern only what is presented after the CT period is 
completed). 
The mean CT's are shown in Table 4.4 . Although the 
Blocks factor was significant (Fl, 45=6.88, p<0.025), indicating 
that latenc-y reduces with practice, it did not interact with 
any other factor and is not shown in the table. 
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Group Rule 
AA AN NA NN Mean 
CONTROL 3.30 4.16 3.88 5.32 4.17 
ARTICULATION 3.17 3.79 3.83 4.40 3.80 
MEMORY 6.61 7.86 7.89 8.16 7.63 
Mean 4.36 5.27 5.20 5.96 
Table 4.4 . The mean comprehension latencies (seconds) in 
Experiment II. Each mean is based on 16 subjects. Total N=48. 
The effect of Rules was highly significant 
(Fl, 45=42.85, p<0.001) showing the expected increase with the 
addition of negative components. This is in line with the 
results of Evans and Newstead (1977). 
As with Experiment I, the Groups factor was 
significant (F2,45=3.95, p<0.05) with the order of means: 
Articulation < Control < Memory. 
When each pair of Groups were compared with t-tests (one 
tailed) it was found that, whereas the Memory Group was 
significantly slower than Control (t30=1.79, p<0.05) and 
Articulation (t30=2.32, p<0.025), the difference between 
Articulation and Control fell short of significance (t30=1.05). 
There was also a significant interaction between 
Rules and Groups in the CT analysis (F2,42=3.86, p<0.05). 
Breakdown analysis indicated that while Rules had a significant 
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effect on each Group individually, only the Control Group 
showed the expected additive effect of negatives. In the 
Articulation and Memory Groups the double affirmative rule was 
significantly more quickly processed than the other rules, but 
a second negative added no significant extra difficulty to that 
caused by one in either component. 
The mean VT's are shown in Table 4.5 Again a 
significant but non-interacting Blocks factor (FI, 42=58.16, 
p<0.001) is not included. The Instance factor had no 
significant effects in this analysis and so, for simplicity, it 
also is omitted from the table. 
There were significant main effects of Groups 
(F2,42=4.50, p<0.025), Rules (FI, 42=68.25, p<0.001) and Logical 
Case (F1,42=39.46, p<0.001). The last two effects again 
replicated the findings of Evans and Newstead (1977) showing 
the additive, increasing effect of negative components, and the 
significantly slower responding overall to the FT and FF cases. 
However Logical Case interacted significantly with Groups 
(F2,42=4.66, -p<0.025) and inspection of Table 4.5 reveals that 
the effect of Logical Case is less marked in the interference 
groups. Also, whereas TT and TF cases tend to be slower in the 
Memory group compared with Control, the trend is reversed for 
the FT and FF cases. 
The Groups factor produced the same order of means as 
in the Comprehension latencies, with the Articulation Group 
faster than the Control Group. One-tailed t-tests indicated 
that the Articulation Group was significantly faster than both 
Control (t3o=1.89, p<0.05 and Memory (t30=3.33, p<0.005). 
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Group Rule Logical Case 
TT TF FT FF Mean 
CONTROL AA 1.97 2.64 4.43 2.79 2.96 
(Mean=4.22) AN 2.82 2.89 5.11 4.38 3.80 
NA 2.93 3.43 5.68 6.24 4.57 
NN 4.34 4.13 7.15 6.57 5.55 
Mean 3.02 3.27 5.59 5.00 
ARTICULATION AA 1.73 2.53 2.97 3.04 2.57 
(Mean=3.16) AN 2.50 2.76 2.77 4.26 3.07 
NA 2.58 3.37 3.11 3.93 3.25 
NN 3.53 3.48 4.28 3.75 3.76 
Mean 2.59 3.04 3.28 3.74 
MEMORY AA 2.43 3.17 4.07 3.50 3.29 
(Mean=4.18) AN 3.76 4.41 3.97 4.80 4.24 
NA 4.12 3.49 5.18 4.10 4.22 
NN 4.01 4.35 5.08 6.39 4.96 
Mean 3.58 3.86 4.58 4.70 
Mean 3.06 3.39 4.48 4.48 
Table 4.5 The mean verification latencies (seconds) in 
Experiment II. Each mean is based on 16 subjects. Total N=48. 
0 
Finally, as in Experiment I, a check was made for a 
possible relationship between the type of response made and its 
associated (verification) latency, which was calculated for 
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each condition. In the present case, there was no evidence of 
any significant relationship between them. 
(The Analysis of Variance tables for Experiment II are shown in 
Appendix C). 
DISCUSSION. 
The present results are compatible with the Dual 
Process Theory of Reasoning (Wason and Evans, 1975) as modified 
by Evans (1980a; 1980b). Evans suggested that the logical 
component of reasoning performance was mediated by a verbal 
process. Disruption of this verbal component by a verbal 
interference task might be expected to selectively impair 
logical performance. I+ Evans' other suggestion, that 
non-logical 'Matching' responses are mediated by a non-verbal 
process, is correct then no disruption of 'Matching Bias' would 
be expected due to verbal interference. Both Articulation and 
Memory Groups did appear to disrupt logical performance on the 
TT and TF cases and also on the modal 'Irrelevant' responses to 
the FT and FF cases. However 'Matching Bias', attributed to a 
non-verbal process, was not affected by the presence of verbal 
interference tasks. 
It was expected that the Instance +actor (verbal vs 
pictorial) would in+luence the use o+ visual imagery and hence 
interact with the 'Matching' tendency. However, it appears that 
'Matching Bias' is no more marked for pictorial instances than 
for verbal ones. Type of instance did have a rather surprising 
effect on logical performance. Subjects made significantly more 
correct evaluations of TT and TF cases when the instance was 
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pictorial. It is Possible, however, that the poorer performance 
in the verbal condition occurred for a special reason. For, 
whilst the shape was described in the antecedent and the colour 
in the consequent of the rule (eq. 'IF IT IS A TRIANGLE THEN IT 
is RED'), the verbal instance, following grammatical 
convention, described these features in reverse order with the 
colour before the shape (eg. 'RED TRIANGLE'). Consequently the 
verbal instance was incongruent with the rule. Thus, the 
facilitation o+ conditional reasoning with pictorial rather 
than verbal instances could be an artefact. 
The latency analyses yielded comparable results to 
those of Experiment I with respect to differences between 
Groups. In both Comprehension and Verification periods, the 
articulation of an overlearnt sequence led to faster responding 
than in the silent Control Group. The addition o+ a six-dic3it 
memory load caused response latencies to increase relative to 
Control. However, t-test comparisons revealed that the slowing 
effect of the Memory Load was significant only for CT, whilst 
the speeding up effect of articulation per se was significant 
only for VT. 
The overall effect of Memory Group on CT are 
generally in line with the Working Memory hypothesis of 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974). The fact that the Memory Group were 
slower than Control in CT could, quite simply, be due to 
subjects rehearsing the 'novel' digits several times to commit 
them to memory prior to engaging, in the reasoning task. The 
diminished effect in VT could have occurred because repetition 
enabled some of the in4ormation to be memorised before they 
actually attempted the reasoning task. 
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The +acilitatory e++ect under articulation is o+ 
considerable interest. This result apparently con+licts with 
the findings of Hitch and Baddeley (1976). There were no 
interactions of Articulation Group with problem complexity 
+actors which are comparable to those observed by Hitch and 
Baddeley. The significant interaction on VT between Groups and 
Logical Case was opposite to that expected according to their 
Working, Memory hypothesis with the effect of memory load being 
less rather than more marked on the more complex logical cases. 
The facilitatory effect of articulation was 
characteristic mainly of the verification period in the present 
experiment. It thus appears that the ef+ect is characteristic 
of the reasoning process rather than of the time taken to read 
and understand the sentence. 
However it also appears that some kind of speed/error 
trade-o++ may be occuring since the subjectively correct, 
defective truth table responses were significantly reduced in 
the Articulation Group for all four logical cases. It is 
somewhat surprising that a speed/error trade-off should occur 
since the instructions explicitly emphasised the importance of 
accuracy rather than speed of responding. Indeed another 
finding argues against this sort o+ interpretation. In the 
Memory Group interference on response frequencies was least 
marked for FT and FF cases although these particular cases 
were, if anything, associated with faster VT's than the Control 
Group. However, in the conditional inference study (Experiment 
I), the Articulation Group made most errors, with Control and 
Memory at a similar lower level, although these differences 
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were not sic3n if i cant. Possibly the Articulation subjects are 
induced to speed up for some reason, with consequent 
deterioration in accuracy. 
In the present Experiment, as in the previous one, 
instructional emphasis was placed upon accuracy of responding 
rather than speed. The latency effects could therefore be 
slightly difficult to interpret. The Control subjects might be 
inclined to spend rather longer than necessary on the task due 
to the instruction; "It is more important to be accurate than 
fast, so please do not rush on the problems". If the concurrent 
articulation task were found to be aversive (as Baddeley 
suggests in a personal communication) then the subjects Tn i ght 
speed up to avoid it. The lesser evidence of interference in 
the Memory Group, who are also articulating, could arise 
because the memory task forces them to go slower, giving more 
time to consider the problem. This explanation implies that 
articulatory suppression 2RL__2e may not inhibit logical 
reasoning, unless it induces subjects to spend less time ah the 
task. The observation that subjects can speed up under certain 
circumstances during concurrent articulation is still damaging 
to the original Working Memory hypothesis. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION. 
In summary then the two experiments presented here 
have provided some support for Wason and Evans' Dual Process 
theory of reasoning as modified by Evans' subsequent writings 
(Evans, 1980a; 1980b). For instance, in Experiment II the 
logically correct classifications of TT and TF were 
significantly reduced under concurrent articulation (with and 
without a memory load). Also the modal 'Irrelevant' response to 
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FT and FF was reduced in the Articulation Group. In fine with 
prediction the 'Matchinc3 Bias' e++ect, attributed to a 
non-verbal process, was not affected by the presence oi verbal 
inter+erence tasks. 
The results of Experiment I appear to be less 
encouraging. For example Groups did not interact with Inference 
rate. However, if we look closer at the two inferences which 
are logically necessary, regardless of interpretation, a slight 
trend in the expected direction is observed. MP dropped from 
97% ControI to 92% Articulation and MT dropped from 60% to 51%. 
The awkward c3roup to explain is Memory, who inexplicably showed 
no 'Conclusion Bias'. However, it is concurrent articulation 
which is essentially verbal, and the presence of this in itself 
(without memory load) does not alter 'Concldsion Bias', while 
it is associated with slightly more loc3ical errors. 
In Experiment II, subjects were given either a verbal 
desdription of the instance to be evaluated, or a pictorial 
display of it. Although it Was expected that the pictorial 
instance might have encouraged the use of visual imagery and 
leacito an increase in the 'Matching' tendency, no such effect 
was observed. Surprisingly, signi+icantly more responding in 
accordance with logic was found with pictorial presentations. 
However, there was a possible artefactual explanation - the 
incongruency of feature order in the rule and the instance - 
which could have led to this result. Therefore further 
discussion of the effect is considered inappropriate until this 
de+iciency has been eliminated. In chapter 6, Experiments VI 
and VII will +ollow up this curious result. 
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The present results also appear to present some 
problems for the theory of Working Memory proposed by Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974; Hitch and Baddeley, 1976). The faster 
latencies of responding under concurrent articulation (without 
a memory load) relative to silent controls is anomalous. 
Furthermore the lack of interaction between the presence or 
absence of a memory load and degree of problem complexity is 
incompatible with their model. The next chapter contains three 
experiments (III - V) which follow up this particular issue. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTS III TO V. 
FOLLOWING UP THE CURIOUS EFFECTS OF SUPPRESSION. 
The Working Memory framework has been useful in 
explaining data collected from many experimental tasks and, 
subsequently, a number of testable hypotheses have emerged. The 
involvement of a Working Memory system in verbal reasoning has 
been discussed in some detail by Hitch and Baddeley (1976) and 
much of chapter 3 has focussed an their work. 
Using a relatively simple sentence verification task, 
Hitch and Baddeley (1976) found small but reliable effects of 
phonological similarity. When concurrent articulation of an 
overlearnt sequence was required, verification accuracy was not 
affected although the tendency for latencies to increase was 
marginally significant. Nevertheless, Hammerton (1Y6Y) has 
shown a significant decrement due to articulation of another 
overlearnt sequence ('Mary had a little lamb') repeatedly 
whilst solving similar problems. Articulation with a memory 
load significantly increased latencies whilst not affecting 
accuracy. The e++ects which they observed interacted with 
sentence complexity. This was mainly due to the imposition of a 
concurrent memory load. 
Their data were arc3ued to be compatible with the idea 
of a Working Memory system with a central executive of limited 
capacity interacting with a peripheral articulatory loop which 
plays a relatively minor role in verbal reasoning. The 
interactive ef+ects oi concurrent memory load with sentence 
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comp I ex i ty factors were explained by the suggestion that "the 
STM and verification tasks appear to compete for a pool of 
limited capacity since it is reasonable to assume that the 
complicated grammatical transformations take up extra capacity 
while the STM task occupies a roughly constant amount" (Hitch 
and Baddeley, 1976, p616). 
In his review of Working Memory and reading, Baddeley 
(1979, p367) writes that whilst "the articulatory loop is not 
essential +or normal reading and comprehension", there are 
certain conditions under which it is employed. Probably 
included amongst these are tasks involving phonological 
comparisons, which he notes, citing Kleiman (1975), are slowed 
under suppression. Also, Baddeley (1979, p. 355) suggests that 
the articulatory loop would be utilised for tasks "where strict 
word order is crucial to comprehension". In a subsequent paper, 
Baddeley and Lewis (1981, p. 127) write that, in the 
comprehension of prose, subvocalisation does allow the subject 
"to process complex material more accurately". 
These conclusions are strengthened by Baddeley, 
Eldridge and Lewis's (1981) evidence of interference in the 
accuracy (rather than latency) of judgements of anomalous wor d 
order in sentences under articulatory suppression. Both Besner, 
Davies and Daniels (1981) and Baddeley et al sugc3est that what 
suppression suppresses is an articulatory rather than a 
phonoloc3ical code, which primarily affects accuracy, rather 
than latency of responses (see Chapter 3). 
In view of these ideas, it is unfortunate that 
previous attempts to investigate the role of suppression in 
verbal reasoning have employed sentence verification tasks (eq. 
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Hitch and Baddeley, 1976) in which errors are few, and latency 
the prime measure of interest. However, conditional reasoning 
tasks are sensitive to the effect of experimental manipulations 
on both accuracy and latency measures. Considering the above, 
the results obtained with the conditional inference task used 
in Experiment I are surprising. Although the task involved in 
that experiment was of a basically similar design to the 
sentence verification task used by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) 
and Hitch and Baddeley (1976), little support for their ideas 
was found. In Experiment II, whilst a significant increase in 
errors was found under suppression with and without a memory 
load, it is argued that the data were incompatible with those 
of Hitch and Baddeley in other respects which will be detailed 
below. 
Generally, conditional reasoning tasks involve more 
difficult material than Baddeley and Hitch's task; as is 
indicated by their high error rates (see Chapter 1). In 
conditional reasoning tasks word order is crucial, the 
positions of antecedent and consequent and the placement of 
negatives are essential features for c'Onsideration if a 
logically correct solution is to be achieved. All in all, on. 
conditional reasoning tasks we should expect to find 
substantial interference due to concurrent articulation of 
irrelevant material if Baddeley's contentions are correct. 
In fact no significant impairment of conditional 
reasoning performance was found under articulation in 
Experiment I. Furthermore no interaction between the presence 
or absence of a memory load and the degree of problem 
complexity emerged from that experiment. Curiously, subjects 
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performed significantly f2ster under concurrent articulation 
(without a memory load) than in a silent control c3roup. This 
'speeding-up' effect was also observed in Experiment II, but a 
significant difference between Articulation and Control Groups 
was only achieved with verification latencies an that occasion. 
Although there was some disruption of reasoning performance due 
to articulation in Experiment II, one might have expected the 
deficit to be of greater magnitude in view of Baddeley's (1979; 
Baddeley and Lewis, 1981) claims. 
As mentioned above, the Working Memory hypothesis 
predicts an interaction between articulation group and problem 
complexity factors, since both tasks are assumed to impose a 
competing load on a limited capacity central executive. 
However, the only interactions between these two +actors, on 
latency or accuracy, in either of these studies occurred in 
Experiment II. A significant interaction between Groups and 
Rules was apparent from the CT analysis. If due to complexity, 
then according to Hitch and Baddeley (1976), the additive 
effect of negatives (see Chapter 1 and Evans and Newstead, 
1977) should be more marked under interference conditions, 
particularly when a memory load is imposed. In -fact the 
interaction arose because the addition of a second negative 
into the rules produced no extra difficulty for the 
Articulation and Memory Groups, although it had led to 
increased comprehension latency for the Control Group. In the 
VT analysis Logical Case and Groups interacted significantly 
but, on this occasion, the effect of problem complexity was 
reduced for bot h articulatory groups relative to Control. 
Furthermore the imposition of a concurrent memory load lead, if 
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anything, to faster responding t. han Control for the most 
complex FT and FF cases. These are not the sort of interactions 
that the Working Memory model predicts. 
In view of the surprising results summarised above, 
it was decided to investic3ate this effect more closely. In 
Experiment III a specific manipulation was introduced to test a 
possible interpretation of the finding a+ accelerated solution 
times under concurrent articulation. As Baddeley and Lewis 
(1981, p109) have noted "the early stages of reading were and 
are associated with speaking, with reading aloud preceding 
silent reading". It is suggested (eq. Mattingly, 1972, p135) 
that comparatively few "high speed readers are somehow able to 
go directly to a deep level of language, omitting the 
intermediate stages of processing to which other readers and 
all listeners murst presumably have recourse". It seems 
plausible that an habitual dependence upon an intermediate 
phonoloc3ical process would recur with complex verbal reasoning 
tasks. If concurrent articulation interferes with the use of 
this phonoloc3ical code in the manner proposed by Kleiman 
(1975), then subjects would have to oper&te in an alternative 
code such as a visual or semantic one. Such a code may permit 
faster processinc3 of the material than the repressed 
phonological one. On the other hand, if the accuracy of rhyme 
judgements is impaired by suppression as the Besner et al 
(1981) study suggests, then this might be expected to increase 
the frequency of logical errors observed in this condition. 
In order to test this hypothesis, the truth table 
evaluation task used in Experiment II was modified to require 
attention to different characteristics of the stimuli, which 
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were words. In one condition the sound o+ the words was 
relevant, in another the meaning, and in a third condition the 
colour of the ink in which they were printed. 
EXPERIMENT III 
The E+fect of Articulatory gLIppression and Codin_9_R2_qLLirements 
gfl Truth Table Evaluation with Conditionals. 
METHOD. 
Desi_gn 
Three concurrent load Groups with twelve subjects in 
each were- tested on a truth table evaluation task using 
conditional rules. As in the previous experiments Control, 
Articulation and Memory Groups were required to perform the 
conditional reasoning task with a concurrent task imposed as 
detailed for Experiment I. 
As in Experiment II, within Groups subjects attempted 
16 distinct logical problems (see Table 1.10). In the present 
case, however, these were presented in each o+ three blocks 
corresponding to three experimental Conditions. The nature of 
the problem materials within each block was such as to 
influence the type of code used to store and compare the rules 
and instances. Thus each Condition required subjects to 
concentrate upon a particular Visual, Rhyming or Semantic 
aspect of the problem materials in order to make their 
decisions. The six different possible orders of Conditions were 
used twice within each experimental Group. A dif+erent 
randomised order of presentation of problems within each 
Condition was used for each presentation. 
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SL-tbiects 
Thirty-six undergraduate students of Plymouth 
Polytechnic, having no previous experience of this type of 
task, served as subjects on a paid volunteer basis. They were 
tested individually. 
Task and Materials 
Subjects were presented with a conditional rule on 
one field of a three-field tachistoscope. The rule described 
the relationship between a pair of words. They referred either 
to the colours of the inks in which the words were written 
(Visual Condition), the sounds of the words (Rhyming Condition) 
or the semantic categories to which the words belonged 
(Semantic Condition). Examples of each Task Modality Condition 
are given below: 
Visual Condition 
IF THE LEFT WORD IS COLOURED YELLOW 
THEN THE RIGHT WORD IS COLOURED GREEN 
Rh2M2_Condition 
IF THE LEFT WORD RHYMES WITH GLOW 
THEN THE RIGHT WORD RHYMES WITH VOTE 
Semantic Condition 
IF THE LEFT WORD IS A PART OF THE BODY 
THEN THE RIGHT WORD IS A TYPE OF ANIMAL 
When subjects had read and understood the rule, they pushed a 
switch causing a particular instance of a pair of words 
(printed in coloured inks) to be superimposed beneath it. One 
word appeared to the left and the other word to the right of 
the screen. 
The subjects' task was, as in Experiment II, to 
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evaluate whether the instance conformed to, conflicted with, or 
was irrelevant to the rule and to signal their response by 
pushing an appropriate button. 
The ink colour, rhyming characteristic and semantic 
categories of the words were manipulated to generate the 
various logical cases. 
Sixteen dif+erent words were used in the instances in 
various paired combinations. Each word was selected from one of 
four semantic categories and it also fitted into one of four 
(orthographically dissimilar) rhyming categories. Each of these 
words was printed consistently in one of four coloured inks 
throughout the Experiment. The stimulus words are shown in 
Appendix D. 
As in Experiment II, the tachistoscope was connected 
to automatic timers so that latencies of response, split into 
Comprehension Time (CT) and Verification Time (VT), could be 
measured. 0+ course, the particular responses made to each 
problem were recorded. 
Procedure 
Subjects in all conditions were read the standard set 
of preliminary instructions as used in Experiment II. They were 
told that the experiment was concerned with people's ability to 
understand logical relationships but was not intended as a test 
of intelligence. 
The particular logical task was then described in the 
following manner: 
"You will be presented, on the screen, with a series of rules 
defining the relationship which exists between various pairs of 
words. The rules may or may not contain negatives. For example: 
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IF THE LEFT WORD IS 'BALL' THEN THE RIGHT WORD IS 'LEAF', or 
IF THE LEFT WORD IS 'TIN' THEN THE RIGHT WORD IS NOT 'BAG', or 
IF THE LEFT WORD IS NOT 'HOUSE' THEN RIGHT WORD IS 'POLE', or 
IF THE LEFT WORD IS NOT 'SOUP' THEN THE RIGHT WORD IS NOT 'ANT' 
When you are satisfied that you understand each rule you should 
move the toggle switch (marked 'X'in Iýront of you) to the left 
or to the right. This will cause a particular instance of a 
pair of words to appear on the screen underneath the rule. One 
word will appear on the left and one word on the right of the 
screen. You have to decide whether that instance conforms to, 
conflicts with, or is irrelevant to the given rule and to 
indicate your answer by pushing the appropriate button firmly. 
On di++erent occasions I will require you to attend to either: 
1) the colours, o+ the words in the instance, 
or 2) the rhyming characteristics of the words in the instance, 
or 3) the meanings o+ the words in the instance. 
Although you will be timed, it is more important to be accurate 
than +ast, so please do not rush on the problems. 
Have you any questions? " 
Following this the subjects were given instructions 
relating to the practice session. This session comprised of a 
set of 12 practice trials, in three blocks of 4 problems each. 
Each block concentrated upon either the Visual, Rhyme or 
Semantic modality. The orders o+ presentation oi the three 
practice blocks was consistent with the order of the 
experimental Conditions for all subjects. The practice problems 
used disjunctive rules and different materials from those used 
in the experimental trials. 
Immediately prior to the experimental trials subjects 
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were given instructions (as in Experiments I and rI) depending 
upon which concurrent load Group (Control, Articulation or 
Memory) they had been randomly assigned to. As previously, the 
experimenter ensured that the articulation rate was held 
constant durinc3 the trials. 
When the Experiment was completed subjects were 
debriefed. In all, the Experiment took between thirty and forty 
minutes per subject. 
RESULTS. 
Response frequencies and latencies are discussed 
separately in the sections below. As with Experiment II, 
appropriate factors are introduced into the frequency and 
latency analyses of variance to investigate the effects of 
'Matching Bias' and linguistic features respectively. 
Resp2n22_ELe_q! 12f! gies 
The modal responses for the four logical cases are 
shown in Table 5.1 . These subjectively 'correct' answers are 
in line with the truth table for defective implication (see 
Chapter 1) as were those observed in Experiment II. 
It was expected that the concurrent articulation task 
performed whilst S's were evaluating the problems would lower 
the frequency of the subjectively 'correct' answers. This 
disruption should be particularly obvious in the Rhyme modality 
where the articulation of an irrelevant sequence of digits 
might be expected to disrupt the formation or use o+ a 
phonological code involved in making rhyme judgements. 
Separate analyses of variance were performed on the 
modal responses to each 109ical case. The factors were Groups 
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(Control, Articulation and Memory), Conditions (Visual, Rhyme 
and Semantic) and Matching Case. The latter two factors were 
within subjects. 
Table 5.1 . Percentage frequency of responses to each of the 
+our logical cases in Experiment III conforming to a defective 
truth table. Each point is based on 12 subjects. Total N=36. 
(i) 
_TT_as. 
'Conforms' 
Group Condition Matching Case 
pq Pq pq pq Mean 
CONTROL Visual 92 92 75 67 81 
(Mean=86) Rhyme 100 92 83 83 90 
Semantic 92 92 83 83 88 
Mean 95 92 80 78 
ARTICULATION Visual 
(Mean=90) Rhyme 
Semantic 
Mean 
100 100 100 100 100 
83 83 100 75 85 
100 92 75 67 83 
94 92 92 81 
MEMORY Visual 83 83 75 67 77 
(Mean=81) Rhyme 83 100 83 67 83 
Semantic 100 100 83 50 83 
Mean 89 94 80 61 
Mean 93 93 84 73 
(Rule) (AA) (AN) (NA) (NN) 
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_TF_a, 
s 'Conflicts' 
Group Condition Matching Case 
pq pq ýq Mean 
CONTROL Visual 83 83 83 75 81 
(Mean=80) Rhyme 83 92 67 75 79 
Semantic 83 75 75 83 79 
Mean 83 83 75 78 
ARTICULATION Visual 100 100 83 58 85 
(Mean=81) Rhyme 67 92 67 50 69 
Semantic 83 100 75 100 90 
Mean 83 97 75 69 
MEMORY Visual 83 92 75 67 79 
(Mean=78) Rhyme 75 100 67 83 81 
Semantic 83 67 75 67 73 
Mean so 86 72 72 
Mean 82 89 74 73 
(Rule) (AN) (AA) (NN) (NA) 
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(iii) FT_, as. 'Irrelevant' 
Group Condition Matching Case 
pq Pý pq pq Mean 
CONTROL Visual 17 47 25 58 35 
(Mean=35) Rhyme 25 25 17 50 29 
Semantic 25 33 50 50 40 
Mean 22 35 31 53 
ARTICULATION Visual 17 25 17 50 27 
(Mean=29) Rhyme 25 8 25 50 27 
Semantic a 42 25 58 3-T 
Mean 17 25 22 53 
MEMORY Visual 42 75 67 58 60 
(Mean=52) Rhyme 33 50 42 50 44 
Semantic 33 58 58 58 52 
Mean 36 61 56 55 
Mean 25 40 36 54 
(Rule) (NA) (NN) (AA) (AN) 
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(iv) 
-FF_as 
'Irrelevant' 
Group Condition Matching Case 
pq P5 pq -ý-q mean 
CONTROL Visual 33 42 50 58 46 
(Mean=38) Rhyme 42 42 33 33 38 
Semantic 25 25 25 50 31 
Mean 33 36 36 47 
ARTICULATION Visual "S 3ý 42 42 67 46 
(Mean=37) Rhyme 25 25 33 42 31 
Semantic a 42 33 50 33 
Mean 22 36 36 53 
MEMORY Visual 50 50 50 83 58 
(Mean=57) Rhyme 50 33 67 75 56 
Semantic 42 67 58 67 58 
Mean 47 50 58 75 
Mean 34 41 44 58 
(Rule) (NN) (NA) (AN) (AA) 
Contrary to expectations nedther Groups nor 
Conditions produced a significant main effect and neither did 
those factors interact in any of the four analyses. Thus 
concurrent articulation did not interfere with subjects' 
conditional reasoning performance even when they were required 
to attend to phonological (rhyming) characteristics of the 
words. The only significant effects in the frequency anal-Yses 
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were manifestations of the 'Matching Bias' effect. Determinate 
responses - on TT and TF - decreased as mismatches in the 
instance increased, while irrelevant responses - on FT and FF - 
showed an increasing trend. The effect was significant for TT 
(Fl, 33=8.59, P<0.01), FT (FI, 33=8.78, P<0.01) and FF 
(FI, 33=5.90, p<0.025), but fell short of significance in the TF 
analysis (F1,33=2.93). In none of the analyses, however, did 
the effect of 'Matching Bias' interact with Conditions or any 
other factor. 
In essence, then, reasoning responses were in 
accordance with previous research (see, for example, Evans and 
Newstead, 1977) re_Sardless of the presence of concurrent 
articulation or the manipulation of type of encoding required 
to solve the problem. 
Response_Latencies 
The mean Comprehension Times are shown in Table 5.2. 
A logarithmic transformation was applied and the data 
submitted to a3X3X4 analysis of variance, with the factors 
Groups, Conditionsand Rules. 
There was a significant effect of Rules (Fl, --3=4.95, 
p<0.05) and a significant interaction of Rules with Groups 
(F2,32=3.57, p<0.05). However the nature of this interaction 
was opposite to that observed by Hitch and Baddeley (1976). 
Whilst, for the Control Group an increase in latency occurred 
with the addition of negative components in the rules (in line 
with Evans and Newstead, 1977), breakdown analysis indicated 
that the introduction ofasecond negative added no extra 
difficulty in the Articulation Group. In the Memory Group, 
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however, the effect of negatives disappeared completely. 
Group Rule Condition 
Visual Rhyme Semantic Mean 
CONTROL AA 4.55 5.33 5.30 5.06 
(Mean=5.52) AN 4.65 5.65 5.29 5.20 
NA 4.90 6.08 6.37 5.78 
NN 5.45 7.13 5.56 6.05 
Mean 4.89 6.05 5.63 
ARTICULATION AA 3.71 4.54 5.12 4.46 
(Mean=5.01) AN 4.27 5.74 5.23 5.08 
NA 4.55 6.36 5.63 5.51 
NN 4.23 5.42 5.29 4.98 
Mean 4.19 5.52 5.32 
MEMORY AA 5.95 6.97 6.68 6.53 
(Mean=6.52) AN 5.92 7.21 6.04 6.39 
NA 5.89 7.20 6.331' 6.47 
NN 5.64 7.62 6.84 6.70 
Mean 5.85 7.25 6.47 
Mean 4.98 6.27 5.81 
Table 5.2 . Mean Comprehension latencies (seconds) for each 
condition in Experiment III. Each mean is based on 12 subjects. 
Total N=36. 
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There was also a significant main effect of 
Conditions (Fl, 33=11.59, pl%0.01) which seems mainly due to 
faster times in the Visual Condition. 
The effect of Groups was not significant 
(F2,33=1.96), but the order of means was the same as in 
Experiments I and II: Articulation faster than Control faster 
than Memory. Groups did not interact with Conditions 
(F2,33=0.25). Indeed the order of means across the three 
Concurrent Load Groups was the same for Visual, Rhyme and 
Semantic Conditions (see Table 5.2). 
Verification Times were also submitted to analysis of 
variance on logarithmic transformation. The factors were the 
same as in CT's with the addition of Logical Case as a within 
subjects factor on four levels. This factor refers to what is 
presented in the instance when the verification period is 
begun. Since there were no significant interactions the 
presentation of means is simplified in Table 5.3 
The means for the expected interaction between Groups 
and Conditions is shown in Table 5.3 (i). The interaction was 
not significant (F2,33=2.01), and the general pattern of 
results was similar to that found with CT's. Conditions was 
significant (F1,33=13.24, p<0.01) with latencies again fastest 
in the Visual Condition. Although Groups was not significant 
(F2,33=0.88), Articulation was, once again, associated with 
faster latencies than Control or Memory for all Conditions. The 
Memory Group was also associated with faster latencies than 
Control for the Visual and Semantic though not for the Rhyme 
Condition. 
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Table 5.3 . The mean Veri+ication latencies (seconds) in 
Experiment III. Total N=36. 
i) Groupa_X_C2nditions (Each mean is based on 12 subjects). 
Group Condition 
Visual Rhyme Semantic Mean 
Control 5.18 5.73 5.86 5.59 
Articulation 3.90 4.74 4.29 4.31 
Memory 4.81 6.80 4.93 5.51 
Mean 4.63 5.75 5.03 
ii)Loqical Case(Each mean is based on 36 subjects). 
TT TF FT FF 
3.97 4.74 5.72 6.12 
iii)Rules(Each mean is based on 36 subjects). 
AA AN NA NN 
4.34 4.79 5.60 5.83 
Mean 
5.14 
Mean 
5.14 
There was a significant main effect of Logical Case 
(F1,33=19.13, p<0.001) and of Rules (FI, 33=22.72, p<0.001). 
Inspection of the means in Table 5.3 (ii) and (iii) reveals 
that these effects were as expected and are consistent with 
previous research (eq. Evans and Newstead, 1977). 
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Finally, the mean VT's associated with making each 
type of response (Conforms, Conflicts, Irrelevant) were 
calculated for each Condition. There was no evidence of any 
significant relation between response type and latency. 
(The Analysis of Variance tables for Experiment III are shown 
in Appendix E). 
DISCUSSION. 
It was very surprising that Groups did not interact 
significantly with Conditions in any of the analyses since, 
following Kleiman's (1975) findings, the concurrent 
articulation of an irrelevant sequence was expected to disrupt 
the Rhyme Condition particularly when compared with the Visual 
Condition in the present Experiment. 
Although there was not a main effect of Groups on 
comprehen. sion or verification latencies, their order followed a 
similar pattern to that observed in the previous two 
experiments in the CT analysis. In the VT analysis a similar 
pattern was observed at least as far as the Articulation and 
Control Groups were concerned. Irrelevant concurrent 
articulation without a memory load was associated with faster 
responding than the silent Control Group. As with Experiment 
II, on VT the Memory Group also tended to be faster overall 
than Controls. 
The interaction of Rules with Groups on the CT 
analysis ), ielded a result somewhat similar to that observed in 
Experiment II. In the present case, increasing the complexity 
of the rule by the addition of negatives had the expected 
204 
additive effect in the Control Group (see Evans and Newstead, 
1977). In the Articulation Group, the addition of a second 
negative component did not lead to increased latencies. 
However, in the Memory Group, no e-F + ec t o-f negatives was 
observed on latencies. This is inconsistent with the Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974) Tnodel oi Working Memory. 
Baddeley and Hitch's original attempts to demonstrate 
effects of Working Memory on sentence verification used a 
memory preload technique. However, in this case, it was argued 
that subjects were able to carry out the two tasks in 
alternation and so only very weak evidence in favour of the 
Working Memory hypothesis was gained. 
They subsequently adopted the interference 
methodology (which has been utilised in most of the present 
Experiments) because it appears to make concurrent demands upon 
the memory system. Therefore the technique provides a more 
adequate test oi the Workin(3 Memory hypothesis. In assessing 
their model, Hitch and Baddeley (1976, p6l. 3) claim that the 
crucial test is "whether memory load produces interference over 
and above that which is attributable to articulatory activity 
alone". Clearly considering the error data from the present 
Experiment, it does not. 
However, besides the obvious dif+erences between the 
natures of the conditional reasoning task employed in the 
present case and the sentence verification task (Hitch and 
Baddeley, 1976, experiment III), there were other differences 
in procedures adopted. Although the subjects' rates 0+ 
articulation were kept constant at about 4-5 items per second 
in both experiments, the instructional emphasis in the present 
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case was on accuracy rather than speed o-F response. Hitch and 
Baddeley (1976) gave more emphasis on the importance of speed. 
The present procedure also differed from that of Hitch and 
Baddeley in that separate subjects experienced the Control, 
Articulation and Memory Groups. 
It was there-Fare decided to attempt a replication of 
Hitch and Baddeley's (19"76) third experiment whilst maintaininc3 
the present instructional emphasis on accuracy and a between 
group design for the articulation factor. In this way it should 
be possible to tell whether the discrepancies between the 
results of Experiments I- III and Hitch and Baddeley (1976) 
are due to di+ferences in the nature o+ the reasoning task or 
to differences in the experimental instructions and procedure. 
In addition, their problem materials were to be extended by 
includin<9 either words or letters in the instances. 
EXPERIMENT IV 
A_Replication and Extension of Hitch and Baddeley_(1276., 
experiment III). 
It is poSsible that the discrepancies between the 
results of the previous experiments and those of Hitch and 
Baddeley (1976, experiment III) were due to differences in the 
nature o+ the tasks, or to other +actors such as population 
dif+erences. Newstead (1979) has illustrated how established 
experimental results are sometimes difficult to replicate with 
other subject populations. 
In Experiment IV, Hitch and Baddeley's sentence 
verification task will be repeated whilst keeping as close as 
possible to the procedure employed in the previous experiments. 
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Consequently, instructions will be kept as similar as possible, 
and a between rather than a within Group design will be 
maintained. It is also oi interest to determine whether Hitch 
and Baddeley's results will extend to words as well as letters 
in the instances and to tachistoscopic presentation. 
METHOD. 
DRMi_qn 
The verification task used in the present experiment 
Was similar to that used by Hitch and Baddeley (1976, 
experiment III). 
A sentence and an accompanying instance of a 
letter-pair (or viord-pair) were presented simultaneously. The 
sentence described a particular order of the letters (or words) 
named in the instance. The subject's task was to indicate 
whether the letters (or words) named in the instance were in 
the order described by the rule. For example, when presented 
with: 
A follows B 
BA 
the correct response would be 'True'. If the instance had been 
'AB', the correct response would have been 'False'. 
Sentence difficulty was manipulated by varying the 
polarity and voice of the verb. Also both true and false 
instances were used with each sentence type. An equivalent set 
of problems were constructed using the verb 'precedes' instead 
of 'follows'. Thus a block of sixteen problems concerning 
letter-pairs and a similar block o+ sixteen problems concerning 
word-pairs were devised. The order of presentation of blocks 
was counterbalanced. A different randomised order of problems 
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within each block was used for each presentation. 
Eic3ht subjects were run in each oi three experimental 
Groups (Control, Articulation and Memory). The response made 
was recorded together with the response latency for each 
problem. 
Subjects 
Twenty-four students of Plymouth Polytechnic, having 
no previous experience with this particular task, served as 
subjects on a paid volunteer basis. They were tested 
individually. 
Task and Materials 
Subjects were presented with the verification task on 
a two-+ ie Id tachistoscope whose onset and offset was 
synchronised with an automatic timer. They were required to 
decide whether the sentence described the instance correctly or 
not, and to respond 'True' or 'False' as appropriate. Subjects 
were presented with two separate blocks of sixteen problems 
each. 
The particular letter-pairs (or word-pairs) used 
(shown in Appendix F) were different for each problem. None of 
the combinations of letters (or words) used within any problem 
rhymed, and they were selected so as to be visually dissimilar. 
The combinations selected did not appear to have any obvious 
semantic cor, -ýotat ions. 
Procedure 
Subjects in all Groups were given preliminary written 
instructions similar to those used in previous experiments. The 
particular task which they were to per+orm was described in the 
+ol lowi ng manner: 
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"You will be presented, on the screen, with a series of rules 
defining the relationship which exists between various pairs o+ 
letters (or words) . 
The rules may or may not contain negatives. 
For example: 
P follows W, 
or W does not follow P, 
or W is followed by P, 
or P is not followed by W. 
For each problem you will be shown one such rule on a card. 
Underneath this will be an instance containing the particular 
letters (or words) mentioned in the rule. 
For example: 
WP or PW 
Your task is to read each sentence and to decide whether it is 
a true or false description of the instance given. 
If you think that the rule describes the instance correctly 
press the switch towards 'TRUE'. If you think that the rule 
does not describe the instance correctly press the switch 
towards 'FALSE'. 
Although you will be timed, it is more important to be accurate 
than fast so please do not rush on the problems. 
Have you any questions? " 
Subjects were then given eight practice problems of a 
fairly similar nature (using the relationships 'above' and 
'below') in order to familiarise them with the problem format 
and response keys. 
Immediatel,,,, prior to the experimental trials the 
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three Groups received their separate instructions as in the 
previous experiments. 04 course, the experimenter ensured that 
the articulation rates remained constant at about 4-5 items 
per second throughout the trials. 
When the experiment was completed, subjects were 
debriefed. In all the experiment took about 25 minutes per 
subject. 
RESULTS. 
Response latencies were logarithmically transformed 
and then submitted to a3X2X2X2X2 analysis of variance 
with repeated measures on the last four factors. The factors 
were Groups, Letters/Words, Truth Value, Sentence Voice and 
Polarity. The error data were submitted to a similar analysis. 
Response Latencies 
The mean solution latencies are shown in Table 5.4 
Since there was no significant main effect or interaction 
involving Letters/Words, the table is collapsed over this 
factor. 
There was a significant main effect of Groups 
(F2,21=4.73, p<0.025). The order of means was the same as that 
observed by Hitch and Baddeley (ie. Control faster than 
Articulation faster than Memory). Two-t. ailed t tests revealed a 
significant difference between Memory and Control (tl4=2.78, 
p<0.025) Groups only, although the difference between 
Articulation and Memory approached significance (tl4=1.80, 
P<0.10). 
The variables of problem structure produced the 
effects on problem difficulty expected from previous research. 
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Thus negativeswere processed more slowly than affirmatives 
(Fl, 21=158.07, pl%0.001) and passives more slowly than actives 
(FI, 21=16.82, p'NO. 001). There was an interaction between Truth 
Value and Polarity (Fl, 21=12.35, p'10.01)indicating that 
problems containing negatives but requiring a 'False' answer 
were easier than those equiring a 'True' answer with the 
reverse holding for affirmatives. This finding is similar to 
that of Hitch and Baddeley and is typical of sentence-referent 
matching tasks (eg. Trabasso, 1972). There was also a 
significant interaction between Sentence Voice and Polarity 
(FI, 21=10.75, pl%0.01). 
Group True False 
Affirmative Negative Affirmative Negative 
Act. Pass. Act. Pass. Act. Pass. Act. Pass. 
Control 2.60 2.99 3.92 3.84 3.00 3.15 3.60 3.59 
(Mean=3.34) 
Articulation 2.56 3.07 
(Mean=3.93) 
Memory 3.52 4.17 
(Mean=5.12) 
5.01 4.87 2.89 3.63 4.48 4.92 
5.80 6.11 3.64 5.32 6.34 6.06 
Mean 2.89 3.41 4.91 4.94 3.18 4.03 4.81 4.86 
Table 5.4 . Mean solution latencies (seconds) 
for Experiment IV 
broken down by Group, Truth Value, Polarity and Sentence Voice. 
Each mean is based on 8 subjects. Total N=24. 
According to the Working Memory hypothesis, variables 
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af+ectinc3 problem dif+iculty should tend to interact with 
Working Memory load. Althouc3h no interactions in support o+ 
this hypothesis have occurred 
prob I ems of Exper iments I 
significant interaction in the 
between Groups and Polarity ( 
of a memory load increased the 
statements. 
in the conditional reasoning 
to III, there was one such 
present experiment. This was 
F2,21=6.18, p'. 0.01). The presence 
relative difficulty of negative 
A four-way interaction of Groups with Truth Value, 
Sentence Voice and Polarity (F2,21=3.77, p'10.05) can probably 
be dismissed as spurious in view of the large number of F 
ratios in the analysis. 
Res2onse_Frequencies 
The error data were submitted to analysis of variance 
with tha same factors as previously. The percentage means are 
shown in Table 5.5 with the cells, once again, collapsed over 
Letters/Words since this did not produce a significant main 
effect or interaction in the analysis. 
As with Hitch and Baddeley's analysis, there was no 
significant main effect of Groups (F2,21=2.27) on error 
frequencies, although the magnitude of the F ratio was 
comparable with theirs. There was a main effect of Sentence 
Voice (FI, 21=9.33, p<0.01) and this factor interacted with 
Truth Value (FI, 21=4.65, p<. 05). 
There was also a main effect of Polarity 
(FI, 21=16.84, p<0.001) together with a significant interaction 
of Polarity with Truth Value (Fl, 21=7.66, p<0.025). This latter 
result echoed that found in the latency analysis. 
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Group True False 
Affir mative Negative Affir mative Negative 
Act. Pass. Act. Pass. Act. Pass. Act. Pass. 
Control 3 1-7 22 44 9 13 9 19 
(Mean=17) 
Articulation 3 6 25 25 3 13 19 13 
(Mean=13) 
Memory 6 19 19 41 28 34 25 25 
(Mean=25) 
Mean 13 22 37 13 20 is 19 
Table 5.5 . Error percentages for Experiment IV broken down by 
Group, Truth Value, Polarity and Sentence Voice. Each point is 
based on 8 subjects. Total N=24. 
As with Hitch and Baddeley's data, 
between errors and response latencies w 
'0.001) when significant (rho=0.83, t10=4.65, p-% 
the twelve conditions (Groups X Polarity 
suggests that speed/error trade-off was not 
changes in response latency. 
the correlation 
as positive and 
computed across 
"I X Voice). This 
responsible for 
(The Analysis o-f Variance tables -for Experiment IV are shown in 
Appendix G). 
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DISCUSSION. 
As can be seen, these results replicate those of 
Hitch and Baddeley (1976, experiment III) in essential 
respects. 
In addition the present results establish that 
similar effects accrue from using either word-pairs or 
letter-pairs as stimuli even when presented tachistoscopically. 
More importantly, it is evident that when using this rather 
simple sentence verification task with instructions and 
conditions of presentation similar to Experiments I to III, 
concurrent articulation without a memory load does not speed up 
solution latencies. The general order of latency means observed 
in Experiment IV was Control faster than Articulation faster 
than Memory. 
Thus it seems that the 'speeding-up' effects of 
concurrent articulation without a memory load, observed in the 
conditional reasoning experiments, cannot be due to the 
instructional emphasis on accuracy. Nor can they be attributed 
to differences between the populations sampled by the present 
author and by Hitch and Baddeley (1976), or to the use of a 
between rather than within subject design for the articulatory 
(Groups) factor. It appears that the difference lies in the 
reasoning task itself. 
It should therefore follow that, if a sentence 
verification task is performed in which a large load is placed 
on the articulatory system, a marked disruptive effect of 
concurrent articulation of overlearnt material would be 
observed. Surprisingly, such an effect was not observed with 
the conditional reasoning task requiring rhyme judgements, and 
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presumably phonological recoding, described in the previous 
experiment. 
In Experiment V subjects were run under three 
conditions using the 'words' version of the Hitch and Baddeley 
reasoning task with modifications to require attention to 
visual, semantic or phonological characteristics (rhyme 
judgements). A fourth condition, with no particular code 
required, was also run as a control. In the last condition the 
results should replicate those of Hitch and Baddeley (1976, 
experiment III) and of Experiment IV. The 'coding' conditions 
permit a further test of the hypothesis investigated in 
EXperiment III, namely that the presence and absence of 
concurrent articulation should interact with the encoding 
required by the reasoning task. The failure to observe 
this interaction in Experiment iir might be due to the 
complexity of the task and perhaps due to the coding 
requirements affecting only a small component of the total 
latencies. The Hitch and Baddeley task is simpler and quicker, 
and arguably more dependent upon sentence comprehension than 
reasoning per_se. Presumably it is the heavier comprehension 
component which accounts in some way for the discrepancy 
between results of their experiments and our Experiment IV on 
the one hand, and the results of Experiments I to III on the 
other hand. 
Experiment V provides a more powerful test of the 
Baddeley (1979)/Kleiman (1975) hypothesis that articulatory 
recodinc3 is necessary in order to make rhyming judgements about 
visually presented words. The slight increase in latency 
observed on their tasks under concurrent articulation should be 
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increased in the rhyming condition, since this will increase 
the load an the articulatory sub-system. Also, if attention to 
the colour of words induces subjects to utilise a visual code, 
then we might expect the interference caused by concurrent 
articulation to diminish. 
EXPERIMENT V 
The Effect of Articulatory_2LLp2ression and Codin3 irements 
gr! Sentence Veri+ication. 
METHOD. 
Desi_qn 
In this experiment subjects were required to perform 
a sentence verification task similar to that presented in 
Experiment IV. However, on this occasion the nature of the 
problem materials was manipulated in four separate Conditions. 
The latter three Conditions (2, -7 &A) were such as to influence 
the type 0+ code used to store and compare the sentences and 
instances in a similar manner to Experiment III. In one of the 
Conditions (1) no particular code was emphasised specifically. 
All o-F the sentences reierred to the order o+ a pair 
o+ words. They described either: 
I) the particular words in the instance, 
or 2) the colours of the inks in which they were written, 
or 3) the rhyming characteristics of the words, 
or 4) the semantic categories to which they belonged. 
The mean sentence length of each of the latter three sentence 
types was carefully controlled and was 10.75 words in each 
case, so that an), observed effect due to Conditions could not 
be explained SimplY in terms C+ sentence length. The mean 
lencjth of sentences in the f irst category was 4.75 words. An 
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example of each sentence type is given below: 
1) JrF4jkjjFOLLOWS CZ4)$rr, 
or 2) A WORD COLOURED RED FOLLOWS A WORD COLOURED YELLOW, 
or 3) A RHYME WITH GRAMME FOLLOWS A RHYME WITH VOTE, 
or 4) A MEANS OF TRANSPORT FOLLOWS A TYPE OF ANIMAL. 
Given the instance: 
Cr 
the correct response would be 7True' whereas given the 
instance: 
-Tftqm Gr 
the correct response would be 'False' to each of the above four 
sentences. 
As in the previous experiment, sentence difficulty 
was manipulated by varying the polarity and the voice of the 
verb. Both true and false instances were used with each 
sentence type and an equivalent set o+ problems using the verb 
'precedes' instead of 'follows' were constructed. 
Thus the four Conditions corresponded to four blocks 
of sixteen problems, each block concentrated on one of the 
above types of problem material. The stimulus words are shown 
in Appendix D and are identical to those used in Experiment 
III. The particular word-pairings used were varied for each 
problem. Twelve different orders of presentation of Conditions 
were used within each experimental Group. These were randomly 
selected, without replacement, from the twenty-four possible 
orderings. A different randomised order of problems within each 
Condition was used ior each presentation. 
Twelve subjects were run in each of three 
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experimental Groups - Control, Articulation and Memory. The 
response made was recorded together with the latency for each 
problem. 
Subilcts 
The subjects were thirty-six students of Plymouth 
Polytechnic. They had no previous experience with this sort of 
task and were tested individually. They were paid for their 
participation. 
Task and Materials 
Subjects were presented with the sentence 
veri+ication task on a two-+ield tachistoscope set up as in 
Experiment IV. They were asked to decide whether sentences 
described associated instances correctly or not and to make the 
appropriate 'True' or 'False' responses. Conditions was a 
within subject factor and their order of presentation was such 
that all Conditions appeared equally often in each blocked 
position. The order Of problems within each Condition was 
randomised. 
Procedure 
All subjects were given similar preliminary 
instructions to those used in the previous experiments. The 
particular task was then described by the following written 
instructions which were read aloud to the subjects by the 
experimenter: 
"You will be presented, on the screen, with a series of rules 
defining the relationship which exists between various pairs of 
words. The rule may or may not contain negatives. For example: 
DOOR FOLLOWS TREE, 
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or TREE DOES NOT FOLLOW DOOR, 
or TREE IS FOLLOWED BY DOOR, 
or DOOR IS NOT FOLLOWED BY TREE. 
For each problem you will be shown one such rule on a card. 
Underneath this will be an instance of a pair of words. For 
example: 
TREE DOOR or DOOR TREE 
Your task is to read each sentence and to decide whether it is 
a true or a false description of the instance given. If you 
think that the rule describes the instance correctly press the 
switch towards 'TRUE'. If you think that the rule does not 
describe the instance correctly press the switch towards 
'FALSE'. On different occasions I will require you to attend to 
either: 
1) the actual words named in the instance, 
or 2) the colours of the words in the instance, 
or 3) the rhyming characteristics of the words in the instance, 
or 4) the meanings of the words in the instance. 
Although you will be 'timed, it is more important to be accurate 
than fast so please do not rush on the problems. 
Have you any questions? " 
Subjects were then given four blocks of four practice 
problems. Each block corresponded to one of the four types of 
material to be used in the experimental Conditions. However, 
the practice problems used the relationship 'above' or 'below'. 
Thus subjects were familiarised with the problem format and 
response keys. 
Immediately prior to the experimental problems, 
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subjects were given their separate instructions, as in 
Experiments I to IV, depending upon the Group (Control, 
Aý-ticulation or Memory) to which the- y had been randomly 
assigned. 
Subjects were debriefed when they had completed the 
experimental problems. In all the task took about thirty-five 
minutes per subject. 
RESULTS. 
Response latencies were logarithmically transformed 
and submitted to a 31 f% X '-' 4X2X2 analysis of variance. The 
factors were Groups, Conditions, Truth Value, Sentence Voice 
and Polarity. The last four were within subject factors. Error 
data were submitted to a similar analysis. 
Response_Latencies 
Table 5.6 shows the mean latencies broken dot-in by 
Groups, Conditions, Polarity and Sentence Voice. 
There was a significant main effect of Conditions 
(FI933=88.67, p-, 0.001). Breakdown analysis showed that whilst 
the Actual Words and Visual Conditions could not be 
differentiated, these gave rise to significantly faster 
responses than Semantic judgements which in turn were 
significantly faster than Rhyme judgements. It is interesting 
to note that the conditional reasoning tasks of Experiment III 
led to a similar effect of Conditions on response latency. 
Variations in problem structure produced similar 
effects to those observed in Experiment IV. There were main 
effects of Sentence Voice (FI, 33=21.62, P<0.001) and of 
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Group Condition A+firmative Negative 
Act. Pass. Act. Pass. Mean 
Actual Word 2.88 3.44 4.12 4.46 Z. 73 
Control Visual 2.84 3.40 4.08 4.31 3.66 
(Mean=4.48) Rhyme 4.75 4.83 6.84 7.13 5.89 
Semantic 3.89 4.18 5.13 5.45 4.66 
Mean 3.59 3.96 5.04 5.34 
Actual Word 2.77 3.51 4.37 5.00 3.91 
Articulation Visual 3.56 3.89 4.87 4.49 4.20 
(Mean=5.04) Rhyme 5.96 5.31 7.50 6.80 6.39 
Semantic 4.91 4.58 6.10 7.07 5.67 
Mean 4.30 4.32 5.71 5.84 
Actual Word 3.39 4.01 4.33 5.13 4.22 
Memory Visual 3.52 4.57 4.13 4.79 4.25 
(Mean=5.28) Rhyme 6.98 5.89 7.03 7.79 6.92 
Semantic 5.50 4.67 6.09 6.62 5.72 
Mean 4.85 4.79 5.40 6.08 
Mean 4.25 4.36 5.38 5.75 
Table 5.6 . Mean solution latencies (seconds) in Experiment V 
broken down by Groups, Conditions, Polarity and Sentence Voice. 
Each mean is based on 12 subjects. Total N=36. 
Polarity (Fl, 33=151.63, P<0.001), and a Polarity by Truth Value 
interaction (FI, 33=12.84, p<0.01). An inspection of the means 
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for these factors showed that they were in accordance with 
Trabasso (1972) in that True sentences were easier than False 
ones for Affirmative cases only. There was also a Sentence 
-7-7=7.01, p-' Voice by Conditions interaction (Fl, ý 10.025). Further 
analysis indicated that the difficulty of Passives over Actives 
was present only for the Actual Word and Visual Conditions. 
The expected main effect of Groups, found by Hitch 
and Baddeley (1976) and in Experiment IV, was not significant 
-7=0.60), although the direction of the overall means was (F2,37ý 
again Control faster than Articulation faster than Memory. The 
interaction between Groups and Conditions was again absent 
3=0.55), confirming the finding on the Conditional (F2,33 
reasoning tasks used in Experiment III. The effect of 
Conditions on response latency was thus highly similar in 
Experiments III and V. 
The failure to repeat the Hitch and Baddeley effect 
of the Groups factor is Underlined by another finding. Although 
there was again a significant Groups by Polarity interaction 
(F2,33=4.84, p<0.025) it was of the wrong sort, ie. the 
negation effect was least marked in the Memory Group. However, 
the latency findings may be confused by the appearence of error 
differences which are discussed below. 
Rf2p2n22_FnR kencies 
The error percentages, broken dot-in by Groups, 
Conditions, Polarity and Sentence Voice, are shown in Table 
5.7. 
222 
Group Condition Affirmative Negative 
Act. Pass. Act. Pass. Mean 
Actual Word 6 15 a 17 12 
Control Visual 6 6 8 13 a 
(Mean=11) Rhyme a 10 10 21 13 
Semantic 8 10 6 19 11 
Mean 7 10 a 18 
Actual Word 8 19 15 25 17 
Articulation Visual 15 15 15 13 14 
(Mean=18) Rhyme a 21 29 35 23 
Semantic 8 13 17 38 19 
Mean 10 17 19 28 
Actual Word 15 23 21 23 20 
Memory Visual 13 19 21 35 22 
(Mean=24) Rhyme 25 23 27 27 26 
Semantic 21 21 31 33 28 
Mean 19 22 25 30 
Mean 12 16 17 25 
Table 5.7 .. Error percentages for Experiment V broken down by 
Groups, Conditions, Polarity and Sentence Voice. Each point is 
based on 12 subjects. Total N=36. 
In the analysis of variance of error data there was a 
significant effect of Groups (F2,33=4.98, p<0.025). The nature 
of this was inspected using two-tailed t tests. It was found 
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that the Memory Group were signi+icantl, / less accurate than 
Controls (t22=3.06, p'10.01) with the Articulation Group 
intermediate. However, the di++erence between Articulation and 
Memory failed to reach significance (t22=1.36) and the 
difference between Articulation and Control (t22=1.82, p<0.10) 
was just short of significance. 
Perhaps then, the Working Memory load is having its 
e+fect on errors rather than latency in this experiment. I+ so 
we would expect Groups to interact with factors affecting 
problem difficulty. Several such factors produced significant 
main effects in the error analysis: Polarity (FI, 33=13.86, 
p-'%0.001), Sentence Voice (Fl,.. \0.01) and Truth Value 33=11.51, pI 
(FI, 33=5.63, p<0.025) in addition to a Polarity by Truth Value 
interaction (Fl, 33=9.80, p<0.01). As with the latency data, 
this result was rou(3hl>, in accordance with Trabasso (1972). 
However none of these 
--factors 
interacted significantly with 
Groups. 
There was no main e+fect o+ Conditions on response 
frequency and, as in the latency analysis, the interaction 
between Groups and Conditions was almost non-existant 
(F2,33=0.35). This surprising result could have been due to the 
use of Conditions as a within subject 4actor. It was, 
therefore, decided to analyse the first Condition employed with 
each subject but no disparate evidence was apparent although, 
of course, this analysis reduced the number of subjects within 
each Condition by a factor of four. Thus it seems that, even 
when rhyme judgements are required, no extra disruption due to 
rapid concurrent articulation o-f irrelevant material is 
entailed. 
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Finally, correlations were performed between errors 
and response latencies across the twelve cells Groups X 
Polarity X Sentence Voice independently for each of the 
Conditions. In all four cases these were significant and 
positive (Actual Word rho=0.70, t10=3.06, p-'%0.01; Colour 
rho=0.66, t10=2.76, p<0.01; Rhyme rho=0.63, t10=2.57, p<0.025; 
-71, p-1 Semantic rho=0.72, tlO=3. %0.005). These results suggest 
that speed/error trade-off was not responsible for changes in 
response latency within any of the four experimental 
Conditions. 
(The Analysis of Variance tables for Experiment V are shown in 
Appendix H). 
DISCUSSION. 
Experiment V failed to replicate Hitch and Baddeley's 
(1976, experiment III) results even though a similar sentence 
verification paradigm was employed. Although a main effect of 
Groups was observed on error frequency, this factor did not 
interact significantly with any of the factors affecting 
sentence complexity. Although the main effect of Groups was not 
significant in the latency analysis, there was an interaction 
of this factor with sentence complexity. However, the nature of 
this interaction was not compatible with Hitch and Baddeley's 
model. Indeed, the effect of polarity was less marked under 
memory load. 
The most surprising aspect o+ Experiment V was the 
lack o+ any signi+icant interaction between Groups and 
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Conditions in either latency or error analyses. These results 
suggest that Hitch and Baddeley's contention that verbal 
reasoning LIguires the interplay of the articulatory system and 
the central executive is not well-founded. The subsequent 
claims of Baddeley (1979) that the articulatory loop is likely 
to be utilised when rhyme judgements are involved or when word 
order is crucial, were not supported in Experiment V. This 
aspect of the present results will be taken up in the next 
section where other, more recent experiments of Baddeley and 
his colleagues will be considered. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION. 
In general the findings of Experiments III and V 
reported in the present chapter, together with the data of 
Experiments I and II, are difficult to reconcile with those of 
Hitch and Baddeley (1976). They have interpreted the effects of 
concurrent articulation on the verification of sentences of the 
for M7A precedes B' by supposing that this task requires the 
use of the articulatory loop. They further propose that access 
to the articulatory loop is disrupted by concurrent 
articulation. Baddeley has also suggested that the articulatory 
loop assists in tasks requirinc3 retention of word order in 
complex sentences (Baddeley, 1979; Baddeley and Lewis, 1981; 
Baddeley, Eldridge and Lewis, 1981). This would lead to 
inter+erence in either errors or latencies o+ conditional 
reasoning under articulatory suppression. There was also the 
suggestion that suppression might affect either the latency 
(Kleiman, 1975) or the accuracy (Besner et al, 1981) of rhyme 
judgements. All in all, several aspects o+ the present results 
are difficult to reconcile with these proposals. 
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Concurrent articulation of irrelevant material did 
not lead to slower reasoning latencies relative to a silent 
control condition in the conditional reasoning task described 
in Experiment III. This is in spite of the fact that word order 
is an essential component of such a task. In fact such trends 
as were present were for fastIL responding in the Articulation 
Group when compared with the silent Control condition. These 
trends lend support to the results of Experiments I and II 
where a similar effect achieved significance. Experiment IV 
indicates that the dif+erences between these results and those 
of Hitch and Baddeley are unlikely to be due to differences in 
subj ect populations or to the comparison between articulation 
and control conditions being made on a between, rather than a 
within, subject basis. This is because Experiment IV replicated 
Hitch and Baddeley's results in essential respects with 
Articulation Group manipulated as a between subject +actor 
using subjects selected from the same parent population as 
Experiments I to III. 
Furthermore Hitch and Baddeley indicate that -a 
necessary prediction of their model of Working Memory is that 
the effect of a concurrent memory load should interact with 
factors affecting problem complexity. These include Polarity 
which manipulates the presence of negatives in the sentence to 
be verified and Sentence Voice which manipulates the use of the 
active and passive voices. According to their hypothesis, a 
short-term memory load, such as that imposed in the present 
series of experiments, would occupy space in Working Memory 
thus reducing the space available to deal with more complex 
problems. Although the results of their experiments and 
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Experiment IV were in accord with this prediction, Experiments 
I and II, reported in the previous chapter and Experiment III 
which all used conditional reasoning paradigms generally failed 
to show the predicted interaction. Even Experiment V which used 
a sentence verification task of a similar nature to their own 
did not lend support to their account. 
Finally, if the articulatory loop is used in making 
rhyme judgements, it would be expected that conditions which 
involve such judgements would be more affected by concurrent 
articulation or memory load than conditions which do not. 
Therefore, a marked interaction between Articulation Group and 
Coding Condition should have been observed on either errors or 
latencies in Experiments III and V. However no such interaction 
was observed in either study. Indeed later findin(3s (eq. 
Baddeley and Lewis, 1981) have already undermined the view that 
articulatory coding may assist rhyme judgements and the present 
results lend support to these. 
It should be appreciated then that the results so far 
have presented several difficulties for the Working Memory 
hypothesis proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and developed 
in their subsequent writing. These issues will be discussed in 
greater depth in chapter 71. 
Another aspect of the results of Experiments III and 
V merits +urther consideration. In both cases signi+icantly 
+aster latencies were associated with materials emphasising the 
use of a visual as against a phonological or semantic code. In 
Experiment V measures were taken to rule out the possibility 
that the effect was simply one of sentence length. It is of 
interest that faster latencies were observed in both 
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comprehension and verification periods of Experiment III and 
this suggests that comparisons are in some respect easier if 
they are made in a visual code. This result is of a similar 
nature to that observed in Experiment II where the presentation 
of a pictorial instance, compared with a verbal description, 
facilitated performance in conditional reasoning. However, on 
that occasion it affected the nature rather than the speed of 
responding. Since a confounding factor was present in 
Experiment II which could explain that result, a more detailed 
consideration of these effects will be delayed until further 
evidence is gathered. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENTS VI AND VII. 
EXAMINING THE ADVANTAGES OF PICTURES OVER WORDS. 
The experiments in this chapter were designed to 
follow up a particularly curious aspect of one of the studies 
described in chapter 4. In that chapter, Experiment II was 
designed to test the revised Dual Process theory of reasoning 
(Wason and Evans, 1975; Evans, 1980a; Evans, 1980b). This 
theory suggests that conditional reasoning performance is the 
result of dual cognitive processes operating in parallel. In 
the developed theory, the Type I process, which accounts for 
the non-logical aspect of reasoning data, Was postulated as 
non-verbal in nature whereas the Type 2 process, accounting ior 
logical performance, was supposed to be of a verbal nature 
(Evans, 1980a; Evans, 1980b). 
An articulatory suppression technique, similar to 
that used by Hitch and Baddeley (1976), was employed in an 
attempt to selectively disrupt the verbal process which could 
be articulatory in nature. It was also anticipated that the 
presentation of instances in a pictorial as against a verbal 
manner would lead to a selective increase in the non-logical 
response tendency ('Matching Bias') which it was thought could 
be imagery related. However, both oi these manipulations led to 
surprising results. 
Articulatory suppression was associated with faster 
responding than a silent Control Group although some disruption 
of logical performance was also achieved. The implications of 
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this result as it pertains in particular to the Working Memory 
model of Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Hitch and Baddeley, 1976) 
were followed up in three experiments presented in chapter 5. 
In Experiment vi, one possible interpretation of the 
'speeding-up' effect under articulatory suppression will be 
examined. 
The two experiments in the present chapter, which 
employ a Truth Table Evaluation paradigm similar to that used 
in Experiment II, were designed to follow up the effects of 
pictorial versus verbal presentation of the instance in 
conditional reasoning. In Experiment II, it was surprising 
that, in the pictorial condition, a facilitaion of logical 
reasoning performance and no increase in 'Matching Bias' was 
achieved. However, at that stage, a possible arte+actual 
explanation was considered plausible. 
In summaryg the problems presented in Experiment II 
referred to the combinations of shape and colour which were 
permissible with particular conditional rules of the form: 
IF IT IS A TRIANGLE THEN IT IS RED. 
Following presentation of such a rule, subjects were given 
either a verbal description of an instance such as: 
RED TRIANGLE 
or an otherwise equivalent pictorial display. They were asked 
to decide whether it conformed to, conflicted with or was 
irrelevant to the rule. 
On both TT and TF truth table cases the pictorial 
condition was associated with superior logical performance. 
However, the artefactual explanation of poorer performance in 
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the verbal condition points to the incongruency between the 
orders of colour and shape terms in the rule and the instance. 
Whilst the verbal instance follows grammatical convention by 
referring to the colour before the shape (eq. 'RED TRIANGLE'), 
the rule describes features in the reverse order with the shape 
in the antecedent, and the colour in the consequent clause. Of 
course it is possible to construct an eqivalent congruent, but 
grammatically unconventional, verbal instance such as: 
TRIANGLE RED 
It is also possible to describe the colour in the antecedent 
and the shape in the consequent of the rule: 
IF IT IS RED THEN IT IS A TRIANGLE 
When this is done, the grammatical verbal instance (eq. RED 
TRIANGLE) is congruent, whilst the ungrammatical instance (eq. 
TRIANGLE RED) is incongruent with the rule. Presumably, with 
pictorial instances, neither grammaticality nor congruency are 
relevant since features could be extracted in an optional 
order. 
Experiment VI repeats Experiment II with three 
modifications. The first of these allowed the comparison of 
congruent as-well as incongruent verbal instances to pictorial 
ones. Secondly, in the interests of simplicity, the Memory 
Group was dropped from this investigation. Thirdly, the 
instructions are altered to give more emphasis on the need for 
fast responses. This is to take account of BaddeleX's 
suggestion (personal communication) that subjects in the 
Articulation Group are speeding up in order to avoid an 
aversive articulatory task. If Baddeley is correct, this should 
speed up Controls to a similar level to the Articulation Group. 
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If error differences arise from a speed/error trade-off this 
should also eliminate error differences between the Groups 
(particularly noticeable in Experiment II), unless there is a 
! agnuine interference due to articulatory suppression. 
EXPERIMENT VI 
The Effect of Articulator.: e__Suppression on Truth Table 
Evaluation withConditiona1 s_, 
___gMp_L2y 
i n_q 
--- 
C2. n3ru. ent-Verba1_, 
Incon_q. L! A2. nt-Verba1 and Pictorial Instances. 
METHOD. 
Desiqn 
Eighteen subjects were run, in each of two Groups - 
Control and Articulation - on a Truth Table Evaluation task 
using conditional rules. Each subject attempted thirty-two 
problems in two randomised blocks, each of which contained the 
sixteen logical forms sh(pwn in Table 1.10 . 
In one block the colour was described in the 
antecedent and the shape in the consequent of the rule whereas, 
in the other block, the reverse was the case. The order of 
presentation of the blocks was balanced. Each Group was divided 
into three subgroups according to the type o+ instance given - 
Congruent verbal, Incongruent verbal or Pictorial. Thus for the 
Congruent instance subgroup the colour-shape rule lead to a 
grammatical colour-shape instance, whereas the shape-colour 
rule lead to a non-grammatical shape-colour instance. The 
reverse was the case for the Incongruent instance subgroup and, 
of course, an identical pictorial instance was associated with 
both types of rule in the Pictorial instance subgroup. 
As in Experiments II and III, comprehension and 
verification latencies, together with type of response - 
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'Conforms', 'Conflicts' or 'Irrelevant' - were recorded for 
each problem. 
Subjects 
Thirty-six students of Plymouth Polytechnic, having 
no previous experience with this type of task, served as paid 
volunteer subjects. They were tested individually. 
Task and Materials 
The logical task was the same as in Experiments II 
and III. Although the materials were of a similar nature to 
those used in Experiment ii, they were modified in some 
respects. 
The conditional rules used shape-colour relationships 
and were expressed with reference to the colour before the 
shape on half the problems and in the reverse order on the 
other half. In the Pictorial Condition the sentence was 
followed by a picture of a coloured shape. In the other two 
Conditions the instance was verbal and either Congruent or not. 
For example, given the rule: 
IF IT IS GREEN THEN IT IS A CIRCLE, 
a Congruent FT instance would be: 
RED CIRCLE, 
whereas an Incongruent FT instance would be: 
CIRCLE RED. 
Procedure 
The procedure and instructions were essentially 
similar to those of the Control and Articulation Groups of 
Experiment II, with minor modifications to accomodate the 
changes in materials. 
However, the sentence referring to speed and accuracy 
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used in the previous experiments was altered. Instead of 
"A1t hough you will be timed ........ (c+. Procedure, Experiments 
I to V), the subjects were told, "Since you will be timed 
please answer the problems as quickly as possible consistent 
with high accuracy". 
In all the experiment took about 30 minutes per 
subject. 
RESULTS., 
As with the previous studies, analyses of response 
latencies and response frequencies will be described in 
separate sections. 
E222onse_Frequencies 
As in Experiments II and III, the modal responses 
conformed to a defective truth table overall. Once again, 
separate analyses of variance were performed to each logical 
case on that basis. The factors were Groups (on 2 levels), 
Instance (3 levels), Feature Order in Rule (2 levels) and 
Matching Case (4 levels). The percentage of responses 
conforming to a defective truth table are shown in Table 6.1 
Feature Order in Rule was far from significance in 
the TT, TF and FF analyses. However, in the FT analysis, it 
achieved significance (FI, 30=5.32, p<0.05) showing more 
'Irrelevant' responding overall when the shape was mentioned 
before the colour in the rules. However this factor did not 
interact significantly with Instance, or any other factor, in 
the frequency analyses. Matching Case produced significant main 
effects, of the type consistent with 'Matching Bias', in the 
analyses of all four logical cases ( TT case - F1,30=11.791 
2'35 
Table 6.1 . Percentage frequency of modal responses to each of 
the four logical cases in Experiment VI conforming to a 
defective truth table. Each point is based on 6 subjects. Total 
N=36. 
(i) TT as ' Conf orms' 
Group Instance Feature Order Matching Case 
in Rule pq Pý ýq Mean 
Congruent colour-shape 100 100 83 50 83 
(Mean=81) shape-colour 100 83 83 50 79 
Control Incongruent colour-shape 100 83 100 67 as 
(Mean=85) (Mean=83) shape-colour 100 83 67 67 79 
Pictorial colour-shape 100 100 83 67 88 
(Mean=92) shape-colour 100 100 83 100 96 
Congruent colour-shape 100 100 67 50 79 
(Mean=79) shape-colour 100 83 67 67 79 
Articulation Incongruent colour-shape 100 67 100 83 88 
(Mean=83) (Mean=85) shape-colour 100 8ý 1. ) 83 6", a- 
Pictorial colour-shape 100 100 83 67 88 
(Mean=S3) shape-colour 100 67 67 83 79 
Mean 100 87 81 68 
(Rule) (AA) (AN) (NA) (NN) 
2 7>6 
(ii) TF as 'Conflicts' 
Group Instance Feature Order Matchinc3 Case 
in Rule pq pq pq i; q Olean 
Congruent colour-shape 100 100 8-7 17 75 
(Mean=73) shape-colour 83 100 83 17 71 
Control Incongruent colour-shape 8Z 83 67 67 75 
(Mean=81) (Mean=77) shape-colour 100 100 8z; 33 79 
Pictorial colour-shape 100 100 100 a- 96 
(Mean=92) shape-colour 100 100 s--? 67 88 
Congruent colour-shape 100 83 50 33 67 
(Mean=60) shape-colour 67 83 17 50 54 
Articulation Incongruent colour-shape 67 100 83 67 79 
(Mean=74) (Mean=73) shape-colour 83 100 17 67 67 
PictoriaI colour-shape 83 100 100 50 8-7 
(Mean=88) shape-colour 100 100 100 67 92 
Mean 
(Ru I e) 
89 96 72 51 
(AN) (AA) (NN) (NA) 
(iii) FT_as, 'Irrelevant' 
Group Instance Feature Order Matching Case 
in Rule pq pq ýq ýq Mean 
Congruent colour-shape 0 17 0 83 25 
Mean=27) shape-colour 0 1' 0 100 29 
Control Incongruent colour-shape 0 0 -. r3 50 21 
(Mean=31) (Mean=25) shape-colour 0 17 33 67 29 
Pictorial colour-shape 50 0 17 67 34 
(Mean=42) shape-colour 17 67 33 83 50 
Congruent colour-shape 0 33 17 83 -73 
(Mean=3ý -7) shape-colour 0 17 -33 83 33 
Articulation Incongruent colour-shape 0 0 17 67' 21 
(Mean=27) (Mean=219) shape-colour 17 33 17 83 37 
Pictorial colour-shape 0 17 17 50 21 
(Mean=19) shape-colour 0 0 17 50 17 
Mean 
(Ru I e) 
7 la 19 72 
(NA) (NN) (AA) (AN) 
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(iv) FF as 'Irrelevant' 
Group Instance Feature Order Matching Case 
in Rule pq Pý 'ýq ý-q Mean 
Congruent colour-shape 00 17 83 25 
(Mean=27) shape-colour 17 0 17 63 29 
Control Incongruent colour-shape 0 50 0 67 
(Mean=40) (Mean=29) shape-colour 0 33 17 67 
Pictorial colour-shape 0 6-7 67 83 
(Mean=63) shape-colour 67 67 E33 67 
Congruent colour-shape 0 17 50 67 
(Mean=35) shape-colour 33 17 33 67 
Articulation Incongruent colour-shape 0 67 17 83 
(ftlean=32) (Mean=44) shape-colour 17 17 50 100 
Pictorial colour-shape 0 
(Mean=17) shape-colour 0 
Mean 
(Ru I e) 
0 17 50 
0 17 50 
11 28 32 72 
(NN) (NA) (AN) (AA) 
29 
29 
54 
71 
33 
37 
42 
46 
17 
17 
-z j 
p<0.01; TF case - F1,30=16.55, pl%0.001; FT case - FI, 30=41.43, 
p<0.001; FF case - F1,30=42.04, p'NO. 001). In the FF analysis 
Matching Case interacted signi+icantly with Instance 
(F2,30=3.53T, pl, 0.05), although the nature oi the interaction is 
not that predicted in the introduction to this experiment. I+ 
anything, 'Matching Bias' is rather less marked in the 
Pictorial Instance condition. 
The Instance +actor achieved signi+icance in the TF 
analysis (F2,30=10.11, p'10.001). Multiple comparisons usinc3 
t-tests revealed that the Congruent and Incongruent Instance 
conditions could not be distinguished significantly (t30=1.61), 
although both of these conditions led to significantly poorer 
performance than the Pictorial Instance Condition (Congruent vs 
'0.001; Incongruent vs Pictorial t3O=2.83, Pictorial t30=4.44, p-% 
p<0.005). The mean percentage of correct responses in each 
Instance condition were: 
Congruent 67% Incongruent 75% Pictorial 90% . 
Although this factor Was far from significant in the TT 
analysis (F2,30=0.74), the direction of means suggested a 
similar Pictorial advantage. The means for TT were: 
Congruent 80% Incongruent 84% Pictorial 88% . 
In all four analyses the Articulation Group showed a slight, 
bLkt non-significant, disadvantage compared to Control. 
One other highly significa nt e++ect was a Groups by 
Instance interaction in the FF +requency analysis (F2,30=5.79, 
P<O. 01 ). If Congruent and Incongruent are collapsed this 
emerges quite clearly as a cross-over interaction between 
Groups and Verbal/Pictorial Instance. 'Irrelevant' responses 
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are considerably higher for Pictorial in Control and markedly 
lower in Articulation. Although the interaction is not 
significant in the FT analysis, a similar direction of effect 
is observed. 
Resp2nse Latencies 
The Comprehension and Verification latencies were 
submitted to a logarithmic transformation. CT's were analysed 
using a2X2X4 split plot analysis of variance with the 
factors Groups, Feature Order in Rule and Rules. The last two 
factors were within subjects. Since there was no significant 
main effect or interaction involving the Feature Order in Rule 
factor, this is omitted from the presentation of Comprehension 
latencies in Table 6.2 . 
Group Rule 
AA AN NA NN 
Control 2.85 3.72 3.61. 4.11 
Articulation 3.01 3.65 3.51 4.16 
Mean 2.93 3.69 3.56 4.14 
Mean 
3.57 
3.58 
3.58 
Table 6.2 . Mean Comprehension latencies 
(seconds) in 
Experiment VI. Each mean is based on 18 subjects. Total N=36. 
With CT's, the only significant effect was Rules 
(FI, 34=29.71, p<0.001) and this showed that, as negative 
components were added, latencies increased. The Groups factor 
was not significant (FI, 30=0.04). On this occasion the mean 
latency for Control was 3.57 seconds and for Articulation 3.58 
seconds. 
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The analysis for VT's was similar to that for CT's 
except for the addition of the Logical Case factor (within 
subjects) on 4 levels, together with Instance Condition 
(between subjects) on 3 levels. These additions represent 
manipulations incurred with the presentation of the instance. 
The mean VT's. are illustrated in Table 6.3 Since 
there was no main effect of Instance (F2,30=1.16) or of Feature 
-TO=0.69) and these factors did not interact Order in Rule (Fl, ý 
significantly with any other factor, the table is collapsed 
over these factors in the interests of simplicity 0f 
presentation. 
Although there was not a significant main effect of 
Groups (Fl, 30=1.72), the means were Control -3.54 seconds and 
Articulation 2.98 seconds which is in line with the speeding-up 
effect of Experiments I and II, and in line with the 
non-significant trend of Experiment III. Inspection of the 
individual cells in Table 6.3, shows that 14 of the 16 cases 
presented fall in the predicted direction. 
With VT's, there was a significant effect of Rules 
30=210.32, pl%0.001) indicating that the aýdition of one 
extra negative led to increased latencies. However, there was 
not an additional increase when a second negative was 
introduced into the rule. There was also a significant main 
effect of Logical Case (F1,30=24.73, p-'%0.001) indicatinc that 3 
latencies for TT cases were faster than all other cases and TF 
latencies were faster than FF. There was a significant 
interaction between these two factors (F1, --0=6.91, pl%0.0-45). It 
can be seen that the usual order of difficulty of Rule 
form is 
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slightly out of line for the FF case. 
Group Rule Logical Case 
TT TF FT FF Mean 
Control AA 1.99 2.73 3.93 3.38 3.01 
(Mean=3.54) AN 2.69 3.00 3.80 4.97 3.61 
NA 2.86 --". 37 4.53 4.47 3.81 
NN 3.11 3.61 4.39 3.86 3.74 
Mean 2.66 3.18 4.16 4.1-7 
Articulation AA 1.67 2.60 2. SZ 2.54 2.41 
(Mean=2.98) AN 2.47 2.40 3.29 3.96 3.03 
NA 2.29 3.09 2.86 3.57 2.95 
NN 2.79 3.94 3.50 3.90 3.53 
Mean 2.31 3.01 3.12 3.49 
Mean 2.48 3.09 3.64 3.83 
Table 6.3 . Mean Verification latencies (seconds) in Experiment 
VI. Each mean is based on 18 subjects. Total N=36. 
Once again, the mean VT's associated with making each 
type of response (Conforms, Conflicts and Irrelevant) were 
calculated for each cell condition. Again there was no evidence 
of any significant relationship between response type and 
latency. 
(The Analysis of Variance tables for Experiment VI are shown in 
Appendix I). 
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DISCUSSION. 
In Experiment II the effect of concurrent 
articulation was to significantly reduce the frequency of 
responses in line with the defective truth table for all four 
logical cases. The direction of this effect is the same in the 
present experiment although the effect falls short of 
significance in all four analyses. According to the speed/error 
trade-off argument this reduced interference is to be expected, 
if the altered emphasis towards speed in the instructions have 
induced more similar response latencies in the two Groups. 
Inspection of Tables 6.2 and 6.3 reveals this to be 
the case for both comprehension and verification latencies. 
Although the mean for Articulation is faster than Control in 
most of the corresponding conditions for verification 
latencies, the overall differenc e is very small and far from 
significant in the analysis of variance. The only significant 
effect in the comprehension latency analysis was Rules and this 
'complexity' factor failed to interact with Groups. With 
verification latencies, Rules and Logical Case were both 
significant as was the interaction between these factors, but, 
once again, no interaction with Groups was apparent. 
In order to assess this interpretation more 
carefully, it is necessary to make a comparison between the 
solution latencies and percentage of subjectively correct 
responses, in accordance with a defective truth table, for 
directly comparable conditions in Experiments II and VI. The 
relevant details are given in Table 6.4. Each mean is the 
average o+ Pictorial and Incongruent Verbal instances 
-44 
associated with conditional (shape-colour) rules (ie. those 
rules mentioning the shape in the antecedent and the colour in 
the consequent clauses). 
a). Resi3onse latencies. 
Experiment latency 
II CT 
VT 
Total 
vi CT 
VT 
Total 
Control 
4.17 
4.22 
8.39 
3.45 
3.90 
7.35 
Articulation 
3.80 
3.16 
6.96 
3.64 
3.21 
6.85 
b) Percenta_92_1! Alaj_Rgti. Yely_correct L1222. nses. 
Experiment Control Articulation 
11 80 62 
vi 65 55 
Table 6.4 . a). The solution latencies (seconds) and b). the 
percentage of subjectively correct responses, in accordance 
with a defective truth table, for comparable Control and 
Articulation conditions in Experiments II and VI. Each mean is 
the average of Pictorial and Incongruent Verbal instances 
associated with conditional (shape-colour) rules (ie. those 
mentioning the shape in the antecedent and the colour in the 
consequent clauses). 
The results of Experiment VI give marginal support to 
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the view that the faster performance of subjects under 
concurrent articulation in Experiment II was at the expense of 
iI ncreased er rors. Inspect i on of Table 6.4 shows that 
instructional emphasis on speed in the present experiment 
reduced latency differences between Control and Articulation 
Groups. The error differences were also reduced, but were far 
f rom eliminated. These results suggest that articulatory 
suppression does not intrinsical ly disrupt reasoning unless it 
induces faster responding. This point will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter 7. 
In Experiment II a significant facilitation of TT and 
TF evaluations in the Pictorial Condition was found but it was 
possible that this occurred as an artefact of the incongruence 
of the verbal instances with the rules. The present experiment 
has indicated that some genuine facilitation is apparent with 
pictor iaI instances. It has confirmed that neither the 
congruency of the verbal instance with the rule, nor the 
grammaticality of the instance is crucial to the effect. If the 
grammaticality of the instance had been important then a marked 
interaction between the Feature Order in Rule factor and the 
Instance factor would have arisen. This interaction was not 
significant in any of the analyses. 
On the f ace of it, it appears to be difficult to 
reconcile this aspect of the results with the suggestion of 
Evans (1980b) that the logical component of reasoning 
performance is mediated by a verbal process. Why should a 
pictorial instance, rather than a verbal one, facilitate a 
logical verbal process? The highly significant interaction 
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between Groups and Instance observed in the FF analysis and the 
similar trend in the FT analysis may provide a clue. I+ a drop 
in 'Irrelevant' responding in these cases is re<ýarded a-- 
interference, then it appears that pictorial instances are more 
subject to interference under concurrent articulation than 
verbal ones. This curiosity is at least of a similar kind to 
the general facilitation of TT and TF responding with pictorial 
instances. Perhaps the pictorial instances did not induce a 
pictorial code after all. This issue will be deferred until the 
final disussion. 
The final experiment Was designed to determine 
whether the presentation of features pictorially rather than 
verbally necessarilX leads to facilitation. It is possible that 
the facilitation in the previous experiments was due to another 
confounding characteristic associated with the instances. 
Whereas the pictorial instances a1w ay s comprised of two 
relevant features, cfolour and shape, conjointed into a 
'gestalt', the verbal instances consisted of two discrete 
words. It was decided to examine the effect when this 'gestalt' 
property o+ pictorial presentation was not present. 
For Experiment vii, conditional reasoning problems 
similar to those used in the previous studies of truth table 
evaluation were constructed. On this occasion one of three 
types oi instance (Pictorial, Verbal or Split-Pictorial) was 
presented for evaluation. The Pictorial and Verbal instances 
were similar to those used previously and were expected to 
yield equivalent findings. The Split-Pictorial instances 
consisted of pictorial representations of the features 
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presented discretely side by side. That is a blob of colour was 
presented alongside an outline shape. If the facilitation is 
due to pictorial qualities Ugr 
__je 
then the Split-Pictorial 
instances should be evaluated more easily than Verbal ones 
although they should not be noticeably harder than conjoint 
Pictorial instances. I+ the e++ect is due to the conjointness 
of the Pictorial features then the Split-Pictorial instances 
should be harder than the Pictorial instances although they 
should not be noticeably easier than Verbal ones. 
EXPERIMENT VII 
The Effect o+_Con_qLjA2n. L-V2Ltal_, Pictorial and 'Split-Pictorial 
Instances on Truth Table Evaluation with Conditionals. 
METHOD. 
Design 
Sixteen subjects were run, in each of three 
experimental Groups, on a truth table evaluation task using 
conditional rules concerning the relationship between 
particular colours and shapes. The Groups were differentiated 
according to the type of instance which was t (: ) be evaluated. 
One Group was given Verbal instances. A second Group was given 
Split-Pictorial instances in which the colour-ieature and the 
shape-feature were presented separately to the left and to the 
right of a tachistoscope screen. The conditional rule and the 
instances were presented simultaneously. For the Verbal and 
Split-Pictorial Groups the features of the instance were 
presented in a grammatical form, congruent with the rule (see 
Experiment VI). The third Group was given 'gestalt' Pictorial 
instances with identical rules. 
All subjects attempted sixteen distinct logical 
24- ý Q, 
problems (4 Rules X4 Logical Cases. cf Table 1.10) presented 
in two randomised Blocks, so that each subject attempted 
thirty-two problems in all. 
As in the previous experiments of this kind, subjects 
were required to decide whether the instance conformed to, 
conflicted with or was irrelevant to the rule. 
In addition to the particular response made, the 
latency of responding was measured. 
SýAb. ie cts 
Forty-eight students of Plymouth Polytechnic served 
individually as paid volunteers. They had no previous 
experience of this type of task. 
Task and Materials 
Subjects were presented with a cond it iona I rule on 
one field of a two-field tachistoscope. Beneath this rule was a 
particular instance of a Verbal, Split-Pictorial or conjoint 
Pictorial nature. 
As in Experiments II, III and VI, the subject's tasV 
was to evaluate the instance against the rule and to signal his 
response by pushing the appropriate 'Conforms', 'Conflicts' or 
'Irrelevant' button. 
The tachistoscope was coupled to an automatic timer 
so that the response latency could be measured. On this 
occasion overall solution latency, rather than separate CT's 
and VT's (cf Experiments II, III and VI), were taken. 
All of the problems concerned colour-shape 
relationships. They may be illustrated with the following 
example which uses an AA rule beneath which are illustrated the 
three alternative kinds of instance conforming to a TT Logical 
249 
7Z3 
Case: 
Given the rule: 
IF THE COLOUR IS BLUE THEN THE SHAPE I'=, A SQUARE 
A Verbal instance would be: 
BLUE SQUARE 
whereas a. Sp 1i t-P i ctor iaIi nst -. nce viou Id be: 
All 
I- 
and a conjoint Pictorial instance would be: 
Procedure 
After preliminary written instructions similar to 
those given in the previous experiments, the subjects were 
introduced to the task with the iollowing instructions which 
were read aloud to him by the experimenter: 
"Instructions 
You will be presented, on the screen, with a rule de+ining the 
relationship between a colour and a shape. The rule may or may 
not contain negatives. For example: 
IF THE COLOUR IS PINK THEN THE SHAPE IS AN OVAL, 
or IF THE COLOUR IS ORANGE THEN THE SHAPE IS NOT A RECTANGLE, 
or IF THE COLOUR IS NOT BROWN THEN THE SHAPE IS A CRESCENT, 
or IF THE COLOUR IS NOT PURPLE THEN THE SHAPE IS NOT A HE, KAGON. 
When the rule appears on the screen you should read it very 
carefUll', V. Underneath the rule on the screen will be an 
instance of a particular colour and a particular shape. 
Z. 50 
You. r task is to decide whether that instance conforms to, 
conflicts with, or is irrelevant to that rule and to indicate 
your decision by pushing the appropriate button firmly. Please 
think carefully before making your decision. 
Althouc3h you will be timed, it is more important to be accurate 
than fast, so please do not rush on the problems. 
a Do you understand what you have to do? " 
Subjects were then instructed +or a practice session 
which consisted of eight trials. The problems differed from the 
experimental ones in linguistic form (disjunctives rather than 
conditionals) and in the colours and shapes used. 
When they had finished, subjects were debriefed. In 
all, this experiment took about twenty-five minutes per 
subj ec t. 
RESULTS. 
Response frequencies and latencies were treated to 
separate anal-/ses as described below. 
22ýp2n22_f: nEqu2. nSý i es 
As previously, in Experiments II, III and VI, the 
modal responses con+ormed to a de+ective truth table overall. 
Consequently separate analyses were performed to each Logical 
Case on that basis. There was a between subject factor of 
Instance (on 3 levels), and two within subject factors of 
" levels) and Matching Case (4 levels). The percentage Blocks (ý 
of responses conforming to a defective truth table are shown 
in 
Table 6.5 , pooled over 
Blocks which was not significant in 
main effect or interaction. 
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Table 6.5 . Percentage frequency of modal responses to each of 
the four Logical Cases in Experiment VII conforming to a 
defective truth table. Each point is based on 16 subjects. 
Total N=48. 
(i) TT as 'Con-forms' 
Instance Matchinc3 Case 
pq pý ýq 75i Mean 
Verbal 100 100 91 59 as 
Split-Pictorial 100 75 75 53 76 
Pictorial 100 100 97 75 93 
Mean 100 92 se 63 
(Rule) (AA) (AN) (NA) (NN) 
(ii) TF_as_'Con-flicts' 
Instance Matching Case 
pq pa ýq Mean 
Verbal 91 94 78 78 85 
Split-Pictorial 94 100 66 63 
Pictorial 100 97 69 84 
Mean 95 97 71 75 
(Rule) (AN) (AA) (NN) (NA) 
81 
88 
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(iii) FT_as 'Irrelevant' 
Instance Matching Case 
pq pa 5q -Pý Mean 
Verbal 13 28 19 84 36 
Split-Pictorial 19 47 22 75 
Pictorial 13 47 13 66 
Mean 15 41 18 75 
(Rule) (NA) (NN) (AA) (AN) 
41 
35 
(iv) FF_as_'Irrelevant' 
Instance Matching Case 
pq Pý ýq Mean 
Verbal 13 56 38 84 48 
Split-Pictorial 38 41 44 66 
Pictorial 16 38 31 66 
Mean -12 45 a 72 
(Rule) (NN) (NA) (AN) (AA) 
47 
38 
-153 
Matching Case achieved significance in all four 
analyses TT case - FI, 45=19.27, p<0.001; TF case - 
Fl, 45=13.32, pl%0.001; FT case - F1,45=45.59P p<0.001; FF case - 
F1,45=21.93, pl%0.001). The trends were generally in line with 
previous research (eq Evans and Newstead, 1977) and other 
experiments reported here. Determinate responses decreased as 
the number of matching values in the instance increased, whilst 
'Irrelevant' responses showed the opposite tendency. However 
this trend was slightly out of line with the FT case. 
The effect of Instance only achieved significance in 
the TT analysis (F2,45=5.01, p<O. OZ'Y1. The means are shown in 
Table 6.6(i). This effect was more closely examined using 
t-tests. The Pictorial and Verbal Groups could not be 
significantly differentiated (t45=0.99). However, the slight 
trend was the same as in Exper iments II and VI show i ng asIi ght 
advantage f or the Pictorial over the Verbal Group. Using 
two-tailed t-tests it was found that both of these Groups were 
associated with significantly more accurate performance 
than 
the Split-Pictorial Group ( Pictorial vs Split-Pictorial 
t45=3.10, pl%0.01; Verbal vs Split-Pictorial t45=2.11, p<0.05). 
In the TF analysis there was a very slight trend in the same 
direction although this was far from significant (F2,45=0.7/5). 
The means are shown in Table 6.5(ii). 
RR2pS!. n22M_Latencies 
The response latencies were submitted to a 
logarithmic transformation and were submitted to a3X 2' X4X 
4 analysis of variance with the factors Instance, Blocks, 
Logical Case and Rules. The last three factors were within 
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subjects. Table 6.6 illustrates the mean solution latencies. 
Instance Rule Loc3ical Case 
TT TF FT FF Mean 
Verbal AA 4.43 4.79 6.91 5.57 5.43 
(Mean=7.07) AN 5.73 5.65 7.43 9.63 7.11 
NA 5.45 7.17 7.64 9.07 7. -3 
NN 7.48 8.07 9.44 8.64 8.41 
Mean 5.77 6.42 7.86 8.2 -Z 
Split-Pictorial AA 3.63 4.15 6.21 5.94 4.98 
(Mean=6.34) AN 5.60 4.65 7.37 7.33 6.29 
NA 6.31 6.60 6.33 7.56 6.70 
NN 6.74 7.74 7.59 7.46 7.38 
Mean 5.57 5.84 6.88 7.07 
Pic: tor iaI AA 4.65 4.65 7.87 8.33 6.37 
(Mean=8.97) AN 6.42 6.64 11.90 10.42 8.84 
NA 6.14 8.48 9.54 13.36 9.38 
NN 8.84 10.25 12.77 13.21 11.27 
Mean 6.51 7.51 10.52 11-4-3 
Mean 5.95 6.59 8.42 8.87 
Table 6.6 . The mean solution latencies (seconds) 
in Experiment 
VII, broken down by Instance, Logical Case and Rules. Each mean 
is based on 16 subjects. Total N=48. 
In the interest of simplicity, Table 6.6 has been 
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collapsed over the Blocks factor. Whilat Blocks reached 
significance (F1,45=36.44, P<0.001) by demonstrating the 
beneficial effect of practice, it did not interact 
significantly with any other factor. 
There was a significant main effect of Rules 
(F1,45=79.71, p<0.001), the introduction of negatives causing 
the expected additive increases in latency. A main effect of 
Logical Case (FI, 45=36.83, p-, ', 0.001) indicated, in line with 
pre vi ous experiments, that responses were slower for the more 
complex logical cases. There was a significant interaction 
between these two factors (FI, 45=6.77, p<0.025). These effects 
are in line with Evans and Newstead (1977) and with the ot her 
truth table evaluation experiments reported here. 
The main effect of Instance did not quite achieve 
significance (F2,4771=2.71, p<0.10). However ac1 ose inspection 
of Table 6.6 will reveal that there was a tendency, in most of 
the cells, for Pictorial instances (Mean solution time 8.97 
seconds) to be evaluated more slowly than Verbal instances 
(7.07 seconds) which were slower than Split-Pictorial ones 
(6.34 seconds). 
Finally, the mean response latencies associated with 
each type of response ('Conforms', 'Conflicts' 
. 
and 
'Irrelevant') were calculated for each cell. As previously, no 
evidence of any significant relationship between response type 
and latency was found. 
(The Analysis of Variance tables for Experiment VII are shown 
in Appendix J). 
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DISCUSSION. 
Experiment VII replicated the finding that Pictorial 
instances are evaluated more accurately than Verbal instances, 
although at a non-significant level. However this was only the 
case when the Pictorial instance displayed the features for 
evaluation in a conjoint or 'gestalt' manner. When the 
pictorial features are displayed discretely, as in the 
Split-Pictorial condition, they appeared to be si<3nif icantly 
more difficult than both alternative modes, at least for the TT 
Logical Case. The overall tendency was similar, though not 
significant, for the TF case. 
Consideration of the introduction to this experiment 
leads one to the conclusion that the facilitation engendered by 
conjoint pictorial instances is not due to their pictorial 
qualities 12er_se. It appears to be more closely linked in some 
way to the conjoint or 'c; estalt' properties with which they are 
associated. 
Unf ortunately, there was a non-signif icant indication 
in this study that the response latencies were fastest in the 
Split-Pictorial condition and slowest in the Pictorial one, 
with those in the Verbal condition lying somewhere in-between. 
As a consequence it is worth exploring the possibility that the 
results are simply due to the effect of a speed/error 
trade-off. 
A close examination of the response latencies in 
Table 6.6 shows that the largest overall differences between 
the three Instance Conditions occurred with the FT and FF 
Logical Cases. Whilst the span c3i this tendency, between the 
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fastest (Split-Pictorial) and slowest (Verbal) Instance 
Conditions, in the TT and TF cases was only 0.94 and 1.67 
seconds respectively, in the FT case this was increased to 3.64 
seconds and in the FF case it was a massive 6.14 seconds. Now, 
a glance at Table 6.5(iii) and (iv) will reveal that, if 
anything, less 'Irrelevant' responses were made in the 
Pictorial Condition with both of these Logical Cases. If it is 
accepted that 'Irrelevant' is the subjectively correct response 
with the FT and FF Logical Cases, as the literature reviewed in 
chapter 1 suggests, then a simple speed/error trade-off account 
would lead one to expect more such responses in conditions 
where the time advantage appears greatest. Since this was not 
the case, it is suggested that the effect of Instance on 
frequencies was not simply the result of a trade-off between 
speed and accuracy of response in Experiment VII. 
GENERAL DIS 'CUSSION. 
The main aim of the experiments presented in this 
chapter was to shed further light on an interesting effect that 
was first noticed in Experiment II. In that experiment it was 
shown that Pictorial instances led to more subjectively correct 
responses than verbal instances in the truth table evaluation 
task. On that occasion it was possible that the result was 
arte+actual and was related to the inconsistent ordering of 
colour and shape features presented in the conditional rule and 
the verbal instance. In Experiment VI, various manipulations 
were introduced into a similar task in order to rule out this 
criticism. 
Once again, Pictorial instances led to superior 
performance over Verbal ones. The relationship between ordering 
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of features in the rule and instance was not important to the 
ef+ect since the two Verbal Instance conditions in which this 
was varied were not significantly differentiated from each 
other. There appears, then, to be some genuine facilitation in 
this task when pictorial rather than verbal instances are used. 
A possible reason for the effect was investigated in 
Experiment VII. The verbal instances presented in the previous 
studies were colour-words paired with shape-words. Whereas 
these represent discrete features with verbal presentation, the 
pictorial conditions combined these features to make diagrams 
of coloured shapes. It was possible that it was this 
conjointedness, rather than pictorial qualities ptn_22, that in 
some way led to superior reasoning performance. The results of 
Experiment VII lend support to this explanation for when the 
features are represented pictorially, but in a discrete manner, 
performance was inferior to that found both in the Verbal and 
also the conventional Pictorial conditions. 
It seems that discrete features in conjoint pictorial 
instances are more salient or discriminable than in alternative 
verbal instances. However, although consistent with the present 
data, this explanation appears to be at variance with Seymour's 
(1979) discussion of the relative characteristics of pictorial 
gestalts versus verbal symbols. He writes that "conceptually, 
the distinction is between a representation which has the 
characteristics of a literal, image-like gestalt, and one which 
is in the form of a logical structure specifying relationships 
among labelled dimensions" (Seymour, ig-9, p239). 
Whilst 
conveying referentially synonymous material, he maintains 
that 
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a pictorial representation emphasises 'global' properties 
whereas a verbal description emphasises the analysis of the 
object into component parts. If this were the case it would 
have been expected that the written instances would lead to 
superior logical performance to the conjoint pictures with 
Experiments II, VI and VII. This is because truth table 
evaluation with conditional rules demands an analysis of the 
component dimensions 0f the instances. It is diff*icult to 
reconcile the present iindings with Seymour's assumptions about 
the unanalysed nature of the pictorial code. 
The present results are also surprising in view of 
the revised version of Wason and Evans' (1975) Dual Process 
theory of reasoning. In its revised form, Evans (1980b) aligned 
logical performance with verbal processes and non-logical 
performance with non-verbal processes. In c-hapter 2 some 
parallels were drawn between this theory and that of Paivio 
(1975) who distinguishes between imagery and verbal systems of 
thinking. Paivio suggests that whereas the imagery system is 
specialised for processing non-verbal, concrete information and 
is analogical in nature, the verbal system is specialised for 
abstract logical thought. In view of these theories, how could 
it be that a verbal logical reasoning process -is facilitated by 
a pictorial rather than verbal presentýation? 
There are other aspects of pictorial examples, 
engendered by their gestalt qualities, that are worthy of some 
consideration. For instance., the facilitating effect of 
pictures might be related to realism effects in reasoning. 
There is a considerable body of evidence to show that certain 
concrete content in an appropriate context can lead to improved 
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performance in reasoning (see Wason and Johnson-Laird, 19-72; 
Evans, 1982). Some of the ideas contained in a recent book by 
Nisbett and Ross (1980) might be relevant at this juncture. 
Nisbett and Ross argue that people give inferential 
weight to information in proportion to its vividness. They 
define vividness as "the emotional interest o-f in-formation, the 
concreteness and imageability of information, and the sensory, 
spatial and temporal proximity of information" (Nisbett and 
Ross, 1980, p62). They suggest that more vivid information is 
"likely to be disproportionately available for influencing 
inferences at any time after the information is initially 
encountered. The inferential impact of more vivid information 
usually is apparent immediately upon receiving the information, 
however, as well as after a delay" (Nisbett and Ross, 1960, 
p62). They contend that "the vividness of information exerts a 
disproportionate impact on inferences via processes quite 
separate f rom memo ry (Nisbett and Ross, 1960, p45). In the 
present case the literal, gestalt nature of a Pictorial 
instance might render it relatively concrete when compared to 
discrete descriptions whether they are of a Verbal or pictorial 
nature. 
As this discussion illustrates there are several 
important issues which are raised by the present experimental 
findings. The attempt to resolve these and to relate these 
matters to the revised Dual Process theory of reasoning will be 
deferred until c-hapter S. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INTERPRETATION OF THE EXPERIMENTS IN RELATION TO THE THEORY OF 
WORKING MEMORY. 
In the present chapter some implications o+ the 
experiments reported in the previous three chapters will be 
discussed in so far as they are relevant to the mode 1 of 
Workinc3 Memo ry proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974). Account 
wi II also be taken of the substantial refinements and 
modifications which have been detailed in the subsequent work 
of the original authors and their colleagues. According to 
Baddeley (1981) the Working Memory system that was initially 
proposed was not intended as a 'predictive' model. He writes 
that "we (Baddeley and Hitch) were sure that W01 would prove far 
more complex than our original conception, and that given the 
state of our knowledge, any attempt to make a rigidly specified 
predictive model was bound to fail. What we proposed was muc h 
more in the spirit of a tentative map of new terrain, giving 
broad guidelines and suggesting areas for more detailed 
explanation. The evaluation of this type of theory rests on its 
fruitfulness in generating new knowledge and fresh insights" 
(Baddeley, 1981, pIS - 19). 
The experiments reported in the previous three 
chapters were performed during the period from 1978 to 1981. 
The original intention of the research was to assess the nature 
of the processes underlying conditional reasoning performance, 
in view o+ the theoretical statements o+ Evans (1980a; 1980b). 
It was considered that the interference methodology employed by 
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Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Hitch and Baddeley, 1976), which. 
involved articulatory suppression, would be a use+ul technique 
to adopt in order to test Evans' claims. However, the results 
of the initial experiment were +ound to have important 
imp I icat ions f or the theory of Working Memory, quite apart +rom 
their relevance to Evans' proposals. As a consequence, aspects 
of the succeeding studies incorporated elements designed to 
test features of the contemporary model of Working Memory. 
THE DEVELOPED THEORY OF WORKING MEMORY. 
Inevitably since the experiments were completed, 
major re-Finements to the Working Memory model have proved 
necessary. The latest version of the model with which the 
author is familiar is that of Baddeley (1983). In this version 
Baddeley describes t V4 C3 C3 + the maj or subcomponents of the 
system, toc3ether with the central executive - "the core of the 
system that is responsible for coord i nat i ng information f rom 
the subsidiary slave systems. The central executive is assumed 
to function as a limited capacity attentional system capable of 
selecting and operating control processes and strategies" 
(Baddeley, 1983, p315). The concept of the articulatory loop is 
modified and is now "assumed to consist of two components, a 
phonological input store and an articulatory rehearsal process 
involving subvocal speech" (Baddeley, 1983, p316). This 
development was considered necessary in order to accommodate 
various results (eg. Salame and Baddeley, 1982) referred to in 
chapter 3. The visuo-spatial scratch-pad has also been more 
clearl-f described since the investigations of Baddeley and 
Lieberman (1980), amongst others. 
Baddeley (1976,1979,1983) is clearly committed to 
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the view that concurrent articulation of irrelevant material 
prevents access to the articulatory loop and thus prevents 
subvocal rehearsal of other relevant material that is presented 
visually. As Baddeley (1983, p317) writes "it is assumed that 
the phonological store can be accessed either by subvocal 
speech, an optional strategy, or directly through auditory 
speech input, an obligatory process". Indeed registration in 
the store is obligatory with auditory presentation whether or 
not the subject is engaged in subvocal rehearsal, but, with 
visual presentation, "such registration occurs onll if the 
subject is able to subvocalise the items as they are presented" 
(Baddeley, 1983, p-717). He also suggests that "under normal 
conditions, visually presented items will be recoded 
phonologically so as to take advantage of this supplementary 
storage" (Baddeley, -1983, p317). 
The sentence verification experiments of Baddele)i and 
Hitch (1974; Hitch and Baddeley, 1976) and of Hammerton (1969) 
have employed articulatory suppression as a secondary task. In 
the former studies a marginally significant disruption was 
produced by it relative to a silent control condition. In the 
latter study the effect was significant at a conventionally 
accepted level. These data suggest that verbal reasoning may 
have an articulatory component. Indeed, in a subsequent study, 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974, experiment IV) endeavoured to disrupt 
any short-term storage component of their reasoning task by 
manipulating orthogonally the phonological and visual 
similarity of the letters concerned in the problems. Examples 
of the letter-pairs used are: M-C low phonological and low 
visual similarity, T-D high phonological and low visual 
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simi larity, X-y low phonological and high vi sua IsimiI ar i ty 
an dB-P high phonological and high visual simi lar it, /. It has 
been shown that the short-term memory span for verbal materials 
is dependent upon phonological coding (Conrad, 1964; Wicklgren, 
1965; Lev-,,,, 1971 - see review Chapter 3). visual similarity is 
Usually -found to have little or no effect on the memory span 
for letters. Baddeley and Hitch's results showed the expected 
sign'if icant effect of phonological similarity with little 
effect of visual similarity. They found that significantly 
fewer correct solutions were achieved in three minutes when the 
problems contained phonologically similar materials. On the 
basis of these results BaddeIey and Hitch (1974, p210 - 211) 
ar-3, -te that "the verbal reasonirg task does require the use of 
phonemically coded information, and although the effect (of 
phonological similarity) is small, it is highly consistent 
across S's". The fact that verification latencies on the basic 
task increase considerably when a concurrent memory load of six 
digits is held, the increase being greater for more complex 
sentences, led Baddeley and Hitch to a further conclusion. The 
trade-off between verification latency and additional storage 
load "suggests that the interference occurs within a limited 
capacity work-space', which can be +lexibly allocated either 
to storage or to processing'' (Eaddeley and Hitch, 1974, p209). 
Baddeley (eq. 1979) has suggested that the 
articulatory IC30P would be employed in tasks where word order 
is crucial to comprehension. He has also suggested that, in 
comprehending prose, subvocalisation aids the accurate 
processing of complex information (Baddeley and Lewis, 1981). 
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Furthermore the work of Besner, Davies and Daniels (1981) and 
Baddeley, Eldridge and Lewis (1981) suggest that articulatory 
suppression prevents the formation of an articulatory code 
rather than a phonological code. The effects of suppression are 
most evident on accuracy rather than latency measures in 
various tasks. Nevertheless, Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Hitch 
and Baddeley, 1976) did not find any disruption of response 
frequencies under various articulatory conditions in their 
sentence verification task. In fact the error rates remained at 
a consistently low level (about 5- 10%) throughout all the 
conditions. The effects of articulatory conditions were 
confined to the latency measure. Of course the failure to cause 
disruption to solution rates could be attributed to a ceiling 
effect with this-relatively simple task. 
THE WORKING MEMORY MODEL AND CONDITIONAL REASONING. 
Several of the experiments presented in the last 
section of this thesis have employed conditional reasoning 
paradigms. Although they are of a basically similar design to 
the simpler sentence verification task, there are several 
important differences. Unlike the simpler task in which errors 
are few and where latency is the more sensitive measure, 
conditional reasoning tasks have been shown to be sensitive to 
various experimental manipulations on both response latency and 
frequency measures (see Chapter 1 and Evans, 1982). 
Furthermore, with these tasks, the order of terms and the 
placement of negatives are crucially important matters for 
consideration. In fact, the complexity of these problem solving 
tasks is evidenced by the relatively high error rates which are 
typical of them even under normal circumstances. All of these 
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considerations should lead one to expect, in view of the claims 
of Baddeley noted above, very substantial reliance on the 
articulatory loop with visually presented conditional reasoninc3 
problems. The effects of articulatory suppression on 
conditional tasks should be drastic either on response 
latencies or, more especially on response frequencies. Finally, 
the imposition of a concurrent memory load should produce very 
clear evidence of an interaction with problem complexity 
factors since these should compete for use of the limited 
capacity central executive component of the Workinc3 Memory 
system. 
A summary illustrating the main effects of 
articulatory Groups on response latencies for the conditional 
reasoning experiments (I, II, III and VI) and the simpler 
sentence verification experiments (IV and V) is given in Table 
7.1(a). The main effects of articulatory Groups on response 
frequencies is given in Table 7.1(b). 
In Experiment I, a conditional inference task was 
performed, using vi si-ka I presentation, under various 
articulatory suppression conditions. The results as a whol e 
show a high incidence of logical errors as is characteristic of 
conditional reasoning tasks. However there was no evidence to 
show that loads imposed on Working Memory increases the 
frequency of reasoning errors. This is surprising in view of 
the complexity of the reasoning task used. Whilst Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974; Hitch and Baddeley, 19-6) found little disruption 
of performance in terms of errors on sentence verification, 
they reconciled their data with the Working Memory model with 
2- 6 -: ) 
Table 7.1 . The main effects o+ artiCLklatory Groups (Control, 
Articulation, Memory) on Conditional Inference (CI; Experiment 
I), Truth Table Evaluation (TTE; II, III and VI) and Sentence 
Verification (SV; IV and V). 
(a). Mean solution latencies (seconds). 
Experiment Instructional Group Variance P 
Emphasis CON. ART. MEM. Ratio 
I (CI) Accuracy 8.59 6.1-7 11.6ý 3 F2,30=9.66 <0.001 
II (TTE) Accuracy ct 4.17 3.80 7.63 F2,45=3.95 <0.05 
vt 4.22 Z. 16 4.18 F2,42=4.50 <0.025 
III (TTE) Accuracy ct 5.52 5.01 6.52 F2,33=1.96 NS 
vt 5.59 4.31 5.51 F2,33=0.88 NS 
VI (TTE) Speed ct 3.57 3.58 -- FI, 34=0.04 NS 
vt 3.54 2.98 -- FI, 30=1.72 NS 
IV (SV) Accuracy 3.34 3.93 5.12 F2, "11=4.73 <0.025 
V (SV) Accuracy 4.48 5.04 5.28 F2,33=0.60 NS 
ct = comprehension time, vt = verification time. 
b) . Percenta_q2_L2nL2S: t_L2. Rj2ond i n_g_,. 
Experiment Instructional Group Variance P 
Emphasis CON. ART. MEM. Ratio 
I (CI) Accuracy 79 71.78 Since sp-parati-, arýalystc, 
II (TTE) Accuracy 80 62 72 wo-rt pe-r+orrntok 
ý*, r UXAN 
III (TTE) Accuracy 60 59 67 logir--&I caso-, t: ý, tso- F 
VI (TTE) Speed 65 55 -- ra. 'Ljoy. are- not a-valhl)lt, 
IV (SV) Accuracy 83 87 75 F2,21=2.27 NS 
V (SV) Accuracy 89 82 76 F2,33=4.90 1%0.025 
The percentage correct figures for Experiment I combine only 
the unambiguous (MP and MT) logical cases. The figures for 
Experiments II, III and VI combine 'subjectively correct' 
responses to the four logical cases, conforming to a truth 
table for defective implication. 
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re-ference to their latency data. 
In the present case, latencies were slowed in the 
concurrent memory load group relative to silent controls in 
accordance with Baddeley and Hitch. However , latencies were 
significantly : LAster than controls under concurrent 
articulation 2gL_jg. This contrasts with the data of Baddeley 
and Hitch and that of Hammerton (1969). In both of these cases 
an increase in reasoning latency occurred under irrelevant 
articulatory conditions when no memory load was imposed. Whilst 
certain activities, such as skilled reading, are not slowed 
down by suppression because they do not require the loop 
(Baddeley, 1979), the results of Experiment I cast doubt on 
suggestions that complex, novel verbal reasoning problems 
require the use of the articulatory loop. 
The latency data also deviate from those of Baddeley 
and Hitch for other reasons. Increased disruption should occur 
for more complex problems when a concurrent memory load is 
imposed because of increased competition for the 
limited-capacity central executive store. The presence of 
negatives is a manipulation of problem complexity, and as 
expected the more negated problems were more slowly processed. 
However this complexity -factor did not interact with 
articulatory Groups in the manner predicted by the Working 
Memory hypothesis. Similarly the significant effects of 
Inference on latency (consistent with previous literature) 
might have been expected to interact with Groups but did not. 
The surprising effects of Groups on reasoning latency 
obtained in Experiment I were replicated in Experiment II which 
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employed a different conditional reasoning paradigm known as 
Truth Table Evaluation. On this occasion latencies were able to 
be split into comprehension times (CT) and verification times 
(VT) as had been done previously by Evans and Newstead (1977). 
In fact Groups produced signiiicant eifects on both time 
periods. In both cases the mean times were fastest under 
concurrent articulation without a memory load, as in Experiment 
I, but this effect only achieved significance for VTs. 
The overall effect of the Memory group is in line 
with the Working Memory hypothesis. However, the expected 
increase in latencies under memory load conditions was only 
observed on CTs. It was argued in the discussion of El(periment 
II (Chapter 4) that the diminished effect of the memory load in 
VTs cou Id be explained as a result of the subjects rehearsing 
the 'novel' digits several times during the preceding CT 
period. Some of the irýformation could thus have been committed 
to memory before subjects actually attempted to solve the 
reasoning task. Once the list is memorised, the memory load 
condition reduces to reasoning with concurrent articulation. 
This sort -o+ interpretation is not inconsistent with the 
Working I'lemory hypothesis o+ Eaddeley and Hitch. 
However, another aspect of the latency data in 
Exper iment II appears to be in conf 1 ict wi th the Work i ng Memory 
hypothesis. There were two significant interactions between 
Groups and problem complexity factors in this experiment. In 
the CT analysis Rules and Groups interacted significantly. 
Although the usual additive effect of negatives in the rules 
was apparent in the Control group, the effect was less rather 
than more marked under concurrent articulation both with and 
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without a memory load. In the VT analysis there was a 
significant interaction between Logical Case and Groups. Once 
again the effect of problem complexity was reduced for the 
articulatory groups. 
In the present context, the apparent facilitation 
under Articulation is perhaps the most interesting aspect of 
the first two experiments. The fact that it is characteristic 
of VT, as indicated by the significant difference between 
Articulation and Control Groups found in Experiment II, 
suggests that the effect is on the process of reasoning rather 
than on the time taken to read and understand the conditional 
rule. On this basis it could be argued that the sentence 
verification task used by Baddeley and Hitch is mainly one of 
comprehension whereas conditional probjems require more 
operations in the verification stage. 
A possible explanation of the 'speeding-up' effect of 
Articulation relative to Control will now be considered. It 
will be remembered that Groups exerted a significant effect on 
logical responding in Experiment II. In the analyses of all- 
four logical cases performance was better, in that more 
subjectively correct defective truth table responses were 
given, under Control conditions and the worst performance was 
observed under Articulation. Similarly in Experiment I, the 
direction of er rors, t hough not significant, was for the 
Articulation group to make most with Control and Memory at a 
similar level. One possible explanation for these results is 
that Articulation subjects are induced to speed up for some 
reason, with consequent cost in reasoning accuracy. Baddeley 
(personal communication) has suggested that subjects might find 
the articulation process aversive and speed up to avoid it. He 
thinks that the instruction nplease do not rush on the 
problems", used in all but one of the seven experiments 
reported here, may induce subjects to take longer over the 
problems than they might feel to be necessary. The lesser 
evidence of interference in the Memory groupq who are also 
articulating, presumably arises because the memory task forces 
them to go slower, and gives more time to think about the 
problems. If this explanation is correct, it implies that 
articulatory suppression 122n_22 may not inhibit logical 
reasoning, unless it induces the subject to spend less time on 
the task. 
In Experiment VI a conditional reasoning task, 
essentially similar to that used in Experiment II, was 
employed. However, amongst other changes that need not concern 
us here, the instructions required subjects to "answer the 
problems as quickly as possible consistent with high accuracy". 
If Baddeley is correct, latency differences between the Control 
and Articulation groups should be considerably reduced. Then, 
if error differences are the result of a speed/error trade-off, 
these should also be eliminated between the Groups, unless the 
interference due to articulatory suppression is S2n. uinR. On the 
face of it, the results of Experiment VI give marginal support 
to this view, since instructions emphasising speed reduced both 
latency and error differences between Articulation and Control 
groups. This suggests that articulatory suppression 2. gr R2 does 
not disrupt reasoning, unless it induces faster responding. 
It is not, howevery usual to observe speed/error 
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trade-off relationships on complex reasoning tast<s. On the 
contrary, increased errors are normally associated with lon32n 
latencies. We must therefore ask why concurrent articulation 
should accelerate responses in the first place? Baddeley's 
suggest ion that subjects are avoiding the aversive effects of 
the competing task is not very plausible. In Experiment II, it 
wou Id have t C3 be supposed that subjects were willing to 
sacri+ice accuracy, contrary to instructions. Another 
consideration is that, unless suppressed, we would expect some 
form of subvocalisation to be present on these tasks. 
Electromyographic studies generally find evidence of 
micromovements and electrical potentials in the speech organs 
during problem solving, especially when the problems are novel 
or complex (cf. McGuigan, 1966; Sokolov, 1972). Let us suppose 
that such subvocalisation is helpful, but tends to slow down 
the thought process. The effect of articulatory suppression 
would, then, be to speed up solution times and cause some loss 
of accuracy. Certainly the results of Experiments I and II are 
compatible with this suggestion, so +ar as Control and 
Articulation groups are concerned. As was previously suggested, 
the longer latencies in the Memory group probably re+lect an 
initial period a+ rehearsal and registration. 
Why, then, did the differences in latencies and 
errors reduce to insignificance in Experiment VI? If the 
instructions are effective in making subjects go faster, then 
it may be that Control subjects are forced to dispense with the 
luxury of subvocalisation. According to this view, the change 
Of instructions should hinder the performance of the 
Control 
subjects more than that of the Articulation subjects, who are 
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already denied access to an articulatory stratec)),. Comparisons 
between the two experiments (see Table 6.4) are in line with 
this hypothesis. Mean latencies of Control SUbjects were 1.0ý4 
seconds faster in Experiment VI than Experiment II, whereas the 
difference +or Articulation subjects was only 0.11 seconds. The 
mean percentage of responses conforming to the defective truth 
table dropped from 80% to 65% between the Control groups, and 
from 62% to 55% beývjeen the Articulation groups. 
On balance, then, the present results suggest that 
the use of implicit speech slows down problem solving to some 
benefit. However, it appears that this conclusion may not be 
generalisable across tasks, since Sokolov (1972) reports that 
articulatory suppression increases the latency of mental 
arithmetic, when inexperienced subjects are used. On the other 
hand, he does report cases of accelerated solution times under 
suppression for hic3hly skilled and practiced subjects who may 
have less need of articulatory processes. Anagram solving does 
not appear to suffer under concurrent articulation (Peterson, 
1969), and neither is it speeded up, in the light o+ an 
unpublished experiment by Evans and Brooks. It may be that an 
articulatory strategy is simply irrelevant to this particular 
task . 
Where does this leave the articulatory loop and the 
Working Memory model? The general tone of the above discussion 
appears compatible with Baddeley's (1979) amended concept of 
the loop as an optional control strategy. It is necessary, 
however, to examine the discrepencies between the present 
results and those of Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Hitch and 
Baddele-,,, 1976). First, the subjects in the conditional 
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reasoning tasks speeded up under articulatory st-i. ppression, 
whereas theirs did not. Second, their latency data showed 
interactions between interierence tasks and linguistic 
complexity factors, wh ich the present data does not. Both 
discrepencies could arise from the +act that their relatively 
simple task was primarily a comprehension task, whereas 
conditional tasks have a greater reasoning requirement. The 
Control groups in the present experiments had a much higher 
base rate time, which is well beyond that required to read the 
sentences. It could well be that the conditional tasks induced 
a relatively lengthy verbal reasoning process with 
accompanying subvocalisation - with much more scope for 
speeding up. In support of this interpretation, the latency 
difference between Control and Articulation was significant for 
VT but not for CT in Experiment II. Whilst this difference was 
not signif icant for either analysis in Experiments III and VI, 
the tendency in both studies was more marked on VT. Also, the 
interactions with linguistic complexity on Baddeley and Hitch's 
task could arise from comprehension processes that would 
account for a relatively small component of conditional 
reasoning latencies. 
Nevertheless, if the interference under suppression - 
most noticeable in Experiment II is due to impairment of 
Working Memory function, then it should be related to the 
difficulty of the problems. Analyses of variance were run 
separately for the four truth t&ble cases in Experiment II (cf. 
Table 4.3), but it does appear that the magnitude of the 
interference was greater for FT and FF than for TT and TF. The 
drop in defective truth table responses averages 21 % in the 
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former cases and only 10% in the latter. It is certainly 
reasonable to regard the TT and TF cases as easier, in the 
sense that most psychologists studying conditional reasoning 
believe that subjects are predisposed to consider cases where 
the antecedent condition is fulfilled (see Chapter I and 
Evans, 1982, chapter 8). 
EFFECTS OF SUPPRESSION ON SPECIFIC CODING REQUIREMENTS. 
It was argued above that subjects may habitually 
subvocalise on complex conditional reasoning tasks, but that 
articulatory suppression causes subjects to dispense with this 
strategy. This could account for subjects speeding up under 
suppression conditions. A specific manipulation was introduced 
into Experiment III to test this interpretation of the data. 
. 
It had been suggested by Baddeley (1979), in view of 
Kleiman's (1975) finding that rhyme judgements are slowed under 
suppression, that the articulatory loop would be required when 
making judgements of phonological similarity. This claim has 
been withdrawn in view of subsequent data (eq. Baddeley and 
Lewis, 1981; Besner, Davies and Daniels, 1981). However 
Experiment III was designed to test the possibility that 
habitual dependence on a slow phonological process would recur 
with complex conditional reasoning tasks. Different conditions 
of this experiment required judgements of a visual, 
phonological or semantic nature. In view of Kleiman's data, it 
is possible that the condition requiring rhyme judgements would 
not be associated with faster responding under suppression. 
On 
the other hand if the accuracy of rhyme judgements is impaired 
by suppression, as the Besner et al study suggests, then an 
increase in logical errors might have been expected in this 
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condition. 
In fact the interaction, in Experiment III, between 
art i cu. I atory Group and task Conditions -failed to reach 
significance in any of the analyses of response frequency. 
Similarly, the analyses of response latency failed to achieve 
significance. However, the latencies on both CT and VT produced 
the same overall pattern of results with Articulation faster 
than Control for all three task conditions. The Memory group 
also tended to be faster than Control on VT for Visual and 
Semantic conditions, but this was not the case with Rhyme 
judgements. The only interaction between Groups and a 
linguistic complexity factor occurred, as with Experiment II, 
in the CT analysis. As previously, there was less evidence of 
the additive effect of negatives in the Articulation groupsy 
with the effect of negatives disappearing completely for the 
Memory group. 
At this stage, it was considered expedient to attempt 
a replication of Baddeley and Hitch's original study (Baddeley 
and Hitch, 1974, experiment III; Hitch and Baddeley, 1976, 
experiment III) in order to check whether procedural 
differences or differences between the subject populations 
studied were responsible for the differences between their 
results and those of Experiments I to III. Experiment IV was 
successful in replicating their results with tachistoscopic 
presentation, using instructions which emphasised accuracy 
rather than speed of responding, and with Groups as a between 
rather than a within subject factor. Similar results were 
obtained whether word-pairs or letter-pairs were used as 
Stimulus materials. The mean solution latencies showed the 
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Control group to be fastest, the Memory group slowest, with the 
Articulation group somewhere in between. There was a 
significant interaction between Groups and Sentence Polarity 
which showed that the relative difficulty of negative 
statements was increased under memory load. 
As mentioned earlier, the sentence verification task 
used by Baddeley and Hitch has been claimed to require 
utilisation of phonologically coded information, although the 
disruptive effect of articulatory suppression does not always 
achieve significance. However, if increased load were to be 
pI aced on the articulatory system then the effects of 
suppression should be more severe. It is surprising that no 
such effect was observed in Experiment III with conditional 
reasoning when rhyme judgements, and presumably phonological 
coding, were required. However, since it has already been shown 
that conditional tasks respond differently to interference 
methods, it was appropriate to repeat the manipulation of 
coding conditions on the Baddeley and Hitch task. 
In Experiment V subjects were required to attend to 
visual, rhyming or semantic characteristics of stimulus words 
on the simpler sentence verification task. A fourth condition, 
with no particular code required, was also included. 
The 
suppression Groups were identical to those previously employed. 
Experiment V was thought to provide a more powerful test of 
the 
hypothesis that articulatory recoding enhances the ability to 
make rhyme judgements about visually presented words. 
Once 
again, an interaction between coding Condition and articulatory 
Group was expected. The e++ects of suppression were expected 
to 
be considerably more marked in the Rhyme condition. 
In the 
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Visual condition, where subjects might have been induced to use 
a visual code, a diminished effect of suppression was 
anticipated. The Condition in which no particular code was 
specified was simply expected to produce results equivalent to 
those of Baddeley and Hitch, and the replication study 
(Experiment IV). 
Whilst the main effect of Groups on response latency 
was not significant in Experiment V, the general trend was the 
same as in the Baddeley and Hitch task. However the failure to 
repeat the Hitch and Baddeley effect on latencies is underlined 
by another finding. Although there was a significant 
interaction between Groups and Polarity, it was of the wrong 
sort with the negation effect being least marked for the Memory 
group. Could these results be reconciled with those of Baddeley 
and Hitch on the basis of frequency data? The effect of Groups 
was significant in the analysis of response frequencies in the 
direction that would be expected by Baddeley and Hitch. 
However, there were no interactions of the sort that the 
Working Memory model predicts in the analysis of response 
frequencies. The expected interaction between Groups and 
Conditions did not materialise in the analyses of either 
response latencies or frequencies of Experiment V. Experiment 
V provides no evidence in support of the claim that these 
versions of the sentence verification task require the use of 
phonologically coded information, or that they demand the 
interplay of the articulatory loop and the central executive 
component of Working Memory. 
it appears that the results of Experiments III and V 
are not compatible with Baddeley's (19-? ) suggestion that rhyme 
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judgements require the use of the loop. In view of more recent 
evidence, this difficulty is quite simply dealt with. 
Baddele-, /'s claim rested primarily on Kleiman's findinc3 that 
rhyme judgements were slowed by concurrent shadowing of a 
series of digits. However, this might be due to the perceptual 
rather than the articulatory component of the shadowing task. 
Baddeley and Lewis (1981) have reported the results of a series 
of experiments which demonstrate that there is no more than a 
minimal effect of concurrent articulation on rhyme judgements. 
Besner , Davies and Daniels (1981) did obtain effects of 
concurrent articulation on both latency and accuracy of rhyme 
judgements but judgements of homophony (AIL - ALE) and 
pseudohomophony (KRAYDEL - TRAYDEL) showed effects only on 
accuracy. These effects were obtained in experiments in which 
subjects were instructed to articulate 'as quickly as you can'. 
When the effect on pseudohomophony judgements of articulation 
at 170 w. p. m. was studied, the accuracy effect which had been 
obtained previously was absent. These data, together with those 
of Experiments III and V, suggest that the substantial and 
robust effects that would be expected if rhyme judgements 
depended on the articulatory loop do not occur. Clearly rhyme 
judgements require the use of some sort of phonological code 
but seemingly not the one on which the articulatory loop 
depends. 
It is appropriate at this point to reconsider the 
relevance of this series of experiments to the hypothesis that 
concurrent articulation interferes with some slow habitual 
phonological (or articulatory") process which is not essential 
to carrying out the reasoning task accurately. It was 
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previously suggested that if this hypothesis is valid then the 
reduced reasoning latencies should be absent from a condition 
in which the use o+ a phonological code is en+orced by a 
requirement to make rhyme judgements. However, since rhyme 
judgements a. re not disrupted by concurrent articulation, the 
form of phonological coding they enforce must be different from 
that referred to by the hypothesis above since the latter is ex 
jjy2othesi suppressed by concurrent articulation. Hence 
Experiments III and V do not constitute a crtical test of the 
hypothesis. 
It has been shot-in how one of the difficulties which 
the present results create for the proposals of Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974) and Baddeley (1979) can be resolved by abandoning 
the assumption that rhyme judgements rely on the articulatory 
loop. Baddeley has already abandoned this assumption in his 
more recent papers (Baddeley and Lewis, 1981; Baddeley, 1983). 
For example he writes "although articulatory suppression 
appears to prevent phonoloc3ical coding, as indicated by the 
phonological similarity effect, it does not hamper a subject's 
ability to judge whether two written words rhyme or not" 
(Baddeley, 1983, p-)18). He speculates that, since most people 
can still 'hear' an inner voice despite suppression, some form 
of auditory imac3ery might be involved. 
The effects Of articulatory suppression in the 
present experiments are hard to reconcile with the traditional 
idea (see Chapter 3) that 'inner speech' is essential to 
problem solving thought. Whilst this view has its origins in 
the work of both Pavlov and Watson, it is particularly 
influential in the appoaches of psychologists such as Luria 
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(1959) and V-/cjo t, s ky 19 6 2- ). According to this viewpoint it 
should surely have been expected that drastic interference with 
logical reasoninc3 performance would occur under art i culatory 
suppression. 
At this point let us reconsider the Russian work, 
reviewed by Sokolov (1972), which has been offered in support 
of the traditional 'inner speech' approach. In his book several 
techniques which have been employed to suppress articulation in 
problem solving experiments are described. These include 
physically clamping the lips and tongue as well as a concurrent 
articulation technique similar to that used in the present 
experiments. Although disruption of performance on many 
cognitive tasks is found, there were also a few cases reported 
of accelerated solution of mental arithmetic problems under 
concurrent articulation. However, these were generally 
restricted to well-practiced subjects. Similar acceleration was 
noted on some rare occasions when subjects were translating 
foreign text but, once again, this usually occured with 
experienced individuals. 
In general, 'speeding-up' under concurrent 
articulation only occured rarely with practiced subjects on 
relatively simple, stereotyped tasks. However, those results do 
not parallel the present findings in that, in the present case, 
naive subjects were attempting complex problems, and the 
7 speeding-up' effect did not interact with the practice 
(Blocks) factor in any of the experiments. It is reasonable to 
assume that an articulatory strategy is commonly employed in 
problem solving tasks because it is well-learned and habitual. 
However, its habitual nature might also lead to its utilisation 
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on some occasions when a more e++icient alternative strategy 
would have been appropriate. 
A REASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY OF WORKING MEMORY. 
One general conclusion that can be drawn from the 
present research is that the artici.. Llatory loop is not ess-e. ntial 
to logical thought. For example, the correct classi+ication o+ 
TT and TF in Experiments II, III and VI is well above chance 
level in the Groups given articulatory suppression. Also the 
effects of articulatory suppression pe. L se lead, if anything, 
to faster reasoning latencies with only a marginal drop in 
reasoning accuracy. The possibility that a speed/error 
trade-off was responsible occasioned by the instructional 
emphasis on accuracy rather than speed, particularly in 
Experiment II, received only marginal support from Experiment 
Vi. 
The other remaining di+ficulty +or the Working Memory 
hypothesis is that the effect of a concurrent memory load on 
conditional reasoning does not generally produce interactions 
with problem complexity of the kind that their model predicts. 
There was only a hint of this in Experiment II where the more 
complex logical cases appeared to be more severely affected by 
suppression. Indeed even the results of one of the sentence 
verification studies (Experiment V) do not appear to be 
compatible with the Working Memory hypothesis on this count. 
Therefore in so far as some of Baddeley and Hitch's 
(1974) results lack generality, they provide a doubtful basis 
for a c3eneral model of short-term memory and in particular for 
the calculus of information processing capacity which is 
incorporated in their model. The present results lead to the 
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suggestion that the articulatory processes described by 
Baddeley may not play the central role in verbal reasoning that 
was originally thought. Although conditional reasoning appears 
to satisfy many of the criteria that should implicate an 
interaction between the articulatory loop and the central 
executive components of Working Memory (eg. complex verbal 
information requiring attention to the ordering of words) , few 
of the results that have arisen in conditional reasoning 
paradigms appear to be compatible with the Working Memory 
model . 
Baddeley admits that the central executive 
"represents the most complex aspect of working memory and the 
most di+ficult to analyse and conceptualise" (Baddeley, 1983, 
p77) . This is why most o+ his research has concentrated on the 
more peripheral 'slave' components. In this way he has 
gradually reduced the number of functions that need to be 
assigned to the central executive. He has recently claimed that 
"it may ultimately prove unnecessary to assume a central 
processor ..... if control is exercised by 
the interaction of the 
various subsystems without recourse. to a central controller" 
(Baddeley, 19e3, p7? - 78). Some modifications to the model 
appear to be needed in order to explain why dual tasks, which 
shou Id require allocation of the central processor's limited, 
general-purpose, storage capacity, apparently are able to 
proceed concurrently with little mutual interference. 
Monsell (1984) has expressed an alternative viewpoint 
to Baddeley's which will now be considered. He suggests that 
'working memory' "is merely a label for heterogeneous storage 
capacities intrinsic to diverse domain-speci+ic subsystems" 
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(Monsell, 1984, p327). He makes the point that language 
processing, for instance, requires the interplay of various 
subsystems, some of which "deal with modality-specific, 
relatively peripheral input or output processes, some with 
lexical mappings between modality-specific representations and 
meaning, some with analysis or generation of supralexical - 
syntactic, conceptual and prosodic - structure" (Monsell, 1984, 
p330). It is argued that distributed processing is most 
compatible with distributed storage - "capacities for temporary 
storage specific to and intrinsic to each processing module" 
(Monsell, 1984, p331). In this case working memory is the 
summation of specific storage capacities and no '$general 
purpose' storage capacity need be assumed. 
Multiple short-term storage capacities are argued to 
be associated with various representational domains, each 
specific to the various characteristics of language units (e9. 
auditory, phonological, articulatory, visual, imaginal, 
lexical, syntactic, conceptual). In this case dual task 
interference will be expected when competition for at least one 
22ecific capacity is engendered by tasks which might otherwise 
be quite different. Monsell suggests that each of the domains 
of processing could be organized with respect to various 
temporal, spatial, serial-order, syntactic and semantic 
relationships together with several kinds of 
'process-management' information. On the other hand 
interference might be the result of competition for executive 
controlling processes. 
The Working Memory theory of Baddeley and Hitch has 
proved extremely fruitful in that it has generated a wealth of 
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research activity. As a result of this, it has been successful 
in generating new knowledge and +resh insights. The approach 
that they, and their colleagues, have adopted is typical a+ 
what Lakatos (1971) de+ines, in his paper on the history and 
philosophy o+ science, as a 'Research Programme'. This consists 
of a nconventionally accepted hard core with a positive 
heuristic which defines problems, outlines the construction of 
a belt of auxiliary hypotheses, foresees anomalies and turns 
them victoriously into examples, all according to a 
preconceived plan" (Lakatos, 1971, p99). It is the positive 
heuristic that guides research activity. Falsification, in the 
Popperian sense, does not imply rejection of this sort of 
theory. Anomalies need to be recorded and publicly displayed 
but they need not be acted upon, at least until they become 
sufficiently numerous or important to herald the demise of the 
original Research Programme and the accession of a more 
plausible rival account. 
Lakatos makes a distinction by which Research 
Programmes can be evaluated. He distinguishes between advancing 
problem shi+ts, which occur "as long as its theoretical growth 
anticipates its empirical growth" (Lakatos, 1971, pIOO), and 
stagnatinc3 problem shifts, which occur when its "theoretical 
growth lags behind its empirical growth, that is, as long as it 
gives only 2ast_hoc explanations either of chance discoveries 
or of facts anticipated by, and discovered in, a rival 
programme" (Lakatos, 1971, plOO). Baddeley's admission that the 
Working Memory model was not intended to be predictive is 
disadvantageous in that it characterises a stagnating problem 
shi+t. Hyland (1981) SkJc3c3ests that these are typical of 
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psychological research which tends to be "data or methodoloqý, 
oriented" (Hyland, 1981, p13). 
The data obtained via the experiments described in 
the last three chapters do not appear to be compatible Nith the 
Workin(3: Memory theory in its original formulation. However, the 
current account that Baddeley (1983) gives of Working Memory is 
substantially modified from its previous form. As a last 
resort, the number of discrete stores proposed has been 
increased in the light of anomalous data. A hint has been given 
by Baddeley that even the notion of a general, limited 
capacity, central executive store might prove unnecessary 
(Baddeley, 1983). Eventually it is possible that Baddeley's 
description of Working Memory will not differ substantially 
from rival accounts such as that of Monsell (1984). 
23S 
CHAPTER 8 
INTERPRETATION OF THE EX 'PERIMENTS IN RELATION TO EVANS' 
DEVELOPED DUAL PROCESS THEORY OF REASONING. 
The initial object of this research project was to 
investigate the-idea that reasoning data reflect the operation 
of dual thought processes. This hypothesis Was originally 
suggested by the theory of Wason and Evans (1975). In chapter I 
it was shown how Wason and Evans' theory underwent modification 
as a result of subsequent research. In the light of this, Evans 
(1980a; 1980b) hypothesised specifically that the logical 
component of performance reflects a verbal-rational Type 2 
process, and the non-logical component a non-verbal and 
non-rational Type 1 thought process. 
In chapter 2 some possible connections between the 
revised Dual Process theory of reasoning and other theories of 
high-level cognitive performance were considered. Several 
parallels were drawn between the former theory and the account 
of Paivio (1971; 1975). If the Type 2 process corresponds to 
Paivio's verbal system, then it was considered feasible that 
the Type I process corresponds to his visual system. This would 
imply, perhaps, that 'Matching Bias' has an imagery component. 
'Matching Bias' is clearly demonstrated in 
conditional reasoning when negatives are introduced 
into the 
rules. The bias has been demonstrated in various paradigms such 
as the Wason Selection Task and studies where Truth 
Tables are 
either constructed or evaluated. The logical relevance of an 
item appears to be subjectively determined by the extent 
to 
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which the combinations of values mentioned in the rule and the 
instance correspond (see, for example, Table 1.10). Although, 
Evans (198-3a, discussed in Chapter 1) has shown that 'Matching 
Bias' can be reduced in a Truth Table evaluation task when the 
items mentioned in conditional rules are explicitly negated 
(eg. 'not a 3') rather than implicitly negated as is usually 
the case, it is plausible that explicit negation merely induces 
subjects to f avour a verbal strategy thus leading to reduced 
'Matching Bias'. It could be that, normally, subjects are more 
inclined to use an imagery strategy which might be expected to 
increase the subjective relevance of values which are 
perceptually present, irrespective Of their logical 
significance. 
In order to test the revised Dual Process theory, it 
was decided to adopt selective interference methods. Since the 
notion that the Type I process may be imagery related is rather 
tentative and without direct empirical support, it was decided 
to concentrate initially on the verbal/non-verbal distinction. 
A technique was required which might be expected to interfere 
selectively with a verbal process. In view of the extensive 
literature reviewed in chapter -7, it was thought that the 
methodology known as articulatory suppression mi ght prove 
appropriate in the present case. I+ Evans is correct then 
suppression might be expected to disrupt the logical component 
of reasoning performance relative to the non-logical component. 
However, before Evans' approach is assessed in the light of the 
data obtained from the various experiments presented in 
c. hapters 4 to 6, it is worthwhile considering how the truth 
table evaluation task might be solved under ideal 
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circumstances. 
A COMPETENCE MODEL FOR TRUTH TABLE EVALUATION. 
In this section a competence model for truth table 
evaluation, based on an unpublished account of Evans, will be 
described. It is anticipated that, with the aid o+ this model, 
the locus of various experimental effects will be more easily 
ascertained. The model is presented in Table 3.1 . 
gp2rations: 
1) Represent the rule. 
2) Represent the instance. 
3) Compare the representations of rule and instance. 
a) Note whether the attributes of the instance match 
or mismatch the named attributes of the rule, 
ignoring the presence of negative components. 
Store the following information in the truth index: 
TT if both values match 
TF if only antecedent matches 
FT if only consequent matches 
FF if neither match. 
b) Inspect 
. 
polarity of each component. wnen a 
negative is found, reverse the sign of the 
corresponding part of the truth index. 
4) Compare value of truth index with stored truth table 
of the rule. 
5) Output response in accordance with truth table. 
Table 8.1 - Competence model 
for solution of a truth table 
evaluation task. 
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The model- illustrated in Table 8.1 is used to 
describe an ideal strategy, to account for the logical 
component of performance. Deviations of observed behaviour from 
this competence model will be explained with reference to 
non-logical processes. The model assumes representation and 
processing stages. The representation of the rule may occur in 
a propositional form, in which the presence of negatives is 
preserved. However, it is also plausible to assume that items 
could be encoded in some other manner (eq. phonologically or 
visually) depending upon the strategy occasioned by specific 
task demands. As we shall see, the representation of the 
instance appears to depend upon the manner in which it is 
presented, but with verbal instances a propositional form might 
normally be the case. In accordance with propositional (eq. 
Clark and Chase, 1972) and mixed imagery/propositional (eg. 
Beech, 1980) models o+ sentence-picture verification, it is 
assumed that a truth index is set by a match or mismatch of 
named values (operation 3. a) and subsequently reversed due to 
the presence of negatives in the rule (operation 3. b). The 
difference is that on conditional rule evaluation, the subject 
must determine two truth values (antecedent and consequent), 
and must refer the combination to a truth table (operation 4) 
in order to determine his response. 
Let us consider an example of how the model would 
work. Suppose the following problem, using a verbal instance, 
is presented: 
IF THE COLOUR IS RED THEN THE SHAPE IS NOT A SQUARE. 
BLUE SQUARE 
The subject encodes the rule in two parts, antecedent and 
consequent, eq. ANT (RED), CON (Not(SQUARE)). When the encoded 
instance is compared to this, the colour (BLUE) mismatches, but 
the shape (SQUARE) matches, so the result of operation 3-a is 
that FT is stored in the truth index. 
At operation 3. b it is observed that the consequent 
is negative, so its stored truth value is reversed leading to 
the truth index value of FF. Finally, the subject looks up FF 
in his stored truth table and responds accordingly (operations 
4 and 5). Assuming a truth table for defective implication, he 
responds 'irrelevant'. 
Deviations from the competence model can be explained 
by assuming that the logical process competes for control with 
a non-logical tendency to disregard negatives and to consider 
mismatching items as irrelevant. This leads to the 'Matching 
Bias' effect. Also, the various stages are error prone but it 
is more likely that errors will occur at the comparison stage 
(3. a). These fgssibilities will be considered further in due 
course. 
It is also necessary to explain why errors tend to be 
+ewest with TT and TF logical cases, which lead to determinate 
('True' or 'False') responses, and substantially increased with 
FT and FF logical cases, which lead to an indeterminate 
('Irrelevan t7 ) response. It is assumed that determinate 
responses are most reliably and quickly available +rom the 
stored truth table. However, when no determinate response is 
prompted on an initial run-through, there is an increased 
tendency to cycle back to the comparison stage (3. a) +or a 
rapid check and more weighting is given to the non-logical 
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matching process on this second run-thro, -kgh. 
How does this view correspond to the revised Dual 
Process theory? Essentially it is saying that the logical 
process has greater control with the TT case, and usually for 
the TF case, and thus more correct responding is achieved with 
these logical cases. It is in the 7 defective' region of the 
truth table where the process tends to fail most often (Evans 
and Newstead, 1977), and here that non-logical processes take 
over. 'Matching bias' is a plausible idea for a subject who is 
'stuck' on the task. 
VERBAL INTERFERENCE AND THE DUAL PROCESS THEORY. 
The results of the experiments reported in SSection 2 
of this thesis give modest support to the hypothesis that 
articulatory suppression selectively disrupts reasoning 
performance in the manner expected according to the revised 
Dual Process theory of reasoning. In Experiment II there was 
significant evidence of disruption of logical performance by 
suppression. Also, in support Evans' predictions, the 'Matching 
Bias' effect - attributed to a non-verbal process - was not 
affected by presence of verbal interference tasks. The 
logically correct classifications of TT and TF cases were 
significantly reduced under concurrent articulation (with and 
without memory load). Also the modal 'irrelevant' response to 
FT and FF was reduced in the Articulation group. Although 
significant, the decrement was of modest proportions. Whilst 
the direction of this effect was similar in Experiment VI, the 
effect was far from significant in the analyses of variance. In 
Experiment III, the effect disappeared altogether. 
The results of Experiment I appear to be even less 
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encouraging. For example, Groups did not interact with 
In+erence rate. However, i+ we look more closely at the two 
inferences which are logically necessary regardless of 
interpretation, a slight trend in the expected direction is 
observed. MP dropped from 97% in the Control group to 921% in 
the Articulation group and MT dropped f rom 60% to 51%. The 
awkward group to explain is Memory. When the concurrent 
articulation task incorporated a memory load this, quite 
contrary to expectations, affected the non-lo_gical component of 
performance on the inferential task. However, it is concurrent 
articulation which is essentially verbal, and the presence of 
this in itsel+ (without memory load) does not alter 'Conclusion 
Bias', while it is associated with slightly more logical 
errors. There was not a comparable effect of articulatory 
suppression on the non-logical factor ('Matchincj Bias') in any 
of the Truth Table Evaluation studies (Experiments II, III and 
VI) . 
It was found in Experiment II, in line with previous 
research (eq. Evans and Newstead, Ic? 77), that negative 
components increased latencies in both CT and VT. The effect of 
negatives in either component was additive. This result fits 
the model (Table 8.1) well if it is assumed that CT is the time 
taken to complete operation 1, and VT measures the time taken 
for the other operations. Thus, in line with previous models of 
sentence-picture veri+ication (e<q. Clark and Chase, 1972; 
Beech, 1980), encoding negatives takes longer and accounts for 
the CT effect. Also reversing the value of the truth index 
takes time and this accounts for the VT ef+ect. 
Let us suppose, in view of the finding that 
"' 95 
suppression tends to speed up conditional reasoning, that a 
subject habitually encodes items phonclogically (or in an 
articulatory manner). If concurrent articulation is introduced 
then such encoding is prevented and so the subject switches to 
an alternative faster code which may be visual or semantic. The 
speeding up effect is most marked on the VT period because more 
operations involving the code occur at this stage (Encoding of 
the instance and comparison with the sentence value). 
There was a facilitating effect on comprehension and 
verification latencies in the visual condition of Experiment 
iir when compared with conditions emphasising phonoloc3ical or 
semantic characteristics. This effect will now be considered 
with re+erence to the competence model described above. Only 
operation I can be completed in the CT period. Since faster 
latencies were observed for the visual condition in both CT and 
VT, this effect cannot-be explained simply in terms of the time 
taken to represent the instance. Also if the effect were due to 
instance recoding time, one would expect a comparable effect of 
pictorial versus verbal presentation in the VT analysis of 
Experiment-II, where no significant difference was observed. It 
is quite possible that the Visual condition of Experiment III 
induces a visual mode o+ processing that operates throughout 
the various reasoning stages. It is per+ectly reasonable to 
suppose that the need to consider phonological or semantic 
characteristics includes more complex cognitive mechanisms than 
those involved in colour discriminating, and are consequently 
slower to operate. 
In conclusion, the hypothesis that reasoning data 
reflect distinct types of thought has received some support in 
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these experiments but it is only of modest proportions. The 
disruptive effect of the competing verbal task was not as large 
as might have been expected in view of Evans' (1980a; 1980b) 
theoretical position. However, in view of support given to 
Evans by the hemispheric studies of Golding ( Golding, Reich 
and Wason, 1974; Golding, 1980; 1981) which were considered in 
chapter 1, the Dual Process hypothesis cannot be dismissed as 
incorrect. On balance, the Dual Process hypothesis might be 
correct, but the verbal interference task used in the present 
studies could have been c hosen inappropriately. Articulatory 
suppression might be expected to inhibit verbal thinking, if 
the latter results f rom 'inner speech' based on implicit 
articulation, an approach that was discussed in chapter 7. 
However, it is possible that the logical component of reasoning 
data is the result of verbal processes which are not exlusively 
articulatory in nature. 
THE EFFECT OF PICTORIAL VERSUS VEREALINSTANCES. 
A+ter considering various links between the revised 
Dual Process theory of reasoning and the theory of Paivio (see 
Chapter 2), it was decided to investigate the possible 
influence of visual imagery in the reasoning process. In line 
with Paivio's general approach, visual imagery has been 
implicated in problem solving. For instance, in chapter 2, it 
was shown how the data from transitive inference and 
sentence-picture verification tasks are explained 
parsimoniously in terms of theories incorporating visual 
imacjery processes. 
Until the present studies, the possible effects of 
visual imagery in conditional reasoning have not been explored. 
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However, this was done in Experiments II, VI and VII. It was 
suggested in the review (Chapters I and 2) that the non-verbal 
Type 1 process could involve visual imagery processes. If this 
were the case then it might be expected that an), manipulation 
which encourages the use of a visual strategy would enhance 
non-logical tendencies such as 'Matching Bias'. 
This hypothesis was first tested in Experiment II b>, 
manipulation of the verbal versus pictorial display of the 
instance to be evaluated in a truth table task. Results doubly 
con+ounded expectations, since the manipulation (i) had no 
effect on 'Matching Bias' and (ii) led to significantly ýýtteL 
logical performance with pictorial presentation. Furthermore, 
in Experiment III the design necessitated the use of verbal 
instances, but in one condition subjects were required to 
attend to only a visual (colour) characteristic. Whilst this 
did not affect the frequency of correct decisions, a 
facilitatory effect Was found in that both comprehension and 
verification times were faster in this condition. 
Compared to the effects of articulatory suppression 
and the effects of coding manipulations of Experiment III, it 
is harder to explain the increase in logically correct 
responding in the Pictorial conditions of Experiment II. In 
terms of the model, this result suggests either that instances 
are encoded more accurately (operation 2) or else compared more 
accurately at operation 3. a - Once the match/mismatch 
decision 
has been achieved, it is hard to see how the mode of instance 
can have any further effect upon the chances of a lo<31cal 
decision. 
In Experiment II, there was a possibility of encoding 
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errors being increased in the Verbal condition due to a 
confounding factor. The order of the shape and colour values 
was inconsistent in the rules and instances. As a consequence, 
the subject had to reverse the attributes of the verbal 
instance in order to encode it in a comparable form to the 
rule. With pictorial instances features could be extracted in 
an optional order. If this was the cause of the effect 
observed, then it need have nothing to do with verbal and 
visual mechanisms as such. However, if this was the 
explanation, it would be surprising that the reversal involved 
in encoding the Verbal instance did not result in increased 
VT's- In any case, the possibility that the facilitative effect 
of pictures might be due to this confounding factor was 
eliminated in Experiment VI. Once again, pictorial presentation 
of the instance led to superior responding and no ef +ect on 
'Matching Bias' was observed. It appears that the effect is 
genuine and it is unlikely to be the result of errors during 
the encoding stage. It appears more likely that the effect 
arises in the comparison stage. 
In Experiment VII a possible reason why pictures 
should lead to better performance than verbal descriptions was 
tested. This relates to the combination of features into a 
'gestalt' with the picturial instances. This can be compared to 
the discrete naming of features which is typical of verbal 
descriptions. It was found that when the values mentioned in 
pictorial instances were presented in a discrete manner, 
performance was, if anything, inferior to that with verbal 
information. It appears that the effect is in some way 
dependent on the 'gestalt' nature of pictorial instances. 
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It is worth considering whether the facilitating 
effect of pictures, relates to realism effects in reasoning. In 
r, hapter I several studies were mentioned which were originally 
taken to indicate that the more plausible the context, ant the 
more realistic the reference of the materials, the better 
people perform (see. Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972; Evans, 
1982; Griggs, 1983). In Experiments II, VI and VII the 
sentences refer to coloured shapes. In the verbal conditions 
subjects are given descriDtions of such shapes, whereas in the 
conventional pictorial condition they are given the actual 
coloured shapes themselves. Thus the verbal condition is 
relatively hypothetical, and the pictorial relatively concrete. 
However, it will be remembered that Griggs (1983) argues that 
the facilitatLng effects of realism, for instance when they 
occur in the Wason Selection Task, are most likely caused by 
the cueing effects of thematic materials from long-term memoryq 
instructional effects or changes in the problem context. These 
explanations are not plausible in the present case where 
identical instructions and problem contexts were used for all 
instance conditions. 
The facilitation of reasoning with the pictorial 
instance is hard to reconcile with a unitary propositional 
approach. One could only explain it in such terms by assuming 
that subjects made additional errors in encodin_9 a verbal 
instance. For, once encoded, pictures and words are treated as 
semantically identical according to a pure propositional 
approach. It is implausible, however, to suppose that any 
significant process of error should influence the encoding of 
two well defined attributes. I+ the error difference arises at 
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the processing stage, however, then the two types of problem 
are evidently, not semantically equivalent. 
On the other hand, the results do not appear to fit 
very well to the notion of dual coding such as that of Paivio, 
for instance. I+ the pictorial instance induces use of a visual 
code it would be expected to inhibit rather than facilitate 
verbal reasoning. The point is that images are associated with 
concrete rather than abstract logical thought (cf. Paivio, 
1975). For example how does one represent a negative - such as 
'not red' in a visual image7 Also why should a 7gestalt' 
representation of the instance lead to improved performance in 
conditional reasoning when the very nature of the task demands 
an analysis of that instance into its constituent parts7 
The most plausible answer to this is that a mixed 
model is appropriate and that the particular strategy that a 
subject uses is dependent upon the apparent demands of the 
task. These kinds of explanation have been considered in 
r-hapter 2. On those occasions, applications were to other 
problem solving tasks such as those involving transitive 
inference or simple sentence-picture verif. ication. An 
explanation in similar terms, appropriate to a more complex 
sentence-picture verification task, is not wholly 
unprecedented. The basis of the present explanation is a model 
proposed by Snodgrass (1980; 1984) for picture-word processing. 
It is illustrated in Figure 8.1 . This model predicts both 
amodal and modality specific effects dependent upon particular 
task demands. It was originally developed to characterise 
similarities and differences between pictures and words 
(Snodgrass, 1980) and has recently been extended to 
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characterise similarities and dif+erences between words in one 
language and their translations into another (Snodgrass, 1984). 
EXTERNAL 
WORLD 
INTERNAL 
WORLD 
LEVEL I 
OUTPUT INPUT INPUT OUTPUT 
(Speech k (Visual & (Visual) (Drawing) 
Writing) Auditory) 
IPICTUREI IPICT 
U-R-E7 
PHYSICAL CODE 
MISMATCH 
ACCUMULATOR 
LEVEL II 
CONSCIOUSý 
W 
UNCONSCIOUS 
LEVEL III 
PROTOTYPICAL 
ACOUSTIC 
IMAGE STORE 
ACOUSTIC 
IMAGE 
GENERATOR 
PHYSICAL CODE 
PROTOTYPICAL 
VISUAL 
IMAGE STORE 
VISUAL 
I MAGE 
ENERATOR 
PROPOSITIONAL STORE 1111 
ACCESSIBLE ACCESSIBLE 
BY WORDS 
IBY 
PICTURES 
Figure 8.1 .A schematic diagram of a model 
for picture- and 
word-processing. From Snodgrass (1984) figure 1. 
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The model consists of three levels -jhich are 
described in the following manner. Level I consists of the raw 
codes which result from low-level processing of words presented 
either visually or auditorily or -for pictures presented 
visually. Physical attributes are extracted and stored at this 
level. These include characteristics such as voice and 
intonation, or typeface and colour for words presented in the 
auditory or visual modality respectively. For pictures, 
orientation, amount of detail and other simple physical 
properties are extracted and stored. 
Level II consists of prototypical information about 
words and pictures generated, or potentially available, in the 
form of acoustic or visual images (eg. the sound of words, or 
how objects look). The stores at this level are prototypical in 
that they represent only the basic characteristics leaving out 
non-essential details. Snodgrass suggests that these images are 
available to introspection. It is also suggested that the 
acoustic image prototype store corresponds to the products of 
inner speech and is accessed during-verbal thinking. The visual 
image prototype store is assumed to correspond to the products 
of visual imagery and is accessed during visual imaging and 
visual thinking. However, since images can be in a. potential 
form within these stores, one does not necessarily experience 
an image. Also, it is possible to experience partial 
information as in 7tip-of-the-tonque' states. The -, isual and 
acoustic image generators are assumed to be limited in 
capacity. Each can perhaps produce only a single image at a 
time. However, both genertors can be used in parallel so that 
ø3 
simultaneous visual and acoustic images can be experienced but 
not two images within a single modalit,,. 
In recognising speech, written language or pictures, 
information is assumed to be accumulated about the degree of 
mismatch between the physical image store at Level I and the 
prototypical image store at Level II. More mismatch information 
is accumulated when the written or spoken word does not 
correspond to the prototypical visual or acoustic image stored 
at Level II, such as when a word is written in an unusual 
typeface or spoken in a strange accent. Similarly, if the 
picture of an object differs in some way from the image that 
has been generated, more mismatch information will be 
accumulated. 
Level III is the propositional or semantic store. 
This is viewed as an abstract set of nodes and 
interconnections. It is unavailable to introspection and, as a 
consequence, is labelled at the unconscious level. However 
access to this store is available in both directions- via the 
image stores. In the case of the visual image store, only 
concepts and relationships which can be pictured are available. 
It is assumed that words can access more nodes in the 
propositional store than pictures although there is a degree of 
overlap in the case of concrete objects. 
In Figure 6.1 direct connections are drawn between 
the image stores. This allows for the possibility that 
picture-word matches can be made without accessing the 
propositional stores although it is suggested that this is not 
usually the case. It is more usual to make-access between these 
stores via the propositional route. This because it has proved 
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useful in the past, such as when verbal thou3hts are amb i quous 
and input from p ropos i t,, -, a I memory is called upon t C3 
disambiguate them. 
The model outlined above can be seen to include 
aspects of dual coding in that two imagery systems are 
described at Level II. But, unlike in Paivio's account, the 
meaning of images is contained in the propositional s/stem. It 
was stated that, typically, access between the two systems is 
made via the propositional system rather than directly. However 
Snodgrass (1980, p575) claims that comparisons among entries in 
the two image systems can be made but "only on the basis of 
shared feature values; thus phonemic and visual similarity 
judgements can be made within Level II but conceptual 
similarity judgements must be made by accessing Level III". 
Snodgrass suggests that the propositional level corresponds to 
the propositional memory of unitary propositional theorists. It 
also includes Pylyshyn's (1973) assumption that the operation 
of this system is not available to introspection. 
Let us see how this model can help to explain the 
facilitating effect of picturial over verbal instances in the 
present studies of conditional reasoning. When rules and 
instances are both presented verbally, each is processed via 
the same (left-hand) route in Snodgrass's model. Some confusion 
regarding the features attributed to rýles might be occasioned 
when verbal instances are simultaneously processed for 
comparison at Level II. There may be a tendency to forget or 
over-write relevant features at this stage particularly in view 
of the limited capacity of this store. This disruption would 
lead to the generation of a faulty truth index in terms of the 
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truth table evaluation model presented in Table 8.1 with a 
consequent reduction in correct responding. 
When the rule is presented verbally and the instance 
pictorially, each is likely to be processed via different 
routes in terms of Snodgrass's model. Whilst verbal and 
pictorial features could be compared for identity at Level II, 
there would be little likelihood of confusion between -features 
extracted from the rule and from the instance due to their 
association with distinct modalities. Furthermore, when the 
rule and instance are presented in modality specific manners, 
there is a markedly reduced likelihood of over+lowin3 the 
limited storage capacity available in specific stores at Level 
II. Thus performance is facilitated with pictorial instances. 
In the case of 'Split-Pictorial' instances, used in 
Experiment VII, per+omance on the truth table evaluation task 
was poorer than with either conventional pictorial or verbal 
instances. It is possible that subjects were unable to combine 
the discrete features into an effective visual image in this 
condition or that they were induced, to their disadvantage, to 
employ -a verbal strategy. Paivio (1971) suggests that both 
imaginal and verbal coding systems are available in certain 
circumstances (see Figure 2.2). However, the verbal system is 
more specialised for dealing with information that is 
sequential in nature. The features of the 'Split-Pictorial' 
instance, being presented separately, might be translated into 
a format more suited to a sequential system of thinking. 
Contrary to expectations, the use of conventional 
pictorial rather than verbal instances did not increase 
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'Matching Bias'. This finding does not, however, refute Evans' 
revised account of the Dual Process theory. This is because 
Evans' (1980a; 1980b) attributes the non-logical factor to a 
non-verbal but not necessarily a visual thought process. 
A REASSESSMENT OF THE REVISED DUAL PROCESS THEORY.. 
In spite of the relative lack of support which the 
present series of experiments have given to the revised version 
of the Dual Process theory, it has received some support from 
Golding's hemispheric studies (see Chapter 1). As a result of 
links drawn between the theory and Paivio's dual coding account 
(see Chapter 2), it seemed feasible that the non-verbal process 
might, in fact, be visual in nature. 
A final attempt to interfere selectively with 
possible visual and verbal processes was made in another 
experiment, not reported in the main experimental Section, 
which will be described briefly. Subjects attempted a version 
of the Wason Selection Task (see Chapter 1) presented on a 
mini-computer. Eight trials were given and bothAA and AN rules 
were incorporated so that logical and non-logical aspects of 
performance could be distinguished. Prior to each reasoning 
trial, a verbal or pictorial item was presented on the V. D. U. 
for memorisation. In a Control condition no additional memory 
load was imposed. The verbal item consisted of a randomly 
generated +ive-digit number. The visual item consisted of a 
design incorporating five rectangles stacked one on top of 
another but distributed randomly to the left or to the right of 
a vertical axis. It was felt that the visual design could not 
easily be memorised in a verbal manner. The memorised item was 
to be identified from amongst four similar items present.: --d 
30- 
. 
-:, 
simultaneously after the reasoning trial was completed. It was 
hypothesised that the influence of the logical factor ('Truth 
Value' ) would be diminished by the verbal interference relative 
to the Control group, whereas the influence of the non-logical 
factor (' MaLtc hi ng Bias') would be diminished by the visual 
inteierence relative to the Control group. The percentage of 
items selected by each Group, broken down b>, Logical Case (and 
Matching Case) for both AA and AN rules, is shown in Table 6.2. 
Interference Rule 
Group AA 
Lo gical Case 
TA FA TC FC 
Control 66 21 54 30 
Verbal 57 30 36 39 
Visual 61 29 68 27 
Mean 61 27 53 32 
(Matching Case) (P) (T5) (q) (4) 
AN 
Lo gical Case 
TA FA TC FC 
77 34 48 59 
70 --72 39 5-7 
70 25 52 54 
72 -70 46 57 
(P) (j5) (5) (q) 
TA=True Antecedent FA=False Antecedent 
TC=True Consequent FC=False Consequent 
Table 8.2 . The percentage of 
items selected by Control, Verbal 
memory load and Visual memory load groups. Each point 
is based 
on 14 subjects. Total N=42. 
In fact, neither of the experimental hypotheses were 
confirmed. The results shown in Table 8.2 
indicate that 
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reasoning performance is consistent with previous research for 
all three Groups. Neither the main effect nor any interactions 
involving Groups approached significance. As regards the memory 
task, errors were at about 10% overall for both the Verbal and 
Visual interference groups. 
Unfortunately, the present research has been 
unsuccessful in its attempt to selectively in+. luence the 
non-logical tendency known as 'Matching Bias'. Whether or not 
it is the result of a visual thought process remains a mystery. 
However, no evidence has been derived from the present series 
of experiments to support this hypothesis. 
The extent of disruption of the verbal-logical 
process caused by articulatory suppression was not of the 
magnitude expected, in view of Evans' developed Dual Process 
theory, but this could be due to an inappropriate choice of 
verbal interference. After all, the suggestion that a process 
is verbal in nature does not ný? cessarily tie it to an 
articulatory process. 
Despite its lack of success in terms of the 
hypotheses tested, an interesting finding did emerge from the 
Selection Task experiment just described. Account was taken, by 
the computer, of the order in which cards were selected or 
rejected by subjects. Obviously, the relative (left to right) 
positions of the four 'cards' presented for consideration were 
randomised independently for each trial. The mean rank order of 
the decisions for each card, designated by Matching Case, is 
shown in Table 8.2 
It was found that the order of selection or rejection 
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of the cards was dominated by the cards matching value rather 
than its logical status. P was selected before F and q before -4 
for both rules, although the logical significance of q and 
ij are reversed in the two rules. This effect was significant 
for both rules combined. Evans (1983b) has interpreted this 
findi-nq in support of his recent suggestion that 'Matchinc3 
Bias' is the result of selective processing. He supposes that 
"the subject is more likely to attend to matching values and 
consider their logical significance" (Evans, 1983b, p139). 
Rule p q 
If p then q. 2.15 2.80 2.38 2.66 
If p then not q. 2.08 2.81 2.41 2.69 
Table 8.2 Mean rank decision order for selections on two 
rules in the Wason Selection Task. From Evans (1983b) table 
5.1. 
The increased attention given to values which are 
present is suggested to result from a 'bias to positivity' 
which is pervasive in human thought. Various studies in the 
literature, and the present experiments, confirm that negatives 
lead to increased difficulty in comprehension. It is also 
stressed that negatives are employed to deny affirmative 
statements. In Evans' (1983b, p141) words "linguistically, 
negatives make statements about affirmatives". In rules such as 
'If the colour is red then the shape is not a square', 
attention is still directed to the features actually present 
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(ie. 'red' and 'square') rather than alternative possibilities. 
Evans (1983b, p141) concludes that "accuracy of performance is 
then a consequence of whether subjects' attention is directed 
t C3 the logically important, rather than psychologically 
salient, aspects of the problem". 
In chapter 1, a. recent experiment by Evans (198-7a) 
was discussed which demonstrated the influence of linguistic 
factors on the non-logical 'Matching Bias' phenomenon. The 
extent of 'Matching Bias' was significantly reduced in a truth 
table evaluation task when instances explicitly, rather than 
implicitly, negated the features present in the rule. This 
demonstrates the influence of linguistic factors on the 
png2222in_9 rather than just the initial representation of 
problem information. The possibility that linguistic effects do 
not wholly explain 'Matching Bias' is suggested by the marked 
extent of it remaining even in the explicitly negated group. 
In conclusion, only modest support is derived from 
the present project for the revised Dual Process theory of 
reason i ng (Evans, 1980a; 1980b). There is a little evidence 
that interfering tasks of a verbal nature selectively disrupted 
the logical component of reasoning performance. The magnitude 
of interference caused by articulatory suppression is modest 
and achieved significance in only one of the experiments. 
However, it is possible that Evans' verbal-logical process is 
not articulatory in nature. Attempts to increase the influence 
of the non-logical process proved unsuccessful. It is surmised 
that Evans' characterisation of the non-logical process as 
non-verbal does not necessarily link it to a visual process. 
However, a number of surprising and novel effects of 
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relevance to current issues in cognitive psychology have 
emerged. In chapter 2 the debate between dual coding and 
unitary propositional theorists was considered. The present 
research has produced data which cannot easily be explained in 
terms of either of these approaches. The facilitatory effects 
of manipulations I ikely to encourage visual modes of processi ng 
are best explained in terms of Snodgrass' (1980; 1984) 
tricoding model of picture and word processing. Whilst it isy 
perhaps, premature to suggest specific practical implications 
for this result, it is plainly important to determine whether 
pictorial (rather than verbal) presentation of information also 
leads to improved performance with other tasks where 
presentation mode can be varied. In the interests of effective 
communication and education it is necessary to determine the 
most efficient means of presenting different types of complex 
information. The influence of presentation factors on 
statistical inference are now under investigation by Evans who 
is the holder of a current research grant from the Economic and 
Social Research Council with this as one of its primary aims. 
The second interesting finding is that the articulatory 
suppression technique tends to accelerate solution latencies in 
conditional reasoning whilst interfering very little with 
reasoning performance. Much of chapter 7 discussed the 
relevance of this and other results to the theory of Working 
Memory. 
The field of conditional reasoning has been somewhat 
insular in the past. Much attention has been paid to the role 
of logic, and arguments for and against rationalistic 
explanations of behaviour. The present project has not 
3 12' 
concentrated on such matters. It has explored the nature of 
cogn iti ve mechan i sms underlying reasoning performance and has 
been concerned with areas of interest more central to cognitive 
psychology. The results achieved by various experimental 
manipulations were of ten surprising and were shown to be o+ 
relevance to general issues in cognition. Although little 
support has been found for the revised theory of Dual Processes 
which instigated the present research, the investigations havev 
n eyiýr 4: heI ess, pr oved wor th L-4h iIe. 
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Competing with Reasoning: A Test of the ? -15 Working Memory Hypothesis 
J. St B. T. EVANS & P. G. BROOKS 
PlYmouth Polviechnic 
An experiment is reported in which subjects attempted conditional reasoning problems 
while concurrently articulating a series of digits, with or without memory load. 
Logical performance was not impaired by the competing tasks and the latency of 
responding was actually faster under concurrent articulation, without memory load, 
than in a control group. The results are discussed with reference to the Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974) model of working memory. 
Baddeley and Hitch ( 1974) suggested that the short-term memory store acts as a 
working memory underlying various cognitive activities such as . reading and 
reasoning. Their model of working memory has two components: a central executive and 
an articulatory loop. The latter not only permits rehearsal of items in short-term 
store, but is also supposed to assist in the processing of word-order information 
(see also Baddeley, 1979). Both rehearsal and word-order functions would seem to be 
required for the solution of verbal reasoning problems, in which separate pieces of 
information need to be compared in order for deductions to be made. 
The working memory model may be assessed by use of competing task methodology. 
The logic of such methods is essentially as follows: if task A and B each require 
the use of a common mechanism, then they will compete for its use, with consequent 
interference. A famous example is Brooks' (1967,1968) demonstration that tasks 
requiring mental imagery are subject to interference by concurrent perceptual tasks 
utilizing the same modality. In the case of the articulatory loop, the accepted 
interference task is that of concurrent speaking aloud of irrelevant verbal 
material. This technique, often referred to as articulatory suppression, has been 
used in a number of recent studies of memory and reading tasks (see Baddeley, 1976, 
1979). It appears that the effect of suppression is to deny access of visually 
presented words to the loop. A central executive is assumed to be partially occupied 
by the requirement to hold a short-term memory load (cf. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). 
0143-3887/81/0102-139 S02.00 Q 198 1 Praeger Publishers 
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An investigation of working memory and reasoning was reDorted by Hitch and 
Baddeiey (1976). For example, in their Experiment 111, subjects were asked to solve 
a reasoning problem under one of three conditions: 
1. Control. No accompanying task. 
2. Articulation. Subject said either 'the-the-the' or '1-2-3-4-5-6' repeatedly 
while performing the task. 
3. Memory. Subjects were presented with a different six-digit number at the start 
of each trial and were required to repeat it aloud. This adds a short-term 
memory load to the concurrent articulation task. 
Reasoning accuracy was not significantly disrupted by the interference task, 
although a significant main effect on response latency was oDserved. Control was the 
fastest condition, Memory the slowest and Articulation intermediate. However, the 
reasoning task adopted by Hitch and Baddeiey was relatively simple compared with 
those normally used in the study of logical reasoning. We therefore decided to 
repeat their experiment -with conditional reasoning problems, which are known to 
produce systematic errors under normal conditions (see Evans, 1982). There is 
consequently no risk of a 'floor' effect, and we might expect an increase in logical 
errors under either interference condition. Since Hitch and Baddeley observed 
interference on the latency scores, however, a similar measure was also employed in 
the present study. 
The experiment employed a set of reasoning problems in which subjects were 
invited to make each of four inferences for each of four rules, thus producing 16 
distinct problems (see Table 1). In formal logic only two of these inferences, MP 
and MT, are considered valid. However, in natural language the conditional sentence 
Table 1. The different logical forms used in the experiment 
Inference 
MID DA AC MT 
Given Conclu- Given Conclu- Given Conclu- Given Conclu- 
Rule sion sion sion sion 
If p then q p q 
if p then 
not q p not q 
If not p 
then q not p q 
If not p 
then not q not p not q 
MP Modus Ponens 
DA Denial of the Antecedent 
AC Affirmation of the Consequent 
MT Modus Tollens 
not p not q q p not q not p 
not p q not q p q not p 
p not q q not p not q p 
p q not q not p q p 
3 
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is sometimes used to express equivalence, rather than implication, in which case all 
four inferences are valid. 
It can be seen from Table I that each of tne four inferences results in an 
affirmative conclusion on two rules, and a negative conclusion on two rules. 
Previous research has shown that, all else being equal, subjects prefer to accept 
negative conclusions (e. g. Evans, 1972,1977; Roberge, 1978; Pollard & Evans, 1980), 
which has been interpreted as a non-logical response bias. 
Performance of subjects on the 16 problems was assessed under similar conditions 
to those of Hitch and Baddeley (1976) except that one of the Articulation groups 
(the-the-the) was dropped. 
METHOD 
Design 
Three experimental groups, each consisting of six male and six female subjects, were 
tested on an inference task using conditional rules. 
In the Control group subjects were required to remain silent during the task. In 
the Articulation group subjects were instructed to repeat the heavily overlearned 
counting sequence 'one-two-three-four-five-sixl repeatedly at a rate of about four 
words per second. In the Memory group the subjects heard a spoken sequence of six 
random digits at the start of each trial. They were required to speak the sequence 
repeatedly at a rate of about four words per second. In this condition alone the 
sequence to be articulated was changed on each trial. 
Within groups, subjects were required to evaluate each of the 16 types of 
inference shown in Table 1. To assess the effects of practice, three blocks of the 
16 problems using different lexical content were constructed. A different randomized 
order of presentation of problems within each block was used during each session. 
Also, the order of presentation of the three blocks was varied systematically within 
groups. Each subject thus received a total of 48 problems. 
Subjects 
Thirty-six students at Plymouth Polytechnic, having no previous experience with this 
type of task, served as subjects on a paid volunteer basis. They were tested 
individually . 
Task and Materials 
Subjects were presented with the two premises of each argument, together with the 
appropriate valid or fallacious conclusion (cf. Table 1). They were required to 
decide whether or not the conclusion necessarily followed logically from the 
premises. 
All the arguments concerned shape-colour relationships. One of four shapes 
(triangle, circle, square or 'diamond), together with one of four colours (red, 
blue, yellow or green), were named in systematically randomized combinations for 
each problem. 
4 
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The materials may be illustrated with the following sample problem which uses an 
AC inference with an qf not p then not q' rule. 
Given: 
I. If it is not a triangle then it is not red. 
2. It is not red. 
Conclusion- 
It is not a triangle. 
Problems were presented on a two-field tachistoscope whose onset and offset were 
synchronized with an automatic timer. 
The subject's task was to decide whether or not the conclusion necessarily 
followed logically and to signal his response by pressing a toggle switch to 
indicate 'yes' or 'no'. 
Pr(wedure 
Each subject was read a standard set of instructions in which the nature of the 
logical task was explained. It was emphasized that subjects should press the 'yes, 
key if they considered that the conclusion necessarily followed from the premises. 
If not, they should press the 'no' key. They were told that they would be timed, but 
that accuracy was more important than speed. 
Subjects were then given eight practice trials which differed from the test 
problems in that disjunctive rules were used in place of conditionals. Following the 
practice trials, the instructions to the three groups were as follows. 
Control group Do you understand what you have to do? We will now start on the main 
problems. I will give the signal 'Ready , Start' as in the practice session ... 
Articulation group Do you understand what you have to do? We will now start on the 
main problems. I would like you to carry out an additional task while solving these 
problems. Please say aloud the sequence of numbers '1,2,3,4,5,6'. Speak them 
repeatedly at an even pace, like this (DEMONSTRATE), when I give you the signal 
'Ready, Start'. You may stop counting as soon as you have indicated your answer to 
the problem by pushing the key. I cannot tell you the purpose of this procedure at 
this stage, but I will be happy to discuss it with you after the experiment. Do you 
understand what you have to do? I will give you the signal, 'Ready, Start' as in the 
practice session ... 
Memory group Do you understand what you have to do? We will now start on the main 
problems. I would like you to carry out an additional task while solving these 
problems. Please say aloud the sequence of numbers which I will give you after the 
'Ready' signal. Speak them repeatedly at an even pace, like this (DEMONSTRATE) , when 
I give you the signal 'Ready, Number'. You may stop counting as soon as you have 
indicated your answer to the problem by pushing the key. I cannot tell you the 
purpose of this procedure at this stage, but I will be happy to discuss it with you 
after the experiment. Do you understand what you have to do? I will give you the 
signal 'Ready, Number' as in the practice session ... 
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In the Articulation and Memory groups the problems were presented immediately after 
the subject commenced articulation. The experimenter was vigilant for any 
perceptible drop in the articulation rate throughout the experiment, and prompted 
subjects to maintain the required rate as and when necessary. 
RESULTS 
The percentage frequency with which subjects accepted each inference is shown in 
Table 2, together with a summary of the significant effects in the analysis of 
variance. In order to provide reasonable numbers for the analysis, the subjects' 
Table 2 
(a) The percentage of 'yes' responses (arguments accepted) in each condition broken 
down by polarity of conclusion (n = 12 in each group) 
Inference 
Polarity of 
Group conclusion MID DA AC MT x 
Control Af f irmative 97 46 76 43 66 
Negative 97 63 86 77 81 
Articulation Aff i rmative 90 46 69 35 60 
Negative 93 68 69 67 74 
Memory Af fi rmat ive 90 67 88 58 76 
Negative 85 58 82 77 75 
R 92 58 79 59 
(b) Significant effects in the ANOVA 
Within subjects d. f. F P 
Inference 1,33 40.34 --0.001 
Conclusion 1,33 21.42 --0.001 
Conclusion x Inference 1,33 9.91 --0.01 
Conclusion x Groups 2,33 5.76 <0.01 
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three attempts at each problem were combined in the frequency scores. Since the 
effect of negatives is known to operate through the polarity (affirmative/negative) 
of the conclusion evaluated, the data were organized in this way for the analysis of 
variance. The factors were thus Groups (three levels), Inference (four levels), and 
Conclusion (two levels), the last two being within subject factors. 
As would be expected from previous work, the rate of acceptance of inferences 
was significantly influenced by their logical classification (MP, DA, AC or NIT). If 
the competing verbal tasks interfered with subjects' ability to make such logical 
discriminations, then a Groups x Inference interaction would be expected. No such 
interaction occurred. Owing to the ambiguity of the conditional referred to 
previously we can only clearly recognize responses as 'correct' in the cases of MP 
and MT, which should be accepted. The percentage correct on these inferences 
combined are: Control, 79 per cent; Articulation, 71 per cent; and Memory, 78 per 
cent. There is, then, little support for the hypothesis that competing articulation 
tasks (with or without memory load) should disrupt logical reasoning. 
The results, as a whole, show high incidence of logical errors, as is 
characteristic of conditional reasoning tasks. The normal systematic bias to prefer 
negative conclusions was observed and its interaction with Inference is consistent 
with previous work. Conclusion bias was not, however, expected to interact with 
Groups. It can be seen that the bias is completely absent in the Memory group. 
Hitch and 5addeley (1976) also found little disruption of performance in terms 
of errors, but reconciled the data with their working memory model with reference to 
the latency data. In their study, interference conditions significantly increased 
latencies, and also interacted with the complexity of the problems. More complex 
problems - with greater demands on working memory - were slowed down more under 
interference. Our latency analysis (Table 3) tests for replication of these 
effects. The analysis of variance differed from that of the frequency data by 
inclusion of a Blocks factor, and by the inclusion of a Rules rather than Conclusion 
factor to test for the effect of negatives. Previous research (Evans, 1977; Evans & 
Newstead, 1977) indicates that the presence of a negative in either component slows 
negatives in an additive manner. 
Although the Groups factor was significant in the analysis of variance, the 
direction of effect was unexpected. The order of latency was Articulation fastest 
and Memory slowest, with Control in between. - Two-tailed t tests revealed that the 
acceleration of Articulation responses relative to Control was significant (t 22 = 2.27, P ý--0.05), as was the slowing of Memory relative to Control (t 22 2 2.14, 
P, <0.05). Groups did not significantly interact with any other factor. 
131SCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The present study, like that of Hitch and Baddeley ( 1976), fails to find evidence 
that imposing loads on working memory increases the frequency of reasoning errors, 
despite the much greater complexity of the reasoning task used. The latency 
analysis, however, has shown a quite different pattern from theirs, and one that is 
more difficult to reconcile with the Baddeley and Hitch (1974) model. 
Although articulation with memory load significantly increased latencies, the 
effect was not interactive with variables affecting problem complexity, such as the 
presence or absence of negative components. It is hard, therefore, to interpret the 
slowing of response times in terms of a competing load on the central executive. A 
7 
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(a) 
Group 
The mean latency in seconds for each condition (n = 12 in each group) 
Inference 
Rule MID DA AC MT x 
Control If p then q 6.03 8.30 5.94 7.33 6.90 
If p then not q 6.67 10.00 9.85 8.71 8.81 
B. 58 If not p then q 6.96 9.87 8.28 10.08 8.80 
If not p then not q 7.64 10.01 9.85 11.85 9.84 
Articulation If p then q 4.23 5.70 4.29 6.08 5.07 
If p then not q 5.36 6.95 6.73 5.71 6.19 
6.13 If not p then q 4.83 6.96 5.98 7.94 6.43 
If not p then not q 5.61 7.22 7.41 7.11 6.84 
Memory If p then q 9.39 11.70 9.37 10.26 10.18 
If p then not q 9.29 11.92 11.36 13.22 11.45 
11.62 If not p then q 9.34 13.83 12.83 14.64 12.63 
If not p then not q 9.53 12.67 13.53 13.13 12.22 
07 59 8.77 9.67 
(b) Significant effects in 
d. f. 
the ANOVA 
F P 
Between subjects: 
Groups 2,30 9.66 --0.001 
Within subjects: 
Blocks 1,30 18.51 <0.001 
Rules 1,30 14.97 <0.001 
Inference 1,30 24.89 <0.001 
much more plausible explanation is that subjects did not attempt to solve the 
reasoning tasks until they had said the novel digits several times. Thus, in effect, 
the digits are rehearsed and committed to long-term memory before they attempt the 
problems. Consequently, the lack of increase in logical errors under memory load 
cannot be taken as evidence against the working memory model. It rather points to a 
weakness of the method which does not impose a concurrent load on working memory, as 
intended. This account, however, does not explain the suppression of conclusion bias 
under memory load, discussed later. 
The significant acceleration of response times under straight concurrent 
articulation is hard to reconcile with the Baddeley and Hitch model. In the light of 
experimental evidence, Baddeley (1979) has weakened the claim for the articulatory 
8 
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loop, regarding it as an optional control strategy. For reasons given in the 
introduction his view still seems to imply that it should be helpful to conditional 
reasoning, but the very least he could expect is for it to have no effect. An 
explanation of why suppression of the loop should actually facilitate reasoning 
speed is beyond the scope of the model. 
There are two lines of explanation for the acceleration effect. It could be 
specifically related to speech mechanisms. It is possible that on verbal reasoning 
tasks subjects habitually subvocalize. Certainly, electromyognaphic studies find 
evidence of micromovements and electrical potentials in speech organs during problem 
solving, especially when the problems are complex or novel (see McGuigan, 1966; 
Sokolov, 1972). Such subvocalization might slow down thinking, as it is thought to 
slow reading. Hence concurrent articulation, which prevents subvocalization of the 
problem content, may speed up the thought process. This view implies that, contrary 
to traditional theories of 'inner speech' (cf. McGuigan, 1966), such a process has 
little functional value. (It should, however, be noted that there was a 
non-significant increase in errors in the Articulation group). A second line of 
explanation is that the repetition of an overlearned sequence has a very general 
effect of increasing concentration or level of arousal. The effect may not be 
specifically related to speech at all. However, there is no reason to suppose a 
general facilitatory effect of concurrent articulation on problem solving. Sokolov 
(1972) reviews a number of studies of mental arithmetic under various techniques of 
articulatory suppression. Usually the competing task slowed performance, although an 
acceleration effect for exceptionally skilled and practised subjects sometimes 
occurred. There is also no acceleration of anagram solution speed under concurrent 
articulation in experiments by Peterson (1969) and an unpublished study by the 
present authors. 
An unexpected finding in the frequency analysis was the apparent disappearance 
of the 'negative conclusion bias' under memory load. From previous research we would 
expect the bias to be strongly marked on DA and MT, weak but present in AC, and 
absent on MP, where inference rates are very high on all rules. Inspection of the 
Control group data in Table 2 reveals precisely this pattern. The anomalous results 
in the Memory group are the high rates of affirming DA and AC when the conclusion 
was affirmative (against the bias); MT actually showed the normal trend. Since the 
correctness of DA and AC is ambiguous, depending on how the subject interprets the 
conditional, one cannot say that memory load is necessarily interfering with 
reasoning. The result is also hard to interpret, since reasoning research has not 
established whether conclusion bias reflects a preference for negatives or an 
aversion to affirmatives. Only if the latter were the case could one regard the 
effect of memory load as 'releasing' the subject from the conclusion bias. 
Allport (1980 a, b) has recently attacked the notion of 'general purpose limited 
capacity central processors' of the sort entailed by the Baddeley and Hitch model, 
and also questioned the value of competing task methodology. The present experiment 
lends some support to his views. Certainly the effects of the 'competing task' of 
concurrent articulation seem to be specific to the type of problem content used, and 
the present findings are not encouraging to those wishing to pursue a general- 
purpose concept of working memory. 
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APPENDIX B. 
THE_ANA! 
=Y2. j2 OF_yAR. LAt! CE IABI=95-FOR EXPERIMENT I. 
Significance levels (F PR) for all repeated measures factors 
use conserva tive degrees of freedom (see Edwa rds, 19 67). 
(i)ResDonse Fre_q! Aengies. 
Factors are :G (Groups), S (Sex), I (Inferen ce), C (Conclusion 
Type), B (Bl ocks ). 
Source DF Ss MS VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 4.2315 2.116 0.68 ns 
S 1 1.9456 1.946 0.63 ns 
G. S 2 2.0093 1.005 0.32 ns 
RESID 30 93.1042 3.104 
Within S's. 
1 3 69.9016 23.301 37.65 <. 001 
G. I 6 5.8796 0.980 1.58 ns 
S. I 3 0.7627 0.254 0.41 ns 
G. S. I 6 0.7130 0.119 0.19 ns 
RESID 90 55.7014 0.619 
C 1 7.9734 7.973 20.76 <. 001 
G. C 2 4.2870 2.144 5.58 <. 01 
S. C 1 0.0104 0.010 0.03 ns 
G. S. C 2 0.7500 0.375 0.98 ns 
RESID 30 11.5208 0.384 
B 2 1.1551 0.578 1.11 ns 
G. B 4 1.1019 0.276 0.53 ns 
S. B 2 0.2245 0.112 0.22 ns 
G. S. B 4 2.6019 0.651 1.25 ns 
RESID 60 31.2500 0.521 
I. C 3 10.9942 3.665 10.25 <. OI 
G. I. C 6 1.6759 0.279 0.78 ns 
S. I. C 3 1.2905 0.430 1.20 ns 
G. S. I. C 6 3.1574 0.526 1.47 ns 
RESID 90 32.1736 0.358 
I. B 6 2.0671 0.345 1.58 ns 
G. I. B 12 2.3704 0.198 0.91 ns 
S. I. B 6 2.1088 0.352 1.61 ns 
G. S. I. B 12 3.9259 0.327 1.50 ns 
RESID ISO 39.1944 0.218 
C. B 2 0.0718 0.036 0.14 ns 
G. C. B 4 0.1574 0.039 0.16 ns 
S. C. B 2 0.0486 0.024 0.10 ns 
G. S. C. B 4 0.3SE39 0.097 0.39 ns 
RESID 60 15.1667 0.253 
I. C. B 6 1.1690 0.195 0.79 ns 
G. I. C. B 12 4.2963 0.358 1.45 ns 
S. I. C. B 6 1.3032 0.217 
0. SS ns 
G. S. I. C. B 12 1.6759 0.140 
0.57 ns 
RESID ISO 44.3e89 0.247 
11 
(ii)ResjR2L!. §2_j=Rtencies (loqarithmicallY--. LLanaIRLMed). 
Factors are: G (Groups), S (Sex), I (Inference), R (Rules), B 
(Blocks). 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 23.0176 11.509 9.66 <. 001 
S 1 3.1141 3.114 2.61 ns 
G. S 2 0.1997 0.100 0.08 ns 
RESID 30 35.7423 1.19 
Within S's. 
1 3 4.1325 1.377 24.89 <. 001 
G. 1 6 0.0650 0.011 0.20 ns 
S. I 3 0.0468 0.016 0.28 ns 
G. S. I 6 0.1333 0.022 0.40 ns 
RESID 90 4.9806 0.06 
R 3 1.9476 0.649 14.97 <. 001 
G. R 6 0.3171 0.053 1.22 ns 
S. R 3 0.1088 0.036 0.84 ns 
G. S. R 6 0.2214 0.037 0.85 ns 
RESID 90 3.9041 0.04 
B 2 3.5436 1.772 18.51 <. 001 
G. B 4 0.5883 0.147 1.54 ns 
S. B 2 0.0289 0.014 0.15 ns 
G. S. B 4 0.7295 0.182 1.91 ns 
RESID 60 5.7428 0.10 
I. R 9 0.7S49 0.087 3.11 ns 
G. I. R is 0.1954 0.011 0.39 ns 
S. I. R 9 0.1937 0.022 0.77 ns 
G. S. I. R 18 0.5427 0.030 1.07 ns 
RESID 270 7.5791 0.03 
I. B 6 0.2732 0.046 1.70 ns 
G. I. B 12 0.3171 0.026 0.99 ns 
S. I. B 6 0.2504 0.042 1.56 ns 
G. S. I. B 12 0.5376 0.045 1.68 ns 
RESID ISO 4.8080 0.03 
R. B 6 0.0342 0.006 0.24 ns 
G. R. B 12 0.3351 0.028 1.19 ns 
S. R. B 6 0.2641 0.044 1.88 ns 
G. S. R. B 12 0.1749 0.015 0.62 ns 
RESID ISO 4.2122 0.01-1 
I. R. B Is 0.6451 0.036 1.26 ns 
G. I. R. B 36 0.6518 0.018 0.64 ns 
S. I. R. B is 0.4032 0.022 0.79 ns 
G. S. I. R. B 36 0.8229 0.023 0.80 ns 
RESID 540 15.3704 0.03 
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APPENDIX C. 
THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES FOR EXPERIMENT II. 
Significance levels (F PR) for all repeated measures factors 
use conservative degrees of freedom (see Edwards, 1967). 
(i)Resp2naE_FLft-9! ARncies- 
Factors are: G (Groups), IN (Instance), M (Match i nq Case), B 
(Blocks). 
(a)TT_as_' Con+orms'. 
Source DF - SS ms VR F PR 
Between S' s. 
G 2 1.0139 0.507 3.74 <. 05 
IN 1 0.8403 0.840 6.21 <. 025 
G. IN 2 0.1806 0.090 0.67 ns 
RESID 42 5.6875 0.135 
Within S's. 
m 3 4.9444 1.648 15.80 <. 001 
G. M 6 1.0972 0.183 1.75 ns 
IN. M 3 0.5208 0.174 1.66 ns 
G. IN. M 6 0.1250 0.021 0.20 ns 
RESID 126 13.1458 0.104 
B 2 0.7743 0.387 5.66 <. 025 
G. B 4 0.6944 0.174 2.54 ns 
IN. B 2 0.1701 0.085 1.24 ns 
G. IN. B 4 0.2778 0.069 1.01 -ns 
RESID 84 5.7500 0.068 
M. B 6 0.4201 0.070 0.97 ns 
G. M. B 12 1.5694 0.131 1.81 ns 
IN. M. B 6 0.8021 0.134 1.85 ns 
G. IN. M. B 12 0.7083 0.059 0.82 ns 
RESID 252 18.1667 0.072 
13 
(b)TF as 'Con+licts'. 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 1.7222 0.861 4.82 '1-025 
IN 1 2.1267 2.127 11.89 <. Ol 
G. IN 2 0.8472 0.424 2.37 ns 
RESID 42 7.5104 0.179 
Within S's. 
m 3 7.5330 2.511 16.77 <. 001 
G. M 6 1.1389 0.190 1.27 ns 
IN. M 3 0.6441 0.215 1.43 ns 
G. IN. M 6 0.7361 0.123 0.82 ns 
RESID 126 18.8646 0.150 
B 2 2.0035 1.002 6.56 <. 025 
G. B 4 0.0694 0.017 0.11 ns 
IN. B 2 1.1910 0.596 3.90 ns 
G. IN. B 4 1.0694 0.267 1.75 ns 
RESID 84 12.8333 0.153 
M. B 6 0.4410 0.074 0.72 ns 
G. M. B 12 1.1528 0.096 0.93 ns 
rN. M. B 6 0.2257 0.038 0.37 ns 
G. IN. M. B 12 1.0972 0.091 0.89 ns 
RESID 252 25.9167 0.103 
14 
(c)FT as 'Irrelevant'. 
Source DF Ss ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 7.4618 3.731 3.82 <. 05 
IN 1 0.8403 0.840 0.86 ns 
G. IN 2 2.3993 1.200 1.23 ns 
RESID 42 41.020e 0.977 
Within S's. 
m 3 9.1250 3.042 14.38 <. 001 
G. M 6 2.2604 0.377 1.78 ns 
IN. M 3 0.0347 0.012 0.06 ns 
G. IN. M 6 0.4340 0.072 0.34 ns 
RESID 126 26.6458 0.212 
B 2 2.1910 1.096 7.34 <. Ol 
G. B 4 1.5694 0.392 2.63 ns 
IN. B 2 0.0243 0.012 0.08 ns 
G. IN. B 4 0.6736 0.168 1.13 ns 
RESID 84 12.5417 0.149 
M. B 6 0.4063 0.068 0.54 ns 
G. M. B 12 0.7083 0.059 0.47 ns 
IN. M. B 6 0.6840 0.114 0.91 ns 
G. IN. M. B 12 1.6597 0.138 1.11 ns 
RESID 252 31.5417 0.125 
15 
(d)FF as 'Irrelevant'. 
Source DF Ss ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 7.0868 3.543 3.53 <. 05 
IN 1 1.1736 1.174 1.17 ns 
G. IN 2 1.6285 0.814 0.81 ns 
RESID 42 42.1667 1.004 
Within S's. 
m 3 8.9028 2.968 16.81 <. 001 
G. M 6 2.441 
,0 
0.407 2.30 ns 
IN. M 3 0.4792 0.160 0.90 ns 
G. IN. M 6 0.4271 0.071 0.40 ns 
RESID 126 22.2500 0.177 
B 2 4.1076 2.054 14.74 <. 001 
G. B 4 0.6736 0.168 1.21 ns 
IN. B 2 0.3576 0.179 1.28 ns 
G. IN. B 4 0.1528 0.038 0.27 ns 
RESID 84 11.7083 0.139 
M. B 6 O. E3785 0.146 1.26 ns 
G. M. B 12 3.0903 0.258 2.21 ns 
IN. M. B 6 0.4896 0.082 0.70 ns 
G. IN. M. B 12 1.1667 0.097 0.83 ns 
RESID 252 29.3750 0.117 
16 
(ii )Resj22f! j2_j, 2tencies (. I o_9arithmic aI 1-y transformed). 
(a)Compn2h2nsion Times.. 
Factors are: G (Groups), R (Rules), B (Blocks). 
Logical Case was included as a dummy factor. This did not 
affect the analysis and is not included in the Table. 
Source DF SS MS VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G2 15.3879 7.694 3.95 <. 05 
RESID 45 87.6957 1.949 
Within S's. 
R 3 5.0241 1.675 42.85 <. 001 
G. R 6 0.9041 0.151 3.86 <. 05 
RESID 135 5.2768 0.039 
B 2 1.4770 0.738 6.88 <. 025 
G. B 4 0.0911 0.023 0.21 ns 
RESID 90 9.6535 0.107 
R. B 6 0.3158 0.053 2.19 ns 
G. R. B 12 0.2128 0.018 0.74 ns 
RESID 270 6.5341 0.02 
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(b)Verification Times. 
Factors are: G (Groups), IN (Instance), LC (Logical Case), R 
(Rules), B( Blocks). 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 7.6798 3.840 4.50 -1.025 
IN 1 1.1138 1.114 1.30 ns 
G. IN 2 0.1682 0.084 0.10 ns 
RESID 42 35.8680 0.85 
Within S's. 
LC 3 6.7867 2.262 39.46 <. 001 
G. LC 6 1.6026 0.267 4.66 <. 025 
IN. LC 3 0.1224 0.041 0.71 ns 
G. IN. LC 6 0.1911 0.032 0.56 ns 
RESID 126 7.2230 0.06 
R -7 9.8287 3.276 68.25 <. 001 
G. R 6 0.5684 0.095 1.97 ns 
IN. R 3 0.0999 0.033 0.69 ns 
G. IN. R 6 0.3417 0.057 1.19 ns 
RESID 126 6.0482 0.05 
B 2 9.1642 4.582 58.16 <. 001 
G. B 4 0.3017 0.075 0.96 ns 
IN. B 2 0.0548 0.027 0.35 ns 
G. IN. B 4 0.3441 0.086 1.09 ns 
RESID 84 6.6174 0.08 
LC. R 9 1.6172 0.180 3.05 ns 
G. LC. R Is 1.1402 0.063 1.07 ns 
IN. LC. R 9 0.7498 0.083 1.41 ns 
G. IN. LC. R is 0.6583 0.037 0.62 ns 
RESID 378 22.2922 0.06 
LC. B 6 0.3254 0.054 1.31 ns 
G. LC. B 12 0.5535 0.046 1.11 ns 
IN. LC. B 6 0.1825 0.030 0.73 ns 
G. IN. LC. B 12 0.4668 0.039 0.94 ns 
RESID 252 10.4619 0.04 
R. B 6 0.2297 0.038 1.04 ns 
G. R. B 12 0.9044 0.075 2.05 ns 
IN. R. B 6 0.2479 0.041 1.12 ns 
G. IN. R. B 12 0.3861 0.032 0.87 ns 
RESID 252 9.2846 0.04 
LC. R. B 18 0.5407 0.030 0.84 ns 
G. LC. R. B 36 1.5691 0.044 1.21 ns 
IN. LC. R. B Is 0.6293 0.035 0.97 ns 
G. IN. LC. R. B 36 1.8552 0.052 1.44 ns 
RESID 756 27.1367 0.04 
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APPENDIX D. 
THE STIMULUS WORDS USED IN EXPERIMENTS III AND V. 
(i) Classified by the colour of the ink in which they were 
printed: 
Ink Colour 
Red Blue Yellow* Green 
Pram Joe Goat Brain 
Doe Throat Train Sam 
Tram Flo Stoat Vein 
Jane Ram Toe Boat 
*Gold in Experiment V. 
(ii) Classified by their rhyminc3 characteristics: 
Rhyme With 
Feign Gramme Glow Vote 
Brain Pram Doe Throat 
Vein Ram Flo Goat 
Train Tram Joe Stoat 
Jane Sam Toe Boat 
(iii) Classified by their semantic category: 
Christian Part of 
Name the Body 
Jane Throat 
Joe Toe 
Flo Brain 
Sam Vein 
Means o+ Type o+ 
Transport Animal 
Pram Doe 
Tram Ram 
Train Goat 
Boat Stoat 
19 
APPENDIX E. 
THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES FOR EXPERIMENT III, 
Significance levels (F PR) for all repeated measures factors 
use conserva tive degrees of freedom (see Edwards, 1967). 
(i) ResDonse_ FrR-qLJenS. IRI.: - 
Factors are: G (Groups), M (Matching Case), C (Conditions). 
(a)TT_as 'Co nforms'. 
Source DF SS MS VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 0.5046 0.252 0.55 ns 
RESID 33 15.2639 0.463 
Within S's. 
m 3 2.7500 0.917 
G. M 6 0.6806 0.113 
RESID 99 10.5695 0.107 
c 2 0.0185 0.009 
G. C 4 1.0787 0.270 
RESID 66 6.2631 0.094 
M. C 6 0.5000 0.083 
G. M. C 12 1.0694 0.089 
RESID 198 14.4306 0.073 
8.59 <. Ol 
1.06 ns 
0.10 ns 
2.85 ns 
1.14 ns 
1.22 ns 
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(b)TF_, as 'Conflicts'. 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 0.0880 0.044 0.12 ns 
RESID 33 12.1528 0.368 
Within S' s. 
m 3 1.7963 0.599 2.93 ns 
G. M 6 0.4676 0.078 0.38 ns 
RESID 99 20.2361 0.204 
C 2 0.2407 0.120 1.00 ns 
G. C 4 1.1204 0.280 2.32 ns 
RESID 66 7.9722 0.121 
M. C 6 1.4259 0.238 2.02 ns 
G. M. C 12 1.2685 0.106 0.90 ns 
RESID 198 23.3056 0.118 
21 
(c)FT as 'Irrelevant'. 
Source DF Ss ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 3.8519 1.926 1.95 ns 
RESID 33 32.5278 0.986 
Within S's. 
m 3 4.6019 1.534 8.78 
G. M 6 1.2593 0.210 1.20 ns 
RESID 99 17.3056 0.175 
C 2 0.5602 0.1-180 1.14 ns 
G. C 4 0.5093 0.127 0.52 ns 
RESID 66 16.2639 0.246 
M. C 6 0.7176 0.120 1.00 ns 
G. M. C 12 1.0463 0.087 0.73 ns 
RESID 198 23.5695 0.119 
22 
(d)FF_as 'Irrelevant'. 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 3.9074 1.954 1.76 ns 
RESID 33 36.7292 1.113 
Within S's. 
m 3 3.3588 1.120 5.90 <. 025 
G. M 6 0.4259 0.071 0.37 ns 
RESID 99 18.7986 0.190. 
C 2 0.7269 0.363 1.50 ns 
G. C 4 0.3982 0.100 0.41 ns 
RESID 66 16.0417 0.243 
M. C 6 0.8843 0.147 1.22 ns 
G. M. C 12 1.2685 0.106 0.87 ns 
RESID 198 24.0139 0.121 
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(ii)ResDonse_Latencies_(lo_gA. CithmicallZ_traflaformed). 
(a)ComDrehension Times. 
Factors are: G (Groups), R (Rules), C (Conditions). 
Logical Case was included as a dummy factor. This did not 
affect the analysis and is not included in the Table. 
Source DF Ss Ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G24.1427 2.071 1.96 ns 
RESID 33 34.7928 1.05 
Within S's. 
R 3 0.3743 0.125 4.95 <. 05 
G. R 6 0.5398 0.090 3.57 <. 05 
RESID 99 2.4941 0.03 
c 2 2.5850 1.292 11.59 <. Ol 
G. C 4 0.1117 0.028 0.25 ns 
RESID 66 7.3618 0.11 
R. C 6 0.1063 0.018 0.68 ns 
G. R. C 12 0.2150 0.018 0.69 ns 
RESID 198 5.1769 0.03 
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(b)Verification Times. 
Factors are: G (Groups), LC (Logical Case), R (Rules), C 
(Conditions) . 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 3.3207 1.660 0.88 ns 
RESID 33 62.4911 1.89 
Within S's. 
LC 3 4.9331 1.644 19.13 <. 001 
G. LC 6 1.1394 0.190 2.21 ns 
RESID 99 8.5116 0.09 
R 3 3.4747 1.158 22.72 <. 001 
G. R 6 0.2690 0.045 0.88 ns 
RESID 99 5.0471 0.05 
C 2 3.4196 1.710 13.24 <. 01 
G. C 4 1.0385 0.260 2.01 ns 
RESID 66 8.5261 0.13 
LC. R 9 0.8517 0.095 2.29 ns 
G. LC. R is 0.9149 0.051 1.23 ns 
RESID 297 12.2834 0.04 
LC. C 6 0.4750 0.079 1.83 ns 
G. LC. C 12 0.4146 0.035 0.80 ns 
RESID 198 8.5672 0.04 
R. C 6 0.2515 0.042 1.26 ns 
G. R. C 12 0.7505 0.063 1.88 ns 
RESID 198 6.5735 0.03 
LC. R. C 18 1.6553 0.092 2.73 ns 
G. LC. R. C 36 0.9401 0.026 0.78 ns 
RESID 594 19.9960 0.03 
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APPENDIX F. 
THE STIMULUS MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT IV. 
(i) Letters 
(ii) Words 
R A z K 
x v u F 
G H c m 
L s y 0 
Rose Coal Girl Door 
Book Wall Path King 
Lake Ship Fish Neck 
Hill Moon Tree Bird 
26 
THE ANALYSIS OF 
APPENDIX G. 
VARIANCE TABLES FOR EXPERIMENT IV. 
Significance levels (F PR) for all repeated measures factors 
use conserva tive degrees of freedo m (see Edwards, 196 7). 
(i)Res22al2_ L, ýtencies (. loqarithmic allZ t. Eanýformed). 
Factors are: G (Groups), LW (Lette rs/Words), T (Truth Value), V 
(Sentence Vo ice), P (Polarity). 
Source DF SS Ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
_ 
G 2 1.6660 0.833 4.73 <. 025 
RESID 21 3.6953 0.18 
Within S's. 
LW 1 0.0613 0.061 2.33 ns 
G. LW 2 0.0069 0.003 0.13 ns 
RESID 21 0.5522 0.03 
T 1 0.0408 0.041 3.16 ns 
G. T 2 0.0140 0.007 0.54 ns 
RESID 21 0.2708 0.01 
V 1 0.1876 0.188 16.82 <. 001 
G. V 2 0.0131 0.007 0.59 ns 
RESID 21 0.2342 0.01 
P 1 2.3090 2.309 158.07 <. 001 
G. P 2 0.1807 0.090 6.18 ZI. 01 
RESID 21 0.3067 0.01 
LW. T 1 0.0000 0.000 0.00 ns 
G. LW. T 2 0.0030 0.001 0.12 ns 
RESID 21 8.2637 0.01 
LW. V 1 0.0103 0.010 1.53 ns 
G. LW. V 2 0.0068 0.003 0.51 ns 
RESID 21 0.1405 0.01 
LW. P 1 0.0024 0.002 0.17 ns 
G. LW. P 2 0.0005 0.000 0.02 ns 
RESID 21 0.2997 0.01 
T. V 1 0.0009 0.001 0.15 ns 
G. T. V 2 0.0087 0.004 0.69 ns 
RESID 21 0.1324 0.01 
T. P 1 0.1294 0.129 12.35 <. 01 
G. T. P 2 0.0083 0.004 0.40 ns 
RESID 21 0.2201 0.01 
V. P 1 0.1622 0.162 10.75 <. 01 
G. V. P 2 0.0316 0.016 1.05 ns 
RESID 21 0.3170 0.02 
LW. T. V 1 0.0068 0.007 0.51 ns 
G. LW. T. V 2 0.0023 0.001 0.09 ns 
RESID 21 0.2308 0.01 
27 
LW. T. P 1 0.0070 0.007 0.61 ns 
G. LW. T. P 2 0.0054 0.003 0.23 ns 
RESID 21 0.2426 0.01 
LW. V. P 1 0.0057 0.006 0.47 ns 
G. LW. V. P 2 0.0028 0.001 0.11 ns 
RESID 21 0.2591 0.01 
T. V. P 1 0.0042 0.004 0.39 ns 
G. T. V. P 2 0.0823 0.041 3.77 <. 05 
RESID 21 0.2291 0.01 
LW. T. V. P 1 0.0008 0.001 0.09 ns 
G. LW. T. V. P 2 0.0290 0.015 1.55 ns 
RESID 21 0.1960 0.01 
28 
(ii)Response_FrE_qu2nEies. 
Factors are: G (Groups), LW (Letters/Words), T (Truth Value), V 
(Sentence Voice), P (Polarity). 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 0.8763 0.438 2.27 ns 
RESID 21 4.0605 0.19 
Within S's. 
LW 1 0.0007 0.001 0.01 ns 
G. LW 2 0.2201 0.110 ns 
RESID 21 1.9199 0.09 
T 1 0.0163 0.016 0.13 ns 
G. T 2 0.3685 0.184 1.51 ns 
RESID 21 2.5684 0.12 
v 1 0.5475 0.548 9.33 11.01 
G. V 2 0.1732 0.087 1.48 ns 
RESID 21 1.2-324 0.06 
p 1 1.2038 1.204 18.84 <. 001 
G. P 2 0.1576 0.079 1.23 ns 
RESID 21 1.3418 0.06 
LW. T 1 0.1100 0.110 1.46 ns 
G. LW. T 2 0.0091 0.005 0.06 ns 
RESID 21 1.5840 0.08 
LW. V 1 0.1882 0.188 2.51 ns 
G. LW. V 2 0.4388 0.219 2.92 ns 
RESID 21 1.5762 0.08 
LW. P 1 0.0059 0.006 0.10 ns 
G. LW. P 2 0.0742 0.037 0.62 ns 
RESID 21 1.2480 0.06 
T. v 1 0.1465 0.146 4.65 <. 05 
G. T. V 2 0.0820 0.041 1.30 ns 
RESID 21 0.6621 0.03 
T. P 1 0.8913 0.891 7.66 <. 025 
G. T. P 2 0.0560 0.028 0.24 ns 
RESID 21 2.4434 0.12 
V. P 1 0.0007 0.001 0.02 ns 
G. V. P 2 0.1419 0.071 1.99 ns 
RESID 21 0.7480 0.04 
LW. T. V 1 0.0007 0.001 0.01 ns 
G. LW. T. V 2 0.0091 0.005 0.08 ns 
RESID 21 1.2559 0.06 
LW. T. P 1 0.0319 0.032 0.79 ns 
G. LW. T. P 2 0.0091 0.005 0.11 ns 
RESID 21 0.8496 0.04 
29 
LW. V. P 1 0.0007 0.001 0.01 
G. LW. V. P 2 0.0013 0.001 0.01 
RESID 21 1.6387 0.08 
T. V. P 1 0.0788 0.079 1.67 
G. T. V. P 2 0.0091 0.005 0.10 
RESID 21 0.9902 0.05 
LW. T. V. P 1 0.0007 0.001 0.01 
G. LW. T. V. P 2 0.3529 0.176 2.75 
RESID 21 1.3496 0.06 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
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APPENDIX H. 
THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES FOR EXPERIMENT V. 
Significance levels (F PR) for all repeated measures factors 
use conservative degrees of freedom (see Edwards, 1967). 
(i)Respgn22_! =atencies 
(. lc3_ga. rithmicall,,, 
-trans+. 
ormed). 
Factors are: G (Groups), C (Conditions), T (Truth Value), V 
(Sentence Voi ce)q P (Polarity). 
Source DF SS MS VR F PR 
R2tjjeRn_S's. 
G 2 0.5448 0.272 0.60 ns 
RESID 33 14.9916 0.45 
Within S's. 
C 3 9.1128 3.038 88.67 <. 001 
G. C 6 0.1134 0.019 0.55 ns 
RESID 99 3.3913 0.03 
T 1 0.0054 0.005 0.38 ns 
G. T 2 0.0201 0.010 0.70 ns 
RESID 33 0.4749 0.01 
V 1 0.2328 0.233 21.62 <. 001 
G. V 2 0.0116 0.006 0.54 ns 
RESID 33 0.3553 0.01 
P 1 3.7359 3.736 151.63 <. 001 
G. P 2 0.2386 0.119 4.84 <. 025 
RESID 33 0.8130 0.02 
C. T 3 0.0453 0.015 1.32 ns 
G. C. T 6 0.1387 0.023 2.01 ns 
RESID 99 1.1373 0.01 
C. V 3 0.2574 0.086 7.01 -1.025 
G. C. V 6 0.0874 0.015 1.19 ns 
RESID 99 1.2116 0.01 
C. P 3 0.0734 0.024 2.01 ns 
G. C. P 6 0.0852 0.014 1.16 ns 
RESID 99 1.2078 0.01 
T. V 1 0.0000 0.000 0.00 ns 
G. T. V 2 0.0055 0.003 0.29 ns 
RESID 33 0.3082 0.01 
T. P 1 0.1378 0.138 12.84 <. 01 
G. T. P 2 0.0069 0.003 0.32 ns 
RESID 33 0.3542 0.01 
V. P 1 0.0034 0.003 0.33 ns 
G. V. P 2 0.0567 0.028 2.72 ns 
RESID 33 0.3439 0.01 
C. T. V 3 0.0695 0.023 2.56 ns 
G. C. T. V 6 0.0526 0.009 0.9-17 ns 
RESID 99 0.8970 0.01 
31 
C. T. P 3 0.0446 0.015 2.01 
G. C. T. P 6 0.0657 0.011 1.48 
RESID 99 0.7335 0.01 
C. V. P 3 0.1246 0.042 3.58 
G. C. V. P 6 0.0419 0.007 0.60 
RESID 99 1.1488 0.01 
T. V. P 1 0.0389 0.039 2.89 
G. T. V. P 2 0.0167 0.008 0.62 
RESID 33 0.4450 0.01 
C. T. V. P 3 0.0745 0.025 2.21 
G. C. T. V. P 6 0.0810 0.013 1.20 
RESID 99 1.1121 0.01 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
(ii)Respcnse_Fr2_qut. n2ies. 
Factors are: G (Groups), C (Conditions), T (Truth Value), V 
(Sentence Vo ice), P (Polarity). 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
G 2 315.4080 157.704 4.98 <. 025 
RESID 33 1044.1406 31.64 
Within S's. 
C 3 57.1181 19.039 1.77 ns 
G. C 6 22.4392 3.740 0.35 ns 
RESID 99 1062.6302 10.73 
T 1 68.0556 68.056 5.63 <. 025 
G. T 2 37.8038 18.902 1.56 ns 
RESID 33 398.8281 12.09 
V 1 100.3472 100.347 11.51 <. 01 
G. V 2 7.3351 3.668 0.42 ns 
RESID 33 287.6302 8.72 
P 1 145.91-01 145.920 13.86 <. 001 
G. P 2 17.4913 8.746 0.83 ns 
RESID 33 347.5260 10.53 
C. T 3 6.42-16 2.141 0.32 ns 
G. C. T 6 40.3212 6.720 1.00 ns 
RESID 99 667.3177 6.74 
C. V 3 7.8125 2.604 0.44 ns 
G. C. V 6 42.3177 7.053 1.19 ns 
RESID 99 585.8073 5.92 
C. P 3 20.9201 6.973 1.37 ns 
G. C. P 6 57.8559 9.643 1.89 ns 
RESID 99 504.0365 . 5.09 
T. V 1 0.3472 0.347 0.06 ns 
G. T. V 2 6.8142 3.407 0.63 ns 
RESID 33 178.7760 5.42 
T. P 1 83.4201 . 83.420 
9.80 <. 01 
G. T. P 2 24.7830 12.391 1.46 ns 
RESID 33 280.8594 8.51 
V. P 1 7.0313 7.031 1.27 ns 
G. V. P 2 2.4740 1.237 0.22 ns 
RESID 33 182.6823 5.54 
C. T. V 3 47.0486 15.683 2.53 ns 
G. C. T. V 6 313.8108 5.635 0.91 ns 
RESID 99 614.4531 6.21 
C. T. P 3 5.9896 1.997 0.26 ns 
G. C. T. P 6 70.7031 11.784 1.55 ns 
RESID 99 752.9948 7.61 
33 
C. V. P 3 13.2813 4.427 0.95 
G. C. V. P 6 15.2344 2.539 0.55 
RESID 99 460.5469 4.65 
T. V. P 1 0.0868 0.087 0.01 
G. T. V. P 2 5.2517 2.626 0.34 
RESID 3Z 252.4740 7.65 
C. T. V. P 3 5.2951 1.765 0.33 
G. C. T. V. P 6 80.5122 13.419 2.47 
RESID 99 537.6302 5.43 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
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APPENDIX I. 
THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES FOR EXPERIMENT VI. 
Significance levels (F PR) for all repeated measures factors 
use conservative degrees of freedom (see Edwards, 1967). 
(i)ResDonse_Freauencies. 
Factors are: G (Groups), IN (In stance), 0 (Feature Order in 
Rule), M (Matching Case). 
(a)TT as 'Conforms'. 
Source DF SS MS VR F PR 
Between S's. 
IN 2 0.2569 0.129 0.74 ns 
G10.0556 0.056 0.32 ns 
IN. G 2 0.1319 0.066 0.38 ns 
RESID 30 5.2083 0.174 
Within S's. 
0 1 0.0556 0.056 0.40 ns 
IN. 0 2 0.0486 0.024 0.17 ns 
G. 0 1 0.0139 0.014 0.10 ns 
IN. G. 0 2 0.1736 0.087 0.62 ns 
RESID 30 4.2083 0.140 
m 3 3.8472 1.282 11.79 <. Ol 
IN. M 6 0.9653 0.161 1.48 ns 
G. M 3 0.1389 0.046 0.43 ns 
IN. G. M 6 0.2569 0.043 0.39 ns 
RESID 90 9.7917 0.109 
O. M 3 0.4167 0.139 1.03 ns 
IN. O. M 6 0.7292 0.122 0.90 ns 
G. O. M 3 0.0139 0.005 0.03 ns 
IN. G. O. M 6 0.2153 0.036 0.27 ns 
RESID 90 12.1250 0.17>5 
35 
(b)TF as 'Conflicts' 
Source DF Ss ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
IN 2 2.5833 1.292 10.11 <. 001 
G 1 0.3472 0.347 2.72 ns 
IN. G 2 0.1111 0.056 0.44 ns 
RESID 30 3.8333 0.128 
Within S's. 
0 1 0.1250 0.125 1.29 ns 
IN. 0 2 0.0833 0.042 0.43 ns 
G. 0 1 0.0139 0.014 0.14 ns 
IN. G. 0 2 0.3611 0.181 1.86 ns 
RESID 30 2.9167 0.097 
m 3 8.4583 2.819 16.55 -1.001 
IN. M 6 1.5833 0.264 1.55 ns 
G. M 3 0.9028 0.301 1.77 ns 
IN. G. M 6 1.7222 0.287 1.69 ns 
RESID 90 15.3333 0.170 
O. M 3 0.4028 0.134 1.22 ns 
IN. O. M 6 0.8056 0.134 1.22 ns 
G. O. M 3 0.8472 0.282 2.56 ns 
IN. G. O. M 6 0.5278 0.088 0.80 ns 
RESID 90 9.9167 0.110 
36 
(c)FT as 'Irrelevant'. 
Source DF Ss ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
IN 2 0.0625 0.031 0.07 ns 
G 1 0.1250 0.125 0.29 ns 
IN. G 2 1.2708 0.635 1.49 ns 
RESID 30 12.7917 0.426 
Within S's. 
0 1 0.3472 0.347 5.32 11.05 
IN. 0 2 0.1319 0.066 1.01 ns 
0.0 1 0.0556 0.056 0.85 ns 
IN. G. 0 2 0.2569 0.128 1.97 ns 
RESID 30 1.9583 0.065 
m 3 18.4722 6.157 41.43 <. 001 
IN. M 6 1.4653 0.244 1.64 ns 
G. M 3 0.0694 0.023 0.16 ns 
IN. G. M 6 0.8681 0.145 0.97 ns 
RESID 90 13.3750 0.149 
O. M 3 0.2917 0.097 1.41 ns 
IN. O. M 6 0.5625 0.094 1.36 ns 
G. O. M 3 0.4722 0.157 2.28 ns 
IN. G. O. M 6 0.7153 0.119 1.73 ns 
RESID 90 6.2083 0.069 
37 
(d)EE-ia-'Irrelevant'. 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
IN 2 0.3403 0.170 0.37 ns 
G 1 0.4201 0.420 0.92 ns 
IN. G 2 5.2986 2.649 5.79 <. Ol 
RESID 30 13.7292 0.458 
Within S's. 
0 1- 0.1701 0.170 1.58 ns 
IN. 0 2 0.0486 0.024 0.23 ns 
G. 0 1 0.0313 0.031 0.29 ns 
IN. G. 0 2 0.1458 0.073 0.68 ns 
RESID 30 3.2292 0.108 
m -7 14.5104 4.837 42.04 <. 001 
IN. M 6 2.4375 0.406 3.53 <. 05 
G. M 3 0.2049 0.068 0.59 ns 
IN. G. M 6 1.3681 0.228 1.98 ns 
RESID 90 10.3542 0.115 
O. M 3 1.0660 0.355 2.95 ns 
IN. O. M 6 1.0069 0.168 1.39 ns 
G. O. M 3 0.1493 0.050 0.41 ns 
IN. G. O. M 6 0.7986 0.133 1.10 ns 
RESID 90 10.8542 0.121 
38 
(ii)ResI22. ný2_ý: atencies (. loaýgnithmically transformed). 
(a)Comorehension Times. 
Factors are: G (Groups), 0 (Feature Order in Rule), R (Rules). 
Logical Case was included as a dumm- y factor. This did not 
affect the analysis -and is not included in the Table. 
Source DF Ss ms VR F PR 
Between S's.. 
G10.0246 0.025 0.04 ns 
RESID 34 19.0037 0.559 
Within S's. 
R3 
G. R -7 
RESID 102 
0 
G. 0 
RESID 
R. 0 
G. R. 0 
RESID 
34 
3 
3 
102 
2.7822 
0.0629 
3.1823 
0.0145 
0.0114 
1.3274 
0.0300 
0.0161 
1.6170 
0.927 
0.021 
0.031 
0.015 
0.011 
0.039 
0.010 
0.005 
0.016 
29.71 <. 001 
0.67 ns 
0.38 ns 
0.28 ns 
0.63 ns 
0.32 ns 
39 
(b)Veri+ication Times. 
Factors are: G (Groups), IN (Instance), LC (Logical Case), R 
(Rules), 0 (Feature Order in Rule). 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
IN 2 1.4973 0.749 1.16 ns 
G 1 1.1134 1.113 1.72 ns 
IN. G 2 0.2659 0.133 0.21 ns 
RESID 30 19.4036 0.65 
Within S's. 
LC 3 3.6452 1.215 24.73 <. 001 
IN. LC 6 0.0730 0.012 0.25 ns 
G. LC 3 0.4264 0.142 2.89 ns 
IN. G. LC 6 0.2817 0.047 0.96 ns 
RESID 90 4.4222 0.05 
R 3 2.3095 0.770 20.32 <. 001 
IN. R 6 0.1838 0.031 0.81 ns 
G. R 3 0.0272 0.009 0.24 ns 
IN. G. R 6 0.1926 0.032 0.85 ns 
RESID 90 3.4106 0.04 
0 1 0.0667 0.067 0.69 ns 
IN. 0 2 0.1334 0.067 0.69 ns 
G. 0 1 0.0097 0.010 0.10 ns 
IN. G. 0 2 0.0154 0.008 0.08 ns 
RESID 30 2.9024 0.10 
LC. R 9 1.6496 0.183 6.91 -1.025 
IN. LC. R is 0.4264 0.024 0.89 ns 
G. LC. R 9 0.2820 0.031 1.18 ns 
IN. G. LC. R is 0.3390 0.019 0.71 ns 
RESID 270 7.1619 0.03 
LC. 0 3 0.0651 0.022 0.73 ns 
IN. LC. 0 6 0.2227 0.037 1.25 ns 
G. LC. 0 3 0.0906 0.030 1.02 ns 
IN. G. LC. 0 6 0.0328 0.005 0.18 ns 
RESID 90 2.6758 0.03 
R. 0 3 0.0253 0.008 0.34 ns 
IN. R. 0 6 0.3804 0.063 2.58 ns 
G. R. 0 3 0.0251 0.008 0.34 ns 
IN. G. R. 0 6 0.2883 0.048 1.96 ns 
RESID 90 2.2078 0.02 
LC. R. 0 9 0.4975 0.055 2.23 ns 
IN. LC. R. 0 is 0.3047 0.017 0.68 ns 
G. LC. R. 0 9 0.1119 0.012 0.50 ns 
IN. G. LC. R. 0 IS 0.5702 0.032 1.28 ns 
RESID 270 6.6968 0.02 
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APPENDIX J. 
THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES FOR EXPERIMENT VII. 
Significance levels (F PR) for all repeated measures factors 
use conservative degrees of freedom (see Edwards, 1967). 
(i)Res22na2_FLequ2. ncies. 
Factors are: IN (Instance), M (Matching Case), B (Blocks). 
(a)TT_as 'Conforms'. 
Source DF SS MS VR F PR 
Between S's. 
IN 2 1.9740 0.987 5.01 <. 025 
RESID 45 8.3594 0.197 
Within S's. 
m 3 7.5000 2.500 19.27 <. 001 
IN. M 6 0.9844 0.164 1.26 ns 
RESID 135 17.5156 0.130 
B 1 0.0000 0.000 0.00 ns 
IN. B 2 0.1406 0.070 1.34 ns 
RESID 45 2.3594 0.052 
M. B 3 0.0833 0.028 0.48 ns 
IN. M. B 6 0.5260 0.088 1.50 ns 
RESID 135 7.8906 0.058 
41 
(b)TF_, as 'Conflicts'. 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
IN 2 0.3281 0.164 0.75 ns 
RESID 45 9.7969 0.218 
Within S' s. 
m 3 5.1458 1.715 13.32 <. 001 
IN. M 6 0.9635 0.161 1.25 ns 
RESID 135 17.3906 0.129 
B 1 0.0104 0.010 0.14 ns 
IN. B 2 0.0677 0.034 0.45 ns 
RESID 45 3.4219 0.076 
M. B 3 0.5521 0.184 1.95 ns 
IN. M. B 6 0.1823 0.030 0.32 ns 
RESID 135 12.7656 0.095 
42 
(c)FT as 'Irrelevant' 
Source DF SS ms VR F PR 
Retween S's. 
rN 2 0.2708 0.135 0.22 ns 
REsrD 45 27.4688 0.610 
Within S's. 
m 3 22.3854 7.462 45.59 <. 001 
rN. M 6 1.2708 0.212 1.29 ns 
REsrD 135 22.0938 0.164 
B 1 0.0938 0.094 1.00 ns 
rN. B 2 0.4375 0.219. 2.33 ns 
REsrD 45 4.2188 0.094 
M. B 3 0.2604 0.087 1.09 ns 
IN. M-B 6 0.2708 0.045 0.57 ns 
REsrD 135 10.7188 0.079 
43 
(d)FF as 'Irrelevant'. 
Source DF 
Between S's. 
IN 2 
RESID 45 
Within S's. 
m 3 
IN. M 6 
RESID 1-35 
B 1 
IN. B 2 
RESID 45 
M. B 3 
IN. M. B 6 
RESID 135 
ss ms VR F PR 
0.8177 0.409 0.64 ns 
28.9297 0.643 
12.5703 4.190 21.93 <. 001 
2.0156 0.336 1.76 ns 
25.7891 0.191 
0.4401 0.440 2.45 ns 
0.0990 0.050 0.28 ns 
8.0859 0.180 
0.0495 0.017 0.15 n-- 
0.9427 0.157 1.43 ns 
14.8928 0.110 
44 
(ii)Res2gf! RR_j=atencies (. 1(3_qjLithmicajjj trans+c3rmed). 
Factors are: IN (Instance), LC (Logical Case), R (Rules), B 
(Blocks). 
Source DF Ss ms VR F PR 
Between S's. 
IN 2 3.9098 1.955 2.71 ns 
RESID 45 32.4742 0.722 
Within S's. 
LC 3 6.1288 2.043 36.83 <. 001 
IN. LC 6 0.6186 0.103 1.86 ns 
RESID 135 7.4877 0.055 
R 3 7.2183 2.406 79.71 <. 001 
IN. R 6 0.2201 0.037 1.22 ns 
RESID 135 4.0749 0.030 
B 1 2.0630 2.063 36.44 <. 001 
IN. B 2 0.3295 0.165 2.91 ns 
RESID 45 2.5475 0.057 
LC. R 9 1.4554 0.162 6.77 <. 025 
IN. LC. R Is 0.4446 0.025 1.04 ns 
RESID 405 9.6694 0.024 
LC. B 3 0.0273 0.009 0.31 ns 
IN. LC. B 6 0.2633 0.044 1.51 ns 
RESID 135 3.9373 0.029 
R. B 3 0.0388 0.013 0.68 ns 
IN. R. B 6 0.1896 0.032 1.67 ns 
RESID 135 2.5581 0.019 
LC. R. B 9 0.1176 0.013 0.60 ns 
IN. LC. R. B 18 0.3690 0.021 0.94 ns 
RESID 405 8.7971 0.022 
45 
